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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Nicolas Wayne Thompson 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Imagining the Fed: Central Bank Structure and United States Monetary 
Governance (1913-1968) 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the institutional development and policy performance 
of the Federal Reserve System from 1913-1968. Whereas existing scholarship assumes 
Federal Reserve institutions have remained static since 1913, this project demonstrates 
that the Federal Reserve was a site of extensive institutional experimentation across its 
first half century of operations. The 1913 Federal Reserve Act created thirteen 
autonomous agencies without offering guidance regarding how these units should 
function as a coherent system. The extent to which this institutional jumble congealed 
into a central bank-like organization has fluctuated over time. Institutional changes were 
driven by external shocks and shaped by an ongoing internal debate about normative 
systemic governance. Some agents called for greater institutional centralization to 
increase the system’s strategic capacity. Others drew upon shared liberal ideals to defend 
the system’s decentralized governance traditions. These debates resulted in frequent 
reconstitutions of the policymaking regime. This dissertation argues the Fed’s 
temporally-specific institutional configurations were consequential for United States 
monetary and exchange rate policies. During periods of relatively centralized Federal 
Reserve governance, internationally-oriented agents wielded control over the system’s 
 v 
 
policymaking levers to help stabilize the dollar’s exchange rate. During periods of 
institutional fragmentation, by contrast, monetary policies grew increasingly rigid, 
promoting dollar instability. Consequently, the structure of American central banking 
institutions has important implications for both the domestic and international political 
economies. This project suggests that insights from the positive study of institutions 
should be applied to the design of central banking institutions. Although institutional 
fragmentation can check arbitrary power, it likewise can paralyze the policymaking 
process and undermine the formation and steady pursuit of long-term strategic goals.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: POWER, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS, AND 
CURRENCY LEADERSHIP  
We shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, 
not as it might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon; and step 
by step we shall make it what it should be... 
President Woodrow Wilson, Inaugural Address, 1913 
 The dollar is our currency, but it’s your problem. 
            Treasury Secretary John Connally, G-10 Meeting, 1971 
America’s constitutional traditions have potential pitfalls, but saying so won’t 
make you popular. Constitutional restraints on government are widely celebrated as the 
wellsprings of American democracy. In a country where politicians rally support by 
wielding copies of the Constitution, checks and balances, separated powers, and 
federalism, reign supreme. There is a darker side to U.S. constitutionalism, however. The 
same political divisions which prevent the enthronement of a tyrant likewise slow policy 
adjustments and erode national strategic capacity. As national power is fragmented and 
dispersed throughout polity and society, government’s ability to decide upon and pursue 
national goals is limited.1 Nearly two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville warned that 
America’s democracy was “decidedly inferior” in the foreign policy realm and 
susceptible to “abandon[ing] a mature design for the gratification of a momentary 
                                                 
1 Samuel Huntington derided the U.S. as a “Tudor polity,” arguing that the Constitution’s crafters, in their 
haste of to prevent the rise of an absolute monarch, built a decentralized political order incapable of 
governing. Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale 
University Press: 68. 
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passion.”2 By fragmenting foreign policy authority across the executive and legislative 
branches, the Constitution created “an invitation to struggle” over national strategic 
priorities.3 As the U.S.’s unrivaled economic success vaulted it onto the world stage in 
the twentieth century, its fragmented foreign policymaking processes developed into a 
governance dilemma that Theodore Lowi has called “Woodrow Wilson’s Problem in 
Reverse.”4 Given the hegemonic pull of the U.S. economy, other states have long looked 
to the U.S. for international leadership.5 Instead of engaging a coherent state actor, 
however, foreigners are confronted with “an extension of domestic processes, practices, 
and values.”6  The Janus-faced nature of fragmented U.S. political processes means that 
foreigners and Americans alike are often frustrated in their attempts to steer the U.S. 
government on a steady strategic course sustaining a coherent foreign policy mix.  
The governance dilemma Lowi highlights is rooted in the American practice of 
using constitutional restraints to suppress and disperse power at the domestic level. 
Fragmenting devices functioned adequately in the antebellum era when societal wealth 
and power were dispersed widely. As national wealth grew and concentrated rapidly after 
the Civil War, however, America’s fractured governing institutions proved incapable of 
suppressing societal power. Reluctantly, in response to economic development, 
                                                 
2 Toqueville, Alexis de. [1835] 1990. Democracy in America: Volume 1. New York: Vintage Books: 235. 
 
3 Corwin, Edwin. 1975. The President, Office and Powers, 1787-1957: History and Analysis of Practice 
and Opinion. New York: New York University Press: 171. 
 
4 Lowi, Theodore J. 1967. “Making Democracy Safe for the World,” In Domestic Sources of Foreign 
Policy, ed. James N. Rosenau. New York: The Free Press, 301– 302. 
 
5 Kindleberger, Charles. 1973. The World in Depression, 1929-1939. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
 
6 Lowi 1967. 
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Americans began building bureaucratic agencies.7 To navigate their collective “dread” of 
central state authority, however, Americans drew from the constitutional order around 
them to design agencies with decentralized federal structures and fragmented authority.8 
Since bureaucracies were designed to solve specific problems at discrete moments in 
time, Americans haphazardly layered new institutional orders atop of old.9 As the 
American state grew, institutional fragmentation increased, expanding the scope of 
conflict over national priorities, and further reducing state strategic capacity.10 
The trend toward increasing fragmentation has not been secular, however. 
National crises, such as the march to war, trigger consolidations of governing authority 
within the American state. When it is agreed that crisis conditions require urgent policy 
responses, agents withdraw fragmented claims to governing authority. As state power 
concentrates, presidents are empowered to make swift decisions based on their 
perceptions of the national interest.11 A president’s grasp on state power quickly erodes 
after crises pass, however. As excluded agents re-invoke claims to governing authority, 
                                                 
7 Skowronek, Stephen. 1982. Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative 
Capacities, 1877-1920. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
8 Morone, James A. 1991. The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American 
Government. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
9 Orren, Karen and Stephen Skowronek. 1994. “Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a New 
Institutionalism.” In The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations, eds., Lawrence 
C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson. Boulder: Westview Press, 311-30. 
 
10 Lowi (1967, 314) notes, “Fragmentation and conflict perpetuate themselves in separated agencies, each 
with statutory integrity, none enjoying many rights to intervene in the processes of others… seriously 
impair[ing] efforts to put these instruments to the service of political strategies.” 
 
11 Lowi 1967; Zakaria, Fareed. 1999. From Wealth to Power: the Unusual Origins of America's World 
Role. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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the polity re-fragments. As Lowi laments, the return of fragmented governance leads to 
strategic conflict and declining foreign policy coherence. 
In the wake of the twentieth century’s two world wars, U.S. presidents embarked 
on grand international order-building initiatives to re-establish a liberal international 
economy and make American power appear less threatening abroad.12 Their ability to 
bind the U.S. to international regimes was limited, however, by constitutional 
requirements that the Senate ratify international treaties. Consequently, the U.S. didn’t 
join the League of Nations after WWI and the post-WWII attempt to construct an 
International Trade Organization was stillborn. Even when U.S. politicians surmount 
constitutional barriers and commit the U.S. to join international organizations, they are 
unable to prevent subsequent policymakers from exploiting the U.S.’s powerful position 
inside them. Thus, the U.S. is both a “system maker” and a “privilege taker.”13  
At the core of Lowi’s governance dilemma is an American pathology. Most 
Americans hold incoherent institutional and policy preferences. They celebrate their 
political institutions, and the constitutional traditions which inform them, while 
consistently lamenting the policy outcomes their institutions produce. Americans 
regularly bemoan Washington’s gridlock, but few advocate fundamental reforms to the 
U.S.’s governing institutions. Most would agree with former Federal Reserve Board 
Chairman William McChesney Martin’s sentiment that “…an institution will in the last 
analysis render good or bad public service depending upon the abilities of the human 
                                                 
12 Ikenberry, G. John. 2000. After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
after Major Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
13 Mastanduno, Michael. 2009. “System Maker and Privilege Taker: U.S. Power and the International 
Political Economy.” World Politics 61 (1): 121-154. 
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beings engaged in its operation rather than upon its organizational form and 
structure…”14 Instead of rationalizing their fragmented governing institutions, Americans 
prefer to exercise their democratic prerogatives by voting politicians out of office. While 
the faces in Washington regularly change, collective disappointment over policy 
outcomes does not.  
This dissertation explores this institutional dilemma from the vantage of U.S. 
monetary and exchange rate policy. Today, these are considered separate issue areas 
delineated by a neat institutional division-of-labor.15 The Federal Reserve System, 
America’s central bank, is charged with charting domestic monetary policy (interest rate 
policy), while the Treasury presides over international monetary policy (exchange rate 
policy). This dissertation’s empirical chapters demonstrate that this institutional division-
of-labor was not cemented prior to the U.S.’s de facto abandonment of dollar 
convertibility into gold in 1968, however. From the Federal Reserve’s 1914 origin 
through the final days of Bretton Woods, central bankers collaborated with, and 
competed against, U.S. Treasury officials to shape national currency policies. Central 
bankers played pivotal roles in stabilizing the interwar gold exchange standard and the 
Bretton Woods fixed exchange regime. Their ability to promote currency stability was 
limited, however, by the institutional structures they inhabited as well as external policies 
beyond their control. As will be demonstrated in this study’s empirical chapters, 
                                                 
14 Congress. Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Subcommittee on General Credit Control and Debt 
Management. 1952. 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 11 March, 5. 
 
15 Destler, Irving M. and C. Randall Henning. 1989. Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the 
United States. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics; Henning, C. Randall. 
1994. Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Washington, D.C.: Peterson 
Institute. 
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however, the Fed’s central bankers have suffered from the same pathology of misaligned 
institutional and policy preferences that plagues U.S. society broadly. Time and again, 
internal governance struggles have resulted in the casting off of hierarchical 
policymaking institutions in favor of more fragmented processes. I argue that 
participatory processes have repeatedly undermined the system’s policy goals. 
Since the 1970s, the U.S. has adopted a floating exchange rate regime. From a 
social welfare perspective, the floating dollar standard likely benefits a majority of 
Americans. In a large economy where domestic commerce dwarfs international 
transactions, most citizens benefit from the domestic monetary policy autonomy afforded 
by exchange rate flexibility.16 Contemporary economists also generally argue that fixed 
exchange rate systems do not promote international trade and social welfare.17 Earlier 
generations of scholars and practitioners firmly believed, however, that stable exchange 
rates lubricated international trade and investment.18 A minority of contemporary 
economists argue that the U.S. should attach greater priority to promoting exchange rate 
stability due to the dollar’s central role in the global economy.19 
                                                 
16 From the perspective of the macroeconomic trilemma, in a world of high capital mobility, states are 
forced to choose between exchange rate stability and domestic monetary policy autonomy. For a 
theorization of the societal distributional implications of this choice, see Frieden, Jeffry. 1991.  “Invested 
Interests: the Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance." International 
Organization 45 (4): 425-451. Recent scholarship has argued that even in states with small domestic 
markets, the median citizen prefers monetary policy autonomy over exchange rate stability. See, for 
example, Bearce, David H. and Mark Hallerberg. 2011. "Democracy and de facto Exchange Rate 
Regimes." Economics & Politics 23 (2): 172-194. 
 
17 For example, see Bacchetta, Philippe, and Eric Van Wincoop. 2000. “Does Exchange-Rate Stability 
Increase Trade and Welfare?” American Economic Review 90 (December): 1093-1109. 
 
18 For example, see Nurkse, Ragnar. 1944. International Currency Experience: Lessons of the Interwar 
Period. No. 4. Geneva: League of Nations. 
 
19 For example, see McKinnon, Ronald I. 2013. The Unloved Dollar Standard: From Bretton Woods to the 
Rise of China. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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This project is agnostic regarding the desirability of fixed exchange rate systems. 
Rather, exchange rate policy is explored as an arena where international and domestic 
politics collide to evaluate my broader argument regarding the institutional determinants 
of strategic capacity. At the conclusion of each of the twentieth century’s world wars, key 
U.S. leaders recognized the re-establishment of fixed exchange regimes as a strategic 
priority. Many considered stable exchange rates a prerequisite for restoring a prosperous, 
liberal, international economy. Declaring an exchange rate parity and implementing the 
policies necessary to sustain it are two different beasts, however. After World War One, 
the U.S. was the only state to quickly re-establish its currency’s convertibility into gold. 
It failed to support this external commitment with dollar-stabilizing policies, however. 
Instead, the U.S. implemented austere macroeconomic policies and trade protectionism 
which exported deflationary pressures abroad and promoted dollar undervaluation. 
Consequently, John Maynard Keynes derided the early 1920s international monetary 
regime as “A dollar standard… set upon the pedestal of the golden calf.”20  
For better or for worse, the world has lived in an era of international dollar 
leadership since WWI.21 The U.S.’s explosive growth in relative economic power during 
the war was evidenced by its rapid transition from a net debtor country to the world’s 
foremost creditor and its concentration of global monetary gold reserves. Since Keynes’ 
                                                 
20 Keynes, John Maynard. 1923. A Tract on Monetary Reform. London: Macmillan. 
 
21 Barry Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau (2012) have argued that the Federal Reserve System’s market-
making actions helped buoy the dollar to international currency status during WWI, earlier than is 
conventionally understood. Alternatively, Silber (2007) has argued the Treasury Secretary’s 1914 closure 
of the New York Stock Exchange supported the U.S.’s rise to monetary supremacy. See Eichengreen, Barry 
and Marc Flandreau. 2012. “The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Rise of the Dollar as an 
International Currency, 1914–1939.” Open Economies Review 23 (1): 57-87; Silber, William L. 2007. 
When Washington Shut Down Wall Street: The Great Financial Crisis of 1914 and the Origins of 
America's Monetary Supremacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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early critique, successive generations of scholars have criticized the U.S. for destabilizing 
the international monetary regime. 22 The frequency with which the U.S. has disrupted 
international monetary relations makes it appear as though it is an inherently-poor 
currency leader. This is hardly surprising. The number of citizens who benefit from a 
flexible exchange rate far surpass those who prefer the discipline of external stability. 
Given the lopsided nature of this distributional struggle, it is truly remarkable that U.S. 
policymakers ever succeeded in stabilizing fixed exchange rate systems. Nevertheless, for 
periods during both the interwar period and Bretton Woods, the U.S. did manage to 
absorb international adjustment costs and stabilize fixed exchange rate regimes.  
The Institutional Sources of Currency Leadership 
Scholars since Charles Kindleberger have argued that economically dominant 
states have a responsibility to stabilize the international economy. Kindleberger provided 
a demanding list of international leadership functions which needed to be performed by 
“one stabilizer,” including: maintaining an open market for distressed goods, supplying 
steady capital exports, providing international lender-of-last resort facilities, managing a 
fixed exchange rate system, and coordinating domestic monetary policies.23 Subsequent 
scholars have refined Kindleberger’s stabilizing functions and parsed them across 
                                                 
22 For example, see Kindleberger 1973; Block, Fred L. 1977. The Origins of International Economic 
Disorder: a Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present. 
Berkeley: University of California Press; Henning, C. Randall. 1998. “Systemic Conflict and Regional 
Monetary Integration: The Case of Europe." International Organization 52 (3): 537-573. 
 
23 Kindleberger 1973, 292. Lake (1993) has argued that Kindleberger’s five functions can be subsumed 
within the three functions of providing: an international vehicle currency, sufficient global liquidity, and an 
international property rights regime. Lake, David A. 1993. “Leadership, Hegemony, and the International 
Economy: Naked Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?” International Studies Quarterly 37 (4): 
459-489. 
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discrete policy areas. One strand of this literature focuses on the political economy and 
sources of international currency leadership.  
The benefits and costs of currency leadership are straightforward. The main 
benefits include seigniorage revenue for the state and denomination rents for society’s 
international financiers.24 Because currency leaders can settle international transactions in 
their domestic currency, and foreigners are willing to hold that currency as an asset, 
currency leaders can easily finance external deficits and are not forced to stockpile 
foreign reserves. The costs of currency leadership mirror its benefits. Because reserve 
currencies are used as a medium of exchange and a store of value, foreigners have a stake 
in ensuring reserve currency stability. Consequently, currency leaders must take into 
account follower states’ preferences when charting macroeconomic policies. If follower 
states decide a leader’s policies are reckless, they can threaten to liquidate their stockpiles 
of that reserve currency and thereby push adjustment costs onto the currency leader.25 
The literature on the sources of international currency leadership focuses on 
economic structural considerations and domestic policies and institutions. There are three 
key economic determinants of currency leadership: confidence, liquidity, and 
transactional networks.26 Market participants prefer a reserve currency which they 
                                                 
24 James, Harold. 1996. International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods. New York: Oxford 
University Press: 152; Broz, J. Lawrence. 1997. The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press: 55-85; Toniolo, Gianni. 2005. Central Bank Cooperation at the Bank for 
International Settlements, 1930-1973. New York: Cambridge University Press: 352. 
 
25 For an analysis of the politics of currency followership, see Pauly, Louis W. 2006. “Monetary Statecraft 
in Follower States.” In International Monetary Power, ed. David M. Andrews. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 184-207. 
 
26 Helleiner, Eric. 2008. “Political Determinants of International Currencies: What Future for the US 
Dollar?" Review of International Political Economy 15 (3): 354-378. 
 
 10 
 
 
believe will retain its value, will remain readily available, and will be accepted by others. 
These structural sources provide strong incumbency advantages, introducing a high 
degree of path-dependence into the international monetary regime.27 Scholars also argue 
that would-be currency leaders’ domestic policies shape market participants’ reserve 
currency decisions. Scholars have also specified domestic prerequisites for international 
currency leadership. These include institutionally-embedded commitments to relatively 
conservative monetary policies and deep and liquid financial markets.28 One means of 
cultivating these domestic conditions is by delegating monetary policy discretion to an 
independent central bank.29 In the early twentieth century U.S., international financiers 
demanded that a central bank be established to manage the gold standard, cultivate 
domestic financial markets, and issue an internationalizable currency.30 Before the 
Federal Reserve Act was even passed by Congress in 1913, however, the leaders of this 
elite social movement recognized that the proposed reform would create too fragmented 
of a central banking system to achieve their domestic and international objectives.31 
                                                 
27 This leads some scholars to argue that only one reserve currency can achieve a global status at any given 
point in time. See, for example, Cohen, Benjamin J. 2004. The Future of Money. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 
  
28 Broz 1997, 9; Walter, Andrew. 2006. “Domestic Sources of International Monetary Leadership,” In 
International Monetary Power, ed. David M. Andrews. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006: 51-71. 
   
29 Central bank independence remains the workhorse institutional approach to analyzing central bank 
behavior. This literature suggests a positive relationship exists between central banks’ level of autonomy 
when forging monetary policy decisions and price stability outcomes. For an overview of this broad 
literature, see Stanley Fischer, "Central-bank Independence Revisited." The American Economic 
Review (1995): 201-206. 
 
30 Broz 1997; Eichengreen, Barry. 2011. Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the 
Future of the International Monetary System. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
31 Warburg, Paul M. 1913. “The Owen-Glass Bill as Submitted to the Democratic Caucus: Some Criticisms 
and Suggestions.” The North American Review 198 (695): 527-555. 
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This dissertation argues that benign and coercive currency leadership are 
distinguishable empirically and relatively centralized political institutions are better 
suited for promoting benign currency leadership. I suggest that the alignment of currency 
leaders’ de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes provides a useful metric for 
evaluating the nature of their leadership. When currency leaders adopt a currency peg, 
they can promote international monetary stability by enacting policies which align their 
currency’s legal and market values. According to this definition, benign currency 
leadership entails provision of a steady currency anchor for fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Contrastingly, when currency leaders on fixed regimes allow their real exchange rates to 
diverge widely from their nominal values, they export destabilizing shocks. A similar 
logic applies when currency leaders adopt flexible exchange rates. Under a floating 
regime, currency leaders are freed from external constraints in determining their 
economic policies. Currency leaders might be tempted to leverage their powerful position 
to pressure other states to make exchange rate adjustments. In the modern era of floating 
exchange rates, U.S. officials have occasionally pressured other states to appreciate their 
currencies to fight dollar overvaluation, a coercive behavior described by one analyst as 
an “exchange rate weapon.”32 
In short, states exercise benign currency leadership by sheathing their monetary 
power (see Figure 1). Benjamin Cohen has identified two ways in which states exercise 
international monetary power, by delaying the absorption of international adjustment 
                                                 
32 Henning, C. Randall. 2006. “The Exchange Rate Weapon and Macroeconomic Conflict.” In 
International Monetary Power, ed. David M. Andrews. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 117-138. 
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costs and shifting those costs onto their trading partners.33 Since currency leaders have 
the “exorbitant privilege” of settling international payments in their domestic currency, 
they can persistently live beyond their means.34 This makes it easy to forego needed 
policy adjustments which would entail distributing adjustment costs domestically. 
Currency leaders which absorb international adjustment costs exercise more benign forms 
of currency leadership. By contrast, leaders that refuse to absorb adjustment costs 
exercise more coercive forms of currency leadership and destabilize fixed exchange rate 
regimes.  
Figure 1: Varieties of Currency Leadership 
  Leadership Style 
  Benign Coercive 
R
eg
im
e 
Fixed 
Absorb international adjustment 
costs; Enact policies which 
promote real exchange rate 
stability 
Delay and deflect international 
adjustment costs Ignore 
divergences between real and 
nominal exchange rate 
Floating 
Provide sufficient international 
liquidity; Accept market-
determined exchange rate level; 
Tolerate external pegs 
Delay and deflect international 
adjustment costs; Use 
"exchange rate weapon" to 
pressure other states 
 
 In a highly fragmented country like the U.S., distributing adjustment costs 
domestically can be a difficult process. Decisions over fiscal and trade policies are 
governed by protracted institutional processes which require both legislative and 
executive branch approval. Those policy instruments adjust slowly and only sometimes in 
response to changing economic conditions. In the U.S.’s veto player filled political 
system, the one institution which can seemingly make quick and decisive policy 
                                                 
33 Cohen, Benjamin. 2006. “The Macrofoundations of Monetary Power.” In International Monetary Power, 
ed. David M. Andrews. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006: 31-50. 
 
34 Toniolo 2005, 352. 
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adjustments is the nation’s central bank.35 The Democrats who crafted the Federal 
Reserve Act disdained central banks, however, and consequently sought to create a 
decentralized institutional alternative. The extent to which the Fed’s fragmented 
institutions have congealed into a central bank-like structure has varied dramatically over 
time. In some periods, it has resembled a centralized “Fed” capable of implementing 
swift policy adjustments. In others, it has had fragmented processes which make rapid 
policy adjustments difficult. This dissertation argues that since WWI, transitions between 
centralized and fragmented Federal Reserve governance have contributed to 
deteriorations in dollar stability and U.S. currency leadership. 
Research Design and Chapter Outline 
 This dissertation generalizes an institutional hypothesis advanced in Milton 
Friedman and Anna Schwartz’s seminal A Monetary History of the United States.36 
Friedman and Schwartz famously blamed the Federal Reserve’s monetary policies for the 
duration and severity of the Great Depression. They argue that a 1930 increase in the 
Federal Reserve’s fragmentation contributed to its subsequent misguided policies. The 
next chapter develops an institutional theory of central bank structures which explains 
how institutional fragmentation promotes monetary policy rigidity and undermines 
currency stability. It also explores the tensions of sustaining a U.S. central bank. It argues 
                                                 
35 Tsebelis, George. 1995. “Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism.” British Journal of Political Science 25 (3): 289-
325. 
 
36 Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-
1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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that wartime crises promote central bank development, but after crises pass internal 
governance struggles increase central bank fragmentation. 
 Unlike Friedman and Schwartz who evaluate Federal Reserve policies from a 
domestic lens, this project locates Federal Reserve policy debates within broader 
struggles in the international monetary realm. It weaves together segmented debates 
among international political economists and financial historians regarding the 
determinants of fixed exchange rate systems and the Federal Reserve System’s historic 
policy triumphs and failures. Following Friedman and Schwartz, it adopts a narrative 
approach for evaluating monetary phenomena.37 One consequence of the Federal 
Reserve’s foundational fragmentation was that a wide array of the system’s early officials 
claimed a right to weigh in on policy decisions. Due to the limited state of 
macroeconomic knowledge, however, these agents held wildly diverging understandings 
of the proper means and ends of monetary policy. From the system’s origin, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) officials began developing an internationally-
oriented policy framework based on their understandings of the European central banking 
experience which was more coherent than those held by many of their colleagues. In 
monetary policy debates drawn from across the system’s first half century of operations, 
FRBNY representatives squared off against other system officials and pushed for policies 
to promote dollar stability. Their ability to win these debates was often shaped by the 
system’s degree of institutional fragmentation.  
                                                 
37 This approach is extended in Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer. 1989. “Does Monetary Policy 
Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz." NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Volume 4. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 121-184. 
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 To evaluate these claims, I adopt a historical institutional approach to analyze 
both the sources and consequences of institutional change within the Federal Reserve 
System. Many historical institutionalist scholars argue that the passage of time leads to 
increasing institutional stability and consider exogenous shocks the primary drivers of 
institutional change.38 Following in the tradition of American political development 
scholars, however, this dissertation focuses on unsettled governance debates as the 
sources of institutional change.39 The project pays little analytic attention to the 
legislative development of the Federal Reserve Act after 1913. Instead, it traces how 
governance debates unfolded inside the Fed to reshape its policymaking regime. 
Although the shock of war repeatedly led to institutional centralizations, these 
consolidations of authority did not prove durable. After the system’s operational 
independence was restored, the system’s internal power struggle resurfaced and led to 
institutional fragmentation. Even central bankers with strong policy preferences couldn’t 
resist the allure of participatory decision-making processes. Like Americans broadly, 
these central bankers revered institutions incapable of delivering their policy goals. 
 This dissertation’s empirical core consists of three chapters. The first chapter 
enters into debates surrounding the Federal Reserve’s origin. It offers a novel 
interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act’s legislative enactment rooted in the demands of 
partisan coalition-building. Since Democrats desired to achieve the functional benefits of 
                                                 
38 For an example of this approach applied to the Federal Reserve System, see Corder, Kevin. 1998. 
Central Bank Autonomy: The Federal Reserve System in American Politics. New York: Garland 
Publishing. 
 
39 It is undertaken in the spirit of Orren and Skowronek’s (1994, 321) call to “investigate, head on, the 
contingent temporal alignments and simultaneous movement of relatively independent institutional 
orderings that riddle political action.” 
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a central bank without the hierarchical form, they looked to the constitutional order 
around them to build a fragmented alternative. Unsurprisingly, would-be central bankers 
were not pleased with this design and continued trying to reshape the system long after it 
began operations in 1914. 
 The second and third empirical chapters explore the outbreak of power struggles 
inside the system after regaining operational independence following major wars which 
resulted in major transformations of the system’s policymaking regime. The second 
chapter explores the Federal Reserve’s role in the construction, stabilization, and demise 
of the interwar gold exchange standard. It argues that the creation of a compact monetary 
policymaking committee in the early 1920s enabled the system to help stabilize the dollar 
despite the U.S. state’s commitment to mercantilism. This committee’s subsequent 
fragmentation was a proximate cause of the Federal Reserve’s lackluster policy responses 
during the Great Depression. Although New York’s central bankers called for 
expansionary policies to halt the global deflationary slide, they were hamstrung by 
fragmented procedures which empowered voices urging caution. 
The final empirical chapter explores the Federal Reserve’s role in “patching up” 
Bretton Woods during the 1960s. In that decade, the system took on a resurgent 
diplomatic role and collaborated with European central bankers to build new financial 
architecture to stabilize the fixed exchange rate regime. The system’s leaders of this 
international movement pushed for complementary restrictions of U.S. monetary policy 
in defense of the dollar. They were frustrated in their attempts to implement monetary 
austerity, however, by increasing ideological polarization and a fragmented decision-
 17 
 
 
making processes. Had the system retained its hierarchical institutions inherited from its 
wartime capture, it likely would have tightened policy earlier in the sixties and helped 
prolong Bretton Woods.   
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CHAPTER II 
AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF U.S. MONETARY 
GOVERNANCE  
Central bank architecture matters. This chapter develops an institutional theory of 
American monetary policy which explains why and how changes in the structure of U.S. 
central banking institutions have impacted the U.S.’s ability to stabilize the dollar’s 
exchange rate. Scholars have analyzed the political economy of a wide range of 
institutions but have thus far overlooked the impact of central bank decision-making 
structures on monetary outcomes.40 I identify central bank structures as varying across a 
continuum from highly centralized to extremely fragmented. Fragmented central banks 
are less likely to change monetary policies than their centralized counterparts. To support 
currency stability, however, central banks require a degree of policy flexibility. 
Therefore, fragmented central banks are ill-equipped to support currency stability. 
Consequently, domestic reforms which reshape central bank architectures can 
significantly impact both the domestic and international political economies. 
This theoretical chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I unpack 
the relationships among central bank structures, monetary policy outcomes, and fixed 
exchange rates. In the second section, I theorize an historical pattern of recurring 
centralizations and dispersions of US central banking authority and link it to episodic US 
attempts to stabilize the dollar. The prosecution of wars leads to consolidations of US 
                                                 
40 e.g. democracies versus dictatorships, proportional representation versus single member plurality 
electoral systems, independent versus dependent central banks. 
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national financial authority, but war-induced central bank building fails to sustain itself 
after crises pass. Since 1914, this macro-historical pattern has unfolded within the 
institutional confines of the Federal Reserve System. After regaining operational 
independence following WWI and WWII, latent governance debates reemerged within 
the Fed which gradually increased its fragmentation. These institutional changes 
disempowered the Fed’s internationally-oriented agents and decreased the institution’s 
capacity to make decisive policy adjustments. Over time, rigid monetary policies came 
into conflict with fixed exchange rate objectives. Changes in US central bank architecture 
led to dollar instability, which destabilized the international monetary regime.    
Central Bank Architecture and Monetary Governance 
Monetary and exchange rate policy depends in large part on the structure of the 
central bank. One important way that this structure varies is in terms of 
centralization/fragmentation. To illustrate why, imagine a central bank controlled by a 
single central banker. In such an institution, the decision maker is free to adjust monetary 
policies however she sees fit. If the central banker holds a publicly-known preference for 
conservative monetary policies, her hawkish reputation will enhance the central bank’s 
credibility, enabling it to sustain low inflation rates.41 By contrast, consider a hypothetical 
central bank where monetary policy decisions must be approved by 100 central bankers. 
In such an institution, policy preferences diverge and inflation hawks and doves will 
                                                 
41 This point is developed in Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an 
Intermediate Monetary Target." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 (4): 1169-1189. If the central 
banker is a benevolent social planner rather than an inflation-hawk, monetary policy is likely to suffer from 
time inconsistency problems leading to higher than socially-optimal levels of inflation.  See Kydland, Finn 
E. and Edward C. Prescott. 1977. “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans.” The 
Journal of Political Economy 85 (3): 473-491. 
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often disagree about the direction and extent of desired policy changes. In this highly 
fragmented central bank, policy changes are likely to be infrequent and incremental. 
Since the distribution of preferences within this body are more representative of society’s 
than in a central bank controlled by a conservative central banker, individual agents’ 
reputations are unlikely to enhance central bank credibility.42   
Central bank fragmentation forms institutional barriers which can slow or prevent 
policy changes. As monetary policymaking bodies grow less centralized, factions of 
inflation hawks and doves are more likely to form. Though these factions lack the formal 
organization of political parties, they similarly force policy bargains to be made, 
decreasing the likelihood and narrowing the scope of potential policy changes.43  
Hypothesis 1: Higher degrees of central bank fragmentation reduce the likelihood of 
monetary policy changes. 
 Rigid monetary policies can undermine exchange rate stability in three ways: 1) 
by fueling fundamental exchange rate misalignment, 2) by limiting monetary authorities’ 
ability to react to sudden market developments, and 3) by limiting their ability to 
influence international capital flows. Each of these mechanisms undermines exchange 
                                                 
42 The credibility-enhancing advantages of a “conservative” central banker derive from the known 
divergence between his monetary policy preferences and those of society and any potential government. 
Clark, William R. and Vincent Arel‐Bundock. 2013. “Independent but not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in 
Monetary Policy at the Fed.” Economics & Politics 25 (1): 1-26. 
    
43 Tsebelis (1995, 302) refers to such actors as partisan veto players. If one of the factions holds a large 
majority within the chamber, and the preferences of that faction are fairly homogenous, then the influence 
of the minority faction over policy decisions is slight. However, as the strength of the minority faction and 
the heterogeneity of preferences inside factions increases, the minority faction has greater leverage to block 
or influence policy changes. 
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rate stability by shifting market participants’ investment calculus and inviting currency 
speculation.  
When states fix their exchange rate, they declare a parity stating the external value 
of their currency in terms of other currencies or a commodity such as gold. Such 
declarations aren’t credible in the absence of supportive policies, however. If capital 
holders believe that a government doesn’t have the will or capacity to defend a declared 
parity, they have incentives to speculate against the currency.44 To make exchange rate 
commitments credible, governments and central banks adjust macroeconomic policies to 
prevent the currency’s foreign exchange market value from diverging from its declared 
parity. If states maintain a more expansionary (restrictive) macroeconomic policy mix 
than other members of a fixed exchange rate system, their inflation rates will likely 
surpass (fall below) those prevailing elsewhere, causing progressive exchange rate 
overvaluation (undervaluation). States can adjust macroeconomic policies to increase or 
restrain aggregate demand, thereby influencing domestic inflation rates, to realign a 
currency’s declared and market values.  
Due to the political nature of the fiscal policymaking process and significant lags 
in budgetary cycles, however, the burden of macroeconomic adjustment often falls onto 
monetary authorities in the short-run. As argued above, however, certain types of central 
bank structures constrain central bankers’ abilities to adjust monetary policies in defense 
                                                 
44 Second-generation currency crisis models assume that speculators’ decisions to attack a currency are 
driven by assessments of the future course of government policy. In these models, declining 
macroeconomic fundamental conditions (e.g. low stocks of foreign reserves, relatively high inflation rates, 
exchange rate overvaluation) increase the likelihood of a speculative attack. These attacks only occur, 
however, when market participants become convinced that governments and central banks won’t take 
corrective measures to defend the currency. For example, see Obstfeld, Maurice. 1996. “Models of 
Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features.” European Economic Review 40 (3): 1037-1047. 
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of a fixed exchange rate. When agents who prioritize currency stability control central 
banks, they are able to adjust interest rates to promote domestic macroeconomic 
adjustment, and by extension, exchange rate stability. By contrast, fragmented central 
banks are less likely to change monetary policies in response to growing exchange rate 
misalignment. Maintenance of unchanging interest rate policies in the face of mounting 
fiscal shocks or balance-of-payment disturbances can fuel inflationary (deflationary) 
pressures, which are underlying causes of exchange rate misalignment.45 If market 
participants come to believe the authorities are unwilling or incapable of forming 
coherent policy responses to fundamental economic problems, they have incentives to 
speculate against the currency and shift their investments abroad. 
In addition to supporting real exchange rate misalignment, rigid monetary policies 
also limit central bankers’ abilities to respond to sudden financial disturbances such as 
banking panics or asset price bubbles (collapses). If monetary authorities fail to respond 
to these financial shocks in a manner market participants consider prudent, they are likely 
to cascade into larger problems such as banking crises or full-blown currency crises. 
Once again, central bankers’ non-reactions to adverse financial developments erode 
investor confidence and invite currency speculation.     
Finally, fragmented central bank structures limit central bankers’ abilities to 
influence global capital flows. In a world of internationally-mobile capital and fixed 
exchange rates, central banks must formulate monetary policies with an eye toward 
                                                 
45 In his assessment of the US political business cycle literature, Allan Drazen (2001) argues that many 
postwar inflationary monetary expansions in the US have resulted from monetary authorities keeping 
interest rates stable in the face of electorally-motivated fiscal expansions. See Drazen, Allan. 2001. “The 
Political Business Cycle after 25 Years.” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15. Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 75-138. 
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global market conditions.46 If interest rates rise or fall internationally while domestic 
rates remain constant, interest rate arbitrage opportunities arise. If domestic interest rates 
are lower (higher) than those prevailing elsewhere, investors have incentives to move 
mobile capital abroad (into the country).47 Such capital movements can deplete the 
domestic or global stock of monetary reserves, which is a proximate cause of speculative 
currency attacks.48 Central banks which retain flexibility can raise or lower domestic 
interest rates to influence the direction of international capital flows. 
Hypothesis 2: Fragmented central banks undermine exchange rate stability. 
 This section has argued that the stakes are high in central bank design. Formative 
decisions regarding the number of agents influencing monetary policy decisions impact 
the likelihood of policy changes, which in turn affects currency stability. The next section 
theorizes recurring cycles of fragmentation and centralization of U.S. central banking 
institutions and links them to the US’s episodic attempts to stabilize the dollar.   
                                                 
46 This trade-off is recognized as the macroeconomic trilemma. States are only able to pursue two of three 
macroeconomic objectives simultaneously: fixed exchange rates, international capital mobility, and 
domestic monetary policy autonomy. In the modern world of high capital mobility, states’ options are 
reduced to a choice between exchange rate stability and domestic monetary autonomy. For example, see 
Fleming, J. Marcus. 1962. “Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and under Floating Exchange 
Rates.” Staff Papers-International Monetary Fund: 369-380. 
 
47 Henning (1998) argues from an open economy macroeconomic perspective that when “large” states 
maintain expansionary monetary policies, it encourages domestic capital holders to move their mobile 
capital abroad. The inverse is also true and can be equally destabilizing for fixed exchange rate systems. If 
domestic interest rates are higher than those prevailing abroad, capital holders will move their mobile 
capital to the domestic market to attain higher rates of return. These capital flows can promote real 
exchange rate misalignment, deplete foreign monetary authorities’ reserves, and invite speculation against 
their currencies.  
 
48 Frankel and Saravelos (2012) analyze the findings of 83 studies and find that foreign reserve levels and 
real exchange rate overvaluation are the two most important determinants of financial crises. Frankel, 
Jeffrey and George Saravelos. 2012. “Can Leading Indicators Assess Country Vulnerability? Evidence 
from the 2008–09 Global Financial Crisis.” Journal of International Economics 87 (2): 216-231. Obstfeld 
(1996) agrees that large stocks of reserves dissuade speculative currency attacks. 
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Cycles of Central Bank Fragmentation in the United States 
Americans have long been ambivalent regarding the role of central banking 
institutions in governing the U.S. political economy. This section theorizes an historical 
pattern of U.S. central banking institutions cycling through phases of relative 
centralization and fragmentation. It identifies war as a centripetal force which centralizes 
national financial authority. Once wartime crises pass, however, liberal political ideals 
are reasserted to decentralize financial authority. Inside the Federal Reserve System, 
postwar governance debates gradually reshape the system’s decision-making structure by 
increasing its fragmentation. 
War as a Universal Central Bank Builder 
The prosecution of wars places extreme demands on state resources. The fiscal 
channel is one of the primary mechanisms through which war “makes” states.49 American 
Political Development scholars have argued that wars have been a catalyst for increasing 
central state capabilities, developing new taxation instruments, and reshaping domestic 
politics.50 Despite rapid fiscal innovations, however, the US has never financed a major 
war through current revenues alone.51 The U.S. supplements tax revenues by issuing 
                                                 
49 Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
50 Bensel, Richard. 1990. Yankee Leviathan: the Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877. 
New York: Cambridge University Press; Katznelson, Ira and Martin Shefter, eds. 2002. Shaped by War and 
Trade: International Influences on American Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University Press; 
Mayhew, David. 2005. “Wars and American Politics.” Perspectives on Politics 3 (3): 473-493; 
Pollack, Sheldon D. 2009. War, Revenue, and State Building: Financing the Development of the American 
State. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Saldin, Robert P. 2010. War, the American State, and Politics since 
1898. New York: Cambridge University Press; Sparrow, Bartholomew H. 2014. From the Outside in: 
World War II and the American State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
51 Johnson, Simon and James Kwak. 2012. White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National 
Debt, and Why It Matters to You. New York: Pantheon Books. 
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bonds and printing money. Its ability to do both is enhanced by delegation of monetary 
authority to a central bank.  
Wars catalyze central bank formation in three ways. First, growing fiscal demands 
lead state agents to delegate public monetary authorities to central banks to lower the 
state’s nominal borrowing costs.52 Second, economic disruption and capital flight 
redistributes banking reserves across borders and within countries.53 Third, war-inspired 
expansions of government securities markets increase the scope for discretionary postwar 
monetary policy actions. Since central banks can influence domestic interest rates by 
buying and selling securities, larger stocks of outstanding government debt increase 
central banks’ opportunities to influence interest rates.  
Hypothesis 3: War catalyzes centralizations of national financial authority. 
Central Banks as Illiberal Institutions 
 Americans share a broad consensus on fundamental political values described as 
“the American Creed.” These values are antistatist and “delegitimate any hierarchical, 
coercive, authoritarian structures, including American ones.”54 After crises pass, 
Americans invoke shared political values to dismantle war-inspired hierarchies. The 
polity shifts from an executive-centered crisis state to its fragmented constitutional 
                                                 
52 Central banks do this by improving the state’s creditworthiness and by providing a source of seigniorage 
revenue. See, respectively, Broz, J. Lawrence. 1998. “The Origins of Central Banking: Solutions to the 
Free-Rider Problem.” International Organization 52 (2): 231-268; Toma, Mark. 1997. Competition and 
Monopoly in the Federal Reserve System, 1914-1951: a Microeconomic Approach to Monetary History. 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
53 For example, during both WWI and WWII, wealthy Europeans sought to avoid capital losses by moving 
their liquid assets to the U.S. These wars also caused export-led booms which fueled persistent U.S. trade 
surpluses. 
 
54 Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Harvard University Press, 1981: 
4. 
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order.55 Central banks are not immune from these broad political currents. Financial 
hierarchies erected in the march to war are vulnerable to subsequent normative attacks. 
 Traditional American central banking critics have argued that central banks are 
incompatible with a national political economy based on laissez-faire, checks and 
balances, and democratic self-government. American statesmen from Thomas Jefferson 
to Woodrow Wilson argued that central banks increase social inequality, undermine 
democratic institutions, and limit economic freedom. Since central banks rely on market 
power to govern, their actions influence the availability and cost of credit. This great 
“monopoly” disrupts the natural functioning of financial markets and invites central 
bankers to engage in politics. In his 1837 farewell address, Andrew Jackson warned 
Americans that if the second Bank of the United States had survived, “the Government 
would have passed from the hands of the many to the hands of the few… this organized 
money power… would have dictated the choice of your highest officers...”56 
 The unlikely Democratic unified government which established the Federal 
Reserve System in 1913 was ideologically opposed to centralized financial authority. In 
the run up to the 1912 elections, the Democrat-chaired House Committee on Currency 
and Banking held a sensational public investigation of the “money trust.” The 
Democrats’ 1912 Baltimore Platform committed the party to enact positive financial 
reform legislation without establishing a central bank. To do so, Democrats followed a 
populist state-building strategy identified by James Morone as “the Democratic Wish.” 
                                                 
 
55 Lowi 1967. 
 
56 Jackson, ‘Farewell Address,’ March 4, 1837, in Richardson, James D., ed. 1899. Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents, Volume 3. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 303-304. 
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Morone argues that American reform movements often languish in the “political 
stalemate of American liberalism” where “ideology, institutions, and interests all block 
change.”57 To overcome Americans’ collective “dread” of central state authority, 
reformers promise to strip arbitrary power away from a corrupted elite and restore it 
directly to “the people.” Democrats followed this reform strategy by creating a 
fragmented Federal Reserve System composed of twelve autonomous Federal Reserve 
Banks and a new government agency called the Federal Reserve Board. This institutional 
design held the promise of breaking the money trust’s stranglehold over the national 
economy and restoring autonomy to regional banking communities. Institutional reforms 
carried out in the name of “the people,” however, often fail to articulate institutional 
relations of authority.58 In the rush to disperse power, reformers fail to account for 
inevitable conflicts of interest which arise once institutions are up and running. The 
Federal Reserve System is an illustrative example. The Federal Reserve Act splintered 
policymaking authority and systemic resources across thirteen separate organizations. As 
the system was being organized, a “struggle for power” emerged among officials who 
sought to assert and defend fragmented claims of governing authority.59  
 This governance debate was unresolved when the U.S. entered WWI in April 
1917. Through prosecution of the war, a partnership emerged between the Treasury and 
                                                 
57 Morone, James A. 1991. The Democratic Wish: Popular Participation and the Limits of American 
Government. New Haven: Yale University Press: 9-10. 
 
58 Morone 1991, 11-12. 
 
59 Friedman and Schwartz 1963; West, Robert C. 1977. Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve, 1863-
1923. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Wheelock, David C. 1998. “National Monetary Policy by Regional 
Design: The Evolving Role of the Federal Reserve Banks in Federal Reserve System Policy.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper Series 1998-010. 
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the Federal Reserve Bank of New York which centralized financial authority in the 
nation’s political and financial capitols.60 After the system regained operational 
independence in 1920, the power struggle reemerged as systemic agents criticized the gap 
between the system’s de jure decentralization and its de facto hierarchy. Over the course 
of a decade, this debate gradually increased the fragmentation of the Federal Reserve’s 
policymaking regime. This pattern repeated itself following WWII. Wartime capture by 
the Treasury led to a consolidation of financial authority within the Fed. After the system 
regained operational independence in 1951, latent governance debates reemerged as 
agents questioned the legitimacy of inherited institutional hierarchies. Once again, 
arguments in favor of decentralization carried the day over impassioned defenses of the 
status quo. Central bank fragmentation increased.  
 Hypothesis 4: In peaceful times, American political culture promotes central bank 
fragmentation. 
In 1967, Theodore Lowi argued that a significant gap existed between US state 
capacities to develop coherent foreign policies during periods of war and peace. During 
wartime crises, Lowi argued, executive branch officials are capable of making swift 
decisions to advance national interests. After crises pass, however, US national politics 
return to traditional distributive patterns which decrease the state’s strategic capacity. 
Returns to normalcy pose a problem for other states which look to the U.S. for 
international leadership. Instead of engaging a coherent US state actor, other states 
confront “an extension of [US] domestic processes, practices, and values. As a result, we 
                                                 
60 Chandler, Lester V. 1958. Benjamin Strong, Central Banker. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution: 88-93. 
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have the reverse of Wilson’s problem. We have not yet succeeded in making [US] 
democracy safe for the world.”61 
This chapter has identified fragmented central bank architectures as an 
institutional source of U.S. dollar instability. Fragmented central bank structures increase 
monetary policy rigidity which undermines currency stability. Consequently, US 
transitions from centralized to fragmented central bank governance can have destructive 
consequences for fixed exchange rate regimes. When economic circumstances change 
and US monetary authorities fail to react, dollar stability is eroded and market 
participants gain incentives to engage in currency speculation. This dissertation’s 
empirical chapters explore how evolutions of US central bank architectures following 
WWI and WWII help explain the episodic nature of US attempts to stabilize the dollar 
and the international currency regime. 
  
                                                 
61 Lowi 1967, 302.  
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CHAPTER III 
ESCAPE FROM JEKYLL ISLAND: THE PARTISAN ROOTS OF 
FEDERAL RESERVE FRAGMENTATION (1913-1916)  
This chapter tells the history of the origins of the Federal Reserve. It makes two 
points. First, unlike a number of society-centered accounts, it argues that a partisan elite 
compromise shaped the Federal Reserve System’s fragmented design. Second, it 
demonstrates that ambiguities embedded within the law ensured that institutional design 
politics would continue after legislative enactment in December, 1913. By empowering 
the system’s fiercest critics, internationally-oriented bankers and their populist 
opponents, the legislation created a new arena in which agents could struggle to reshape 
the institution. The chapter concludes by showing how this “struggle for power” resulted 
in few reforms prior to US entrance into WWI.62 
Explaining the Federal Reserve System’s Origin and Design 
At the dawn of the twentieth century, U.S. economic governing institutions were 
unable to address the persistent financial instabilities that accompanied growth in an 
industrial economy. Specifically, there was a mismatch between economic problems and 
institutional responses. Scholars generally agree that U.S. financial instability stemmed 
from its retrograde financial institutions.63  
                                                 
62 The “struggle for power” language is used by financial historians to describe early politics within the 
Federal Reserve System.  See Friedman and Schwartz 1963; West 1977; Wheelock 1998. 
  
63 According to Link (1956, 199), “the national banking structure was about as badly adapted to the 
financial needs of a great industrial and commercial nation as any system could be.” See also, West 1977; 
White, Eugene Nelson. 1983. The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929. 
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By the early 1900s, other wealthy states had developed stability-enhancing 
financial institutions such as central- and branch- banking; two-name commercial paper; 
uniform national currencies; and regularized forms of state-financial system interaction. 
These institutions empowered central bankers to prevent costly banking panics and 
cultivated the development of deep and liquid financial markets. In Western Europe, a 
social network among central bankers promoted financial stability and improved the 
credibility of the classical gold standard.64 In Canada, a small number of large, 
nationally-branched, commercial banks successfully avoided banking panics and 
financial crises well into the 1930s.65 
Whereas centralized institutions increased financial stability in other states, each 
aspect of the American financial system, including its banking and regulatory structure, 
financial markets, and currency system, worked to fragment financial authority. Branch-
banking was illegal, so the banking system was populated by tens of thousands of 
                                                 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; Livingston, James. 1986. Origins of the Federal Reserve System: 
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autonomous unit banks whose fates were closely tied to the performance of local 
economies. Regulations allowed banks in lowly-populated areas to hold portions of their 
required reserves on deposit with urban banks where they could collect interest. This 
correspondent banking system caused banking reserves to pyramid in New York City, 
where banks lent reserves out to security brokers on the call loan market.66 When country 
bankers seasonally drew down their balances to satisfy farmers’ liquidity needs, New 
York banks demanded immediate repayment of call loans. Since call loans were invested 
in negotiable securities, the onset of the planting and harvest seasons often led to asset 
liquidations and sharp contractions on the New York Stock Exchange.67  
Agricultural liquidity demands led to interest rate spikes, currency shortages, and 
frequent banking panics. Reserves deposited with correspondent banks were effectively 
unusable.68 For country banks to retrieve their deposited reserves, urban correspondents 
first had to redeem call loans and then physically dispatch funds across the country. This 
process was slow. Inevitably, some country bankers were overwhelmed by farmers’ 
demands for currency and credit, forcing them out of business. Contagion spread 
regionally as other depositors began questioning their own bank’s solvency. In an era 
before national deposit insurance, depositors had strong incentives to remove deposits 
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before a bank shut down.69 Occasionally, banking panics cascaded across the country 
engulfing national financial centers. Panics became financial crises when clearinghouse 
associations, city-level banking cartels, suspended payments.70 Once suspension was 
declared, correspondent banks ceased dispatching bankers’ balances. Adjustment costs 
were pushed onto country banks and their farming clients.  
 In other countries, distressed banks could raise funds quickly by selling assets on 
secondary markets or by rediscounting them at central banks. These options was 
foreclosed to American banks due to a paucity of secondary commercial debt markets 
and the lack of a national central bank.71 In Europe, deep and liquid secondary markets 
existed in two-name commercial paper, commercial debt assets whose payment was 
guaranteed by two signatories.72 Banks which loaned out funds using two-name paper 
could be confident that they would receive payment upon maturity. This high level of 
security promoted the growth of secondary markets. In the U.S., two-name paper usage 
peaked during the 1830s.73 By the twentieth century, American bank portfolios were 
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dominated by single-name promissory notes. These loans were issued to individuals 
rendering them less secure and liquid than two-name paper. Secondary markets were 
virtually non-existent. No central bank stood to rediscount them. Whereas European 
banks could easily raise funds by offloading assets, this option didn’t exist for most 
American banks. 
 The U.S.’s patchwork financial regime exacerbated the banking system’s 
deficiencies. Three aspects of the financial regime undermined stability: the Federal-state 
regulatory structure; the fractured currency system; and segmented fiscal institutions. At 
this time, American bankers were free to incorporate with state governments or the 
federal government, inspiring a “competition in laxity” among state and federal 
regulators.74 This race-to-the-bottom increased systemic risk by inspiring greater risk-
taking. The country’s fractured currency regime made financial stabilization difficult.75 
Specie, bank-issued national banknotes, and Treasury-issued greenbacks, gold- and 
silver-certificates circulated widely. In the short-run, these currencies’ supplies were 
fixed, making this “inelastic” currency regime unresponsive to shifts in societal 
demand.76 When agricultural liquidity demands spiked, currency shortages destabilized 
already-strained financial markets. Finally, segmented fiscal institutions eroded financial 
stability. The Independent Treasury System had been established to create a firewall 
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between government finances and the banking system.77 Instead of depositing 
government revenues in the banking system, government funds were hived off in 
subtreasury vaults. During booms, tax revenues were removed from circulation, creating 
an automatic brake on economic expansion.78 In the early twentieth century, treasury 
secretaries began seasonally depositing funds in New York banks to mitigate panics. This 
practice was widely considered illegitimate, however, as New York banks still charged 
emergency rates to lend out low-cost government-supplied funds.79  
 In sum, the early twentieth century U.S. banking system suffered from extreme 
fragmentation. Whereas other developed states had largely escaped costly banking panics 
and financial crises by centralizing financial authority, each aspect of the American 
financial system worked to fragment financial control. Under the unit banking structure, 
each bank stood seemingly sovereign. In reality, however, the correspondent banking 
system and contagion created a deeply-interdependent banking system. At the city-level, 
clearinghouse associations created islands of stability enabling urban banks to weather 
financial storms. On the macro-level, however, when clearinghouses suspended 
payments, adjustment costs were effectively pushed into the countryside where funds 
were unavailable at any cost.  
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Reforming American Financial Institutions   
Mounting financial disturbances led to calls for major U.S. financial reforms in 
the 1890s, when the U.S. experienced two major financial crises (1890, 1893) and nearly 
suffered a currency crisis. Once source of agitation came from farmers. Since the 1870s, 
the U.S. had experienced persistent deflation. Farmers were hit especially hard by falling 
prices. By the 1890s, many were calling for the free coinage of silver and other populist 
financial reforms.80 Another source of reform agitation came from international investors. 
Uncertainty over the U.S. gold commitment triggered a run on the Treasury’s gold 
reserve in 1895.81 In Europe, privately-controlled central banks administered the gold 
standard. When their gold reserves came under pressure, they were able to cheaply 
borrow funds from their foreign counterparts. Lacking a central bank, the U.S. was 
excluded from this cooperative arrangement. In 1895, the U.S. Treasury was forced to 
turn to a J.P. Morgan-led syndicate to arrange a private gold loan from European 
creditors.82 This arrangement was both embarrassing and costly for U.S. officials.  
Despite the obvious pressures for a central bank, especially when seen from a 
comparative perspective, the opening of the U.S. debate for financial reform in the 1890s 
saw no proposals for central banking.83 Instead, Americans focused on how to improve 
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the credibility of U.S. currency policies while increasing the flexibility of the currency 
supply. After sweeping the 1896 national elections, Republicans sought to arrange an 
international conference aimed at establishing a bimetallic currency standard.84 When this 
initiative failed, Republicans shifted tactics. In 1900, the Gold Standard Act was passed 
making all U.S. currency redeemable in gold. 85  
American bankers held a series of conventions debating alternative currency 
reforms.86 Bankers broadly agreed that the currency elasticity problem should be resolved 
by allowing banks to issue currency collateralized by assets other than US government 
bonds.87 They were split, however, over what types of assets should be eligible collateral. 
A faction of northeastern bankers called for allowing banks to issue currency against 
corporate bonds. These bankers held large stocks of sagging railroad bonds. Chicago-
based bankers, by contrast, called for allowing banks to issue currency against 
commercial assets.88 This latter approach was appealing to the majority of bankers, who 
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owned few corporate bonds. Lingering questions about the quality of American 
commercial debt instruments (promissory notes), however, rendered it vulnerable.89  
The financial reform debate took on increased urgency and changed course 
following the 1907 financial crisis, which varied from typical crises both in its origin and 
intensity.90 U.S. banking panics normally originated in the countryside and migrated 
toward national financial centers. The 1907 crisis, by contrast, originated as a run on New 
York City trust companies.91 When pressure mounted on trust companies in 1907, they 
turned to the New York City Clearinghouse Association for assistance. Their overtures 
were rebuffed, however, and a run on the trust companies ensued. The run spread to the 
city’s commercial banks and the clearinghouse suspended payments, nationalizing the 
crisis. The economy contracted sharply. The 1907 crisis transformed the financial reform 
debate in two ways. First, it led New York bankers to begin championing the creation of 
a central bank.92 Second, it spurred congress to pursue financial reform. In 1908, 
congress passed the Aldrich-Vreeland Act granting temporary emergency powers to the 
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Secretary of the Treasury and establishing a National Monetary Commission (NMC) to 
develop comprehensive financial reform legislation.93 
The Financial Elite-led Explanation of the Federal Reserve Act 
 The leading explanation of the Federal Reserve Act traces its origin to the ideas of 
financier Paul M. Warburg and the NMC’s chairman, Sen. Nelson Aldrich (R-RI).94 
Although the NMC was a bipartisan commission, Aldrich unilaterally controlled its 
activities.95 This section explains Warburg’s role in originating the central bank idea; his 
influence on Aldrich; the excludable benefits internationally-oriented bankers stood to 
gain from establishment of a central bank; and the collective action they undertook to 
advance this goal. 
 Paul M. Warburg was born into a family of European financiers. In 1902, he 
emigrated from Germany to New York City to work at the investment bank Kuhn, Loeb, 
& Company. Upon arriving in the U.S., Warburg was shocked at the state of American 
financial markets, which he considered “as backward as Europe at the time of the 
Medicis, and Asia… at the time of Hammurabi.”96 Warburg believed a central bank could 
overcome the disadvantages of the unit banking system by cultivating the development of 
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secondary commercial debt markets. 97 Warburg first promoted his central bank reform 
ideas informally through conversations. After the 1907 crisis, however, he began 
delivering public speeches and publishing proposals.98  
Sen. Aldrich was a late convert to the cause of central banking. In early 1908, he 
considered the establishment of a US central bank premature.99 Over the summer of 
1908, however, Aldrich led a NMC European tour to examine the inner workings of 
European financial systems. The commission interviewed central bankers and financiers. 
Aldrich was impressed by the resiliency of European financial systems and was 
converted to the central banking cause.100  
Warburg’s plan was developed into actionable legislation, what became known as 
the Aldrich Plan, at a clandestine retreat held at Jekyll Island, Georgia, in November, 
1910. Sen. Aldrich arranged for Warburg, Frank Vanderlip, A. Piatt Andrew, and Henry 
Davidson to travel separately by private railcar to the meeting to prevent word from 
spreading that the NMC’s chairman was meeting privately with Wall Street elites.101 
Aldrich decided to name Warburg’s proposed institution a National Reserve Association 
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(NRA) to overcome entrenched public opposition to central banking.102 The NRA was to 
be administered by a banker-dominated board located in Washington, D.C., with fifteen 
regional branches dispersed across the country. It would centralize banking reserves; 
provide commercial bank rediscounting services; serve as the government’s fiscal agent; 
and issue a new commercial assets-backed currency.103  
International financiers stood to profit from central banking reforms, which 
supported the U.S. dollar’s internationalization.104 American banks were previously 
forbidden from establishing branches overseas and were shut out of the lucrative 
international trade- and bankers- acceptance markets. Many financial elites hoped New 
York City would become a leading global financial center and challenge London for 
international finance business.105  
Financial elites recognized, however, the path to enacting the Aldrich Plan in 
Congress would be difficult. First, they needed to convince politically-powerful Chicago 
bankers to support the proposal.106 So they added a commercial assets-backed currency to 
gain Chicago support.107 Second, they needed to win the approval of the American 
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Bankers Association, which was dominated by small town bankers. Many small town 
bankers feared that the NRA would be controlled by Wall Street.108 To overcome these 
fears, Aldrich described the NRA as “not a central bank, but a cooperative union of all 
banks of the country.”109 The plan also included voting provisions intended to limit larger 
banks’ influence over the selection of NRA officials.110 Finally, Aldrich Plan supporters 
recognized the need to enlist the support of everyday Americans. They organized a 
nationwide public education campaign called the National Citizens League for the 
Promotion of Sound Banking which aimed at convincing Americans to support the 
Aldrich Plan.  
The Agrarian-led Explanation of the Federal Reserve Act  
The leading explanations of the origins of the Federal Reserve claim the Aldrich 
Plan became a “blueprint” for the Federal Reserve Act.111 The National Citizens 
League’s organizers successfully enlisted financial support from bankers across the 
country.112 In 1930, Warburg published the Aldrich Plan and Federal Reserve Act side-
by-side, demonstrating that much of the latter’s language was copied directly from the 
Aldrich Plan.113 This elite-led interpretation has been challenged by political scientists 
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and historians on empirical grounds, however. By the time the Aldrich Plan was 
introduced into Congress on January 8th, 1912, Nelson Aldrich was no longer a Senator 
and Congress had passed legislation disbanding the NMC.114 Although President Taft 
originally signaled support for the plan, he later claimed to have been misquoted. By the 
summer, even the National Citizens League’s Chicago-based leadership was distancing 
itself from the Aldrich Plan.115 What explains the Aldrich Plan’s tepid support? 
 Elizabeth Sanders argues that the Aldrich Plan’s crafters misunderstood “the 
power of agrarian and small-business interests in the legislature and the hatred of 
monopoly that infused the Progressive Era.”116 Sanders divides the early twentieth 
century U.S. political economy into two sections, a northeastern metropolitan core and an 
agricultural periphery.117 Sanders argues that the Aldrich Plan was designed to advance 
the northeastern core’s interest. Once the plan entered the full congress, however, it was 
destined to be transformed by the numerically-dominant periphery.118 She contrasts the 
Federal Reserve System and the proposed NRA: 119   
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…the Federal Reserve System differed from the latter in areas that both 
agrarians and core capitalists considered fundamental: public versus private 
control; degree of centralization; capitalization of local reserve banks; treatment 
of agriculture in the banking and credit system; and potential for inflation.  
 How can these opposing societal explanations of the Federal Reserve System’s 
design be squared? Was it the central bank demanded by northeastern financiers? Or was 
it a decentralized, publicly-controlled, reserve system crafted to advance peripheral 
interests? The next section argues that a partisan elite compromise among Democrats 
does a superior job explaining the Federal Reserve’s defining institutional feature, its 
high degree of fragmentation. 
The Partisan Roots of Federal Reserve Fragmentation 
 Societal interest-based models do a good job of explaining “normal” periods of 
American politics characterized by weak parties and divided government. Under such 
circumstances, institutional reforms often reflect broad societal interests refracted through 
the legislature. Societal models are less effective at explaining reforms enacted in periods 
of unified government controlled by a strong party, however. When a highly-cohesive or 
well-disciplined party controls national political institutions, reforms are often shaped by 
partisan goals.120 American political development scholars have referred to such one-
party alignments as partisan regimes.121 
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 In March, 1913, Democrats gained control of the presidency and both houses of 
congress for the first time in decades. They owed their temporary grasp on national 
power to the division of the Republican Party vote in the 1912 national elections, 
however. Had Theodore Roosevelt not bolted the Republican National Convention and 
started his own Progressive Party in June, 1912, a national Democratic landslide would 
have been unlikely. A second historical accident which had major implications for 
financial reform occurred a week earlier at the Democratic National Convention. After 
many rounds of balloting, the New York delegation belatedly backed frontrunner James 
“Champ” Clark of Missouri for the presidential nomination.122 The Tammany Hall 
delegation’s endorsement backfired, however, when longtime party leader William 
Jennings Bryan denounced Clark as the candidate of Wall Street. Bryan subsequently 
endorsed New Jersey Governor Woodrow Wilson and urged his followers to pledge 
Wilson their votes. Wilson won the nomination on the 46th ballot. 
 Although Wilson campaigned as a progressive, he was no radical.123  His “New 
Freedom” agenda called for legislation which would erode the market power of financial 
and industrial conglomerates including tariff reductions, a progressive income tax, 
currency reform, and antitrust legislation. This agenda sought to restore competition in 
the private economy, not redistribute wealth. Consequently, its legislative enactment was 
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a tough sell to populists who hoped to use Democratic control of the state to enact 
redistributive reforms. When Bryan endorsed Wilson for the presidential nomination, it is 
unlikely he realized Wilson’s conservative sympathies. Bryan shared Wilson’s partisan 
goal of broadening the Democratic coalition by attracting insurgent western progressives, 
however.124 As Wilson’s Secretary of State, he would intervene repeatedly on the 
president’s behalf urging his followers to support right-leaning “New Freedom” reforms. 
These personal interventions were reinforced by a surprisingly effective partisan 
enforcement rule, the binding caucus vote, which bound Democrats to vote in favor of 
legislation after 2/3 of the party caucus voted to make it a party resolution.125  
 In order to understand the unique pressures and opportunities which confronted 
Democrats in 1913, I will trace the development of an elite partisan compromise from the 
collapse of the previously-dominant Republican Party to the passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act. We shall see how cross-pressures facing the Democratic Party’s leadership 
of appeasing the party’s populist base while attracting western progressives into a 
broadened partisan coalition shaped the Federal Reserve Act and led to the creation of a 
highly-fragmented institution. Intriguingly, Sen. Nelson Aldrich was implicated in the 
Republican implosion. After considering the Republican Party rupture, I analyze the 1913 
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legislative construction of the Federal Reserve Act. I show that an elite partisan 
compromise on the system’s organizational structure was completed by June, 1913. The 
Federal Reserve Act signed into law on December 23rd reflected the June compromise.  
The Fall of the Old Guard Republicans 
 The Republican Party dominated national political institutions in the decades 
following the Civil War. While congressional control vacillated between the two parties, 
Republicans retained a firm grip on the presidency.126 Republicans used presidential 
control to sustain a protectionist, financially-orthodox, economic program which 
benefitted northeastern business interests.127 After the pivotal 1896 election, Republican 
domination extended to the legislature where power further concentrated. House Speaker 
“Czar” Joseph Cannon (R-IL) used control over the Rules Committee to centralize 
authority within the speakership at an unprecedented level.128 Sen. Aldrich wielded 
similar power in the Senate. Known in the press as the “general manager of the nation,” 
Aldrich used his chairmanship of both the Senate Finance Committee and the Rules 
Committee to sustain the party’s protectionist economic program. 129  
                                                 
126 Between 1860 and 1912, only one conservative Democrat was able to win the presidency, Grover 
Cleveland. 
 
127 This package included the gold standard, high tariffs, and unregulated labor and production markets. See 
Bensel, Richard. 2000. The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877-1900. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
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 Following Theodore Roosevelt’s decision not to run for presidential reelection in 
1908, a rift emerged between the Republican Party’s conservative northeastern base and 
its progressive western wing. Roosevelt had broken with Republican orthodoxy by 
championing greater federal regulation of corporations. In the west, progressive 
insurgents called for freer trade. 130 In 1909, the House of Representatives passed tariff 
legislation calling for broad tariff reductions. When the Senate took up the bill, Aldrich 
unilaterally raised a number of tariffs. With President Taft’s blessing, the conference 
version of the Payne-Aldrich Tariff reflected northeastern protectionist preferences.131 
The rift between progressive and old guard Republicans deepened. 
Aldrich spent 1909 preoccupied with the tariff, neglecting the work of the NMC. 
This diversion proved costly both for his ambition to shape financial reform and, more 
generally, for the old guard Republican leadership. In March 1910, progressive 
Republicans allied with Democrats to strip speaker Joseph Cannon (R-IL) of his control 
over the rules committee. A month later, Aldrich announced that he would not seek 
reelection that fall. In the 1910 midterm elections, Democrats gained control of the House 
of Representatives for the first time since 1894. Aldrich, already a lame duck, huddled 
with his band of conspirators at Jekyll Island a week after the elections.132 Shortly after 
the Aldrich Plan was introduced into Congress in January, 1912, pressure began 
                                                 
130 Wisconsin progressives championed lower tariffs to improve consumer welfare. Sandel, Michael J. 
1996. Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge: Belknap Press: 221. 
 
131 This section draws heavily off of McCulley 1992, 226-229. 
 
132 McCulley (1992, 229) points out, “A careful examination of the political context of the Jekyll Island 
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mounting for a congressional investigation of the “Money Trust.” The previous two 
decades had witnessed waves of consolidation in both the manufacturing and financial 
sectors.133 Progressive Republican Charles A. Lindbergh, Sr., (R-MN) attacked the 
Aldrich Plan as a “wonderfully clever” plan that invited “capture by Wall Street as soon 
as it should get into operation.” Lindbergh called for an investigation of the 
“combinations of financiers and financial institutions… who control the money and credit 
and, through that control, operate in restraint of trade and in violation of the law.”134  
The Money Trust Investigation and the 1912 Election 
The House’s Democratic leadership was reluctant to take up Lindbergh’s call for 
an investigation. Majority Leader Oscar Underwood (D-AL) harbored presidential 
ambitions and relied on the backing of New York “sound money” Democrats. 
Underwood also feared renewing Republican charges of “Bryanism” and “radicalism” in 
the run up to the 1912 national elections.135 The populist wing of the Democratic Party, 
however, was eager for a highly visible public investigation. With William Jennings 
Bryan’s support, Rep. Robert Henry (D-TX) introduced a bill calling for an investigation 
of banking concentration. Henry’s bill was voted down in the Democratic caucus 115 to 
66. As a compromise, the House passed legislation calling for the House Banking and 
Currency Committee “to obtain full and complete information of the banking and 
currency condition of the United States for the purpose of determining what legislation is 
                                                 
133 For an excellent analysis of the manufacturing merger wave, see Lamoreaux, Naomi R. 1988. The Great 
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needed.”136 The committee divided the tasks of investigating financial conditions and 
drafting reform legislation. Chairman Arsene Pujo (D-LA), who had already announced 
his pending retirement, agreed to lead a “sane” investigation of banking conditions.137 A 
separate subcommittee tasked with drafting reform legislation was headed by second-
ranking Democrat Carter Glass (D-VA). Since Glass was a conservative, financiers 
thought they had little to fear in this division of labor.  
After two months of Pujo Committee inactivity, populist Democrats convinced 
Pujo to undertake a more intensive investigation. He introduced a resolution broadening 
the subcommittee’s mandate to investigate “concentration of money and credit” and 
compelling bankers to testify.138 The House passed this resolution on April 12th, 1912. 
Pujo appointed Samuel Untermyer, a populist New York trial lawyer, as special counsel. 
In May, Untermeyer paraded a number of leading New York bankers before the 
subcommittee and accused the New York Clearinghouse Association of forcing the 
unnecessary closure of country banks during the 1907 panic. The investigation quickly 
became a national sensation. It was suspended in June, however, for the Democratic 
National Convention in Baltimore. Thanks to Bryan’s late endorsement and the 
fragmentation of the Republican vote, Woodrow Wilson would win the presidency and 
Democrats would gain wide majorities in both houses of congress. 
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The Partisan Construction of the Federal Reserve Act 
  Woodrow Wilson’s election altered the course of financial reform. While Wilson 
knew little about the banking industry, no other candidate “grasped the political potential 
of the banking issue or more effectively exploited it for personal and partisan 
advantage.”139 Wilson campaigned against the “money monopoly.” In a March, 1911, 
speech he argued, “Our system of credit is concentrated. The growth of the nation, 
therefore, and all our activities are in the hands of a few men who… destroy genuine 
economic freedom.”140 Although Wilson’s rhetoric appealed to populists, he would 
repeatedly intervene in the legislative process to ensure that conservative Carter Glass 
(D-VA) retained jurisdiction over financial reform.141 The Democratic Party was deeply 
divided among radical agrarians who desired redistributive reforms, left-leaning 
progressives who desired increased state intervention in the economy, and conservatives 
who desired freer trade but otherwise supported laissez-faire. Left-leaning Democrats 
would repeatedly push for the creation of a state-controlled central bank and the inclusion 
of a national deposit insurance scheme. Wilson’s authoritative interventions into the 
legislative process denied populists these institutional goals.  
Over the fall of 1912, Carter Glass began working with economist H. Parker 
Willis to draft financial reform legislation. Glass considered the Aldrich Plan’s basic flaw 
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its “monopolistic tendencies.”142 Otherwise, Glass supported the Aldrich Plan’s banker-
control provisions and functional goals of issuing an elastic currency and providing banks 
rediscounting facilities. Glass and Willis’s original proposal called for a decentralized 
system of 20 privately-organized reserve banks regulated by the Comptroller of the 
Currency. Glass believed the system would undermine Wall Street’s control by building 
“rival aggregations of financial power.”143  
 Glass and Willis pitched their proposal to Wilson on December 26th, 1912. To 
Glass’s surprise, Wilson demanded that a presidentially-appointed board be included as a 
“capstone… placed atop the structure.”144 After the meeting, Glass wondered if the 
president-elect had been influenced “by those who are seeking to mask the Aldrich plan 
and give us dangerous centralization.”145 Despite his misgivings, Glass had little choice 
but to comply with Wilson’s demands. During the spring of 1913, Glass and Willis 
covertly drafted new legislation which paired his regional reserve concept with Wilson’s 
“capstone.” The proposal was circulated among Wilson’s cabinet in early May, 1913. 
The creditor-friendly Glass-Willis-Wilson plan was unacceptable to populist 
Democrats. On May 19th, 1913, William Jennings Bryan met with Wilson and declared 
his opposition to the legislation. Wilson had little chance of securing the votes of rank-
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and-file Democrats without Bryan’s active support.146 Bryan voiced two specific 
objections: 1) he wanted the elimination of banker representation on the Federal Reserve 
Board, and 2) provisions making the system’s currency issues governmental rather than 
private liabilities. Bryan argued Democrats “had been committed by Jefferson and 
Jackson and by recent platforms to the doctrine that the issue of money is a function of 
government and should not be surrendered to banks.”147 Populists began pressing 
alternative reforms. Sen. Robert Owen (D-OK), chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee, informed H. Parker Willis that he and Samuel Untermeyer had crafted an 
alternative reform. Treasury Secretary William McAdoo proposed a Treasury-controlled 
central bank.148  
To reach a resolution among warring factions, Wilson held a number of 
conferences at the White House between June 7th and 18th. On June 17th, Wilson, Glass, 
McAdoo, and Owen held a grueling conference at the White House where Glass argued 
against Bryan’s demands. Owen responded that the board “must be exclusively a political 
agency.” McAdoo agreed “the right measure is the one which puts the Government in the 
saddle.”149 Louis Brandeis, Wilson’s progressive advisor, counseled the president:150 
The power to issue currency should be vested exclusively in Government 
officials, even when the currency is issued against commercial paper… The 
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conflict between the policies of the Administration and the desires of the 
financiers and of big business, is an irreconcilable one. Concessions to the big 
business interests must… prove futile.”   
On June 18th, the President reconvened Glass, Owen, and McAdoo at the White 
House and announced his decision. He sided with the populists by agreeing that currency 
issued by the Federal Reserve Banks would be government liabilities and he agreed to 
remove banker representation from the board.151 Bryan’s demands being satisfied, he 
endorsed the legislation. Wilson’s cabinet “united in a solid phalanx that never broke 
during all the ensuing controversies.”152 Wilson announced the bill to a joint session of 
Congress on June 23rd.  
A few days after the compromise was announced, Wilson agreed to make three 
minor functional concessions to prominent Midwestern bankers: the new system would 
gradually retire outstanding 2% government bonds which were used as collateral for 
national banknotes; regional reserve banks would be given the right to initiate discount 
rate (policy) changes; and a Federal Advisory Council composed of private banking 
representatives would be established to serve as a liaison between the Board and the 
Federal Reserve Banks.153 Wilson sternly rebuffed bankers’ requests to reassert banker 
representation on the Federal Reserve Board, however.154 
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In July, congressional agrarians attacked the legislation and demanded radical 
changes. They voiced three complaints: that the privately-organized Federal Reserve 
Banks would exercise control over expansion of the money supply; that special 
agricultural credit provisions weren’t included; and that the legislation didn’t ban 
interlocking directorates.155 Rep. Henry (D-TX) voiced the populist critique, “The bill as 
now written is wholly in the interest of the creditor classes, the banking fraternity, and the 
commercial world, without proper provision for the debtor classes and those who toil, 
produce, and sustain the country.”156 The radicals were pacified by a few minor 
concessions and William Jennings Bryan’s intervention. In late July, President Wilson 
promised that subsequent antitrust legislation would include a ban on interlocking 
directorates. Populist discontent still threatened to derail the bill when the Democratic 
house caucus took it up on August 11th, however. Three days later, a compromise was 
reached providing preferential treatment for agricultural credit.157 Populists continued 
arguing that the bill’s currency provisions fell short of Bryan’s demand for a government-
controlled currency system, however. On August 22nd, Bryan sent a letter to Carter Glass 
which he requested to be read aloud to the caucus. The letter called on agrarians to “stand 
by the President and assist in securing the passage of this measure at the earliest possible 
moment.”158 Bryan’s endorsement broke the opposition. On August 28th, the caucus 
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voted 116-9 to make the bill a party measure, binding all congressional Democrats to 
vote for it on the house floor.159 
Debate began in the House of Representatives on September 9th. Nine days later, 
Republicans tried to sow discord among Democrats by adding an amendment reaffirming 
the national gold standard commitment. Bryan urged his followers to support the 
amendment. It was approved by a vote of 299-68. Hours later, the House passed the 
Federal Reserve Act by a vote of 287-85. Only three Democrats (of 257) broke party 
ranks to vote against the measure.  
The legislation faced a much tougher path through the Senate. The Senate Finance 
Committee was a bastion of populism. Three of the committee’s seven Democrats were 
hostile toward the president.160 They joined the Republican minority in obstructing the 
bill’s passage. Committee hearings ground on for months.161 On October 23rd, Frank 
Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, unveiled an alternative proposal calling 
for the establishment of a Treasury-controlled central bank.162 Opposition to the Glass-
Owen bill quickly mounted as Republicans and radical Democrats rallied to the 
Vanderlip plan. The day after his testimony, eight of the Finance Committee’s twelve 
members voiced their support for the alternative plan. 
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Glass and Wilson interpreted Vanderlip’s proposal as an attempt to fracture the 
fragile Democratic partisan coalition and prevent financial reform from being passed.163 
When Vanderlip requested to discuss the proposal with Wilson, the president informed 
him doing so would be “quite useless… I could in no circumstances accept or 
recommend it.” On October 24th, Wilson invited Senate Democratic leaders to the White 
House where he angrily informed them that he did not intend to have reform legislation 
dictated by bankers.164 Afterward, the Senate Democratic Caucus pressured Finance 
Committee Democrats to advance the Glass-Owen bill. Two of the three dissenting 
senators, O’Gorman (D-NY) and Reed (D-MO), withdrew their opposition. Even with 
their support, however, the committee remained evenly divided. The impasse was finally 
resolved when the committee agreed to submit both the Federal Reserve Act and the 
Vanderlip plan to the full Senate.  
On November 30th, the Senate Democratic Caucus passed a resolution making the 
Glass-Owen bill a party bill. The caucus approved minor amendments to the bill, most 
notably adding a national deposit insurance scheme. The full Senate began debating the 
bill on December 2nd. Progressive senators joined with Democrats to pass a resolution 
requiring the Senate meet 13 hours per day until a final vote was taken. According to 
former President Taft, Republicans shifted tactics from delay to arguing, “everything that 
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is good in the currency legislation came from the Aldrich Bill, and that which is wrong is 
due to a mixture of Bryanism.”165  
On December 19th, the Senate passed the Federal Reserve Act by a vote of 54 to 
34 (see Table 1). Every Democrat supported the bill. Since the House and Senate versions 
differed, the bill went to conference. The conference version of the bill was announced on 
December 22nd. It dispensed with the deposit insurance scheme and largely reflected the 
House’s version.166 The conference bill was quickly passed and Wilson signed it into law 
on December 23rd, 1913. 
Table 1: Roll Call Votes on the Federal Reserve Act (1913) 
 House Votes Senate Votes 
 Final Conference Final Conference 
Total 287 -- 85 298 -- 60 54 -- 34 43 -- 25 
Democrats 248 -- 3 248 -- 2 48 -- 0 39 -- 0 
Republicans 30 -- 80 38 -- 58 6 -- 34 4 -- 25 
Progressives 9 -- 2 12 -- 0     
 
Subversive Agents: Formative Politics in the Federal Reserve (1914-1916)  
 The Federal Reserve Act called for the incorporation of 8-12 Federal Reserve 
Banks and a new government agency, the Federal Reserve Board, to regulate them. 
Beyond inaugurating this open-ended institution-building process, the act left ambiguous 
how these institutional components would function as a coherent system. It left three 
interrelated governance questions unresolved. First, where was the ultimate locus of 
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authority within the system? Did it lie with the reserve banks, the Board, or the Treasury? 
Second, was the Board’s purpose oversight or control? Was it an independent agency or a 
bureau of the Treasury? Third, how was the system supposed to fulfill its vague mandate 
to “furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting commercial paper, to 
establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and for other 
purposes?” These questions animated early governance debates inside the Federal 
Reserve System and provided openings for reform-minded agents.  
Institutional agents’ preferred resolutions to these governance questions were 
shaped by their position inside the system and the reform ideas they carried with them 
when they entered Federal Reserve service. The Federal Reserve Act’s officer selection 
procedures ensured that some of the system’s fiercest critics, populist Democrats and 
New York financial elites, would have a hand in administering the new system. These 
agents carried alternative reform visions and sought to reshape the Federal Reserve. This 
section analyzes the transformative efforts of three early reformers, William McAdoo, 
Paul M. Warburg, and Benjamin Strong. These agents were all losers in the passage of 
the Federal Reserve Act. McAdoo had tried and failed to establish a Treasury-controlled 
central bank. As treasury secretary, however, he was made the ex officio chairman of the 
Board. Warburg and Strong were leading Aldrich Plan advocates. Wilson appointed 
Warburg to serve on the inaugural Federal Reserve Board and Strong was selected by the 
FRBNY’s directors to serve as its executive officer, or Governor. From these positions, 
they sought to enact reforms which would recast the Federal Reserve System in their 
preferred image. 
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Of the three, McAdoo most explicitly sought to dominate the institution for 
personal gain. He systematically attempted to assert dominance over the system and used 
his discretion over fiscal resources as a lever for asserting power within the Federal 
Reserve. Harboring presidential ambitions, McAdoo believed his surest path to the White 
House lied in wielding the Federal Reserve’s powers as a populist weapon to attack and 
dismantle Wall Street. As will be demonstrated below, however, McAdoo’s power 
peaked within the system in 1914. 
Warburg and Strong shared overlapping reform visions. Warburg hoped to 
increase the system’s centralization by eliminating marginal reserve banks and 
establishing the Board as a prestigious and independent agency. He believed these steps 
would promote private-sector confidence in the system, purge the system of inequality-
based conflict, and cultivate the growth of secondary commercial debt markets. Strong 
shared Warburg’s financial developmental goals, but also held hegemonic ambitions.167 
He wanted to elevate New York’s profile as a global financial center and internationalize 
the dollar. For Strong, the system’s fragmented structure of 12 autonomous reserve banks 
and a presidentially-appointed board posed formidable barriers to the advancement of his 
international goals.168 Warburg and Strong also considered the system’s delegated 
authorities insufficient for establishing the system as a permanent and effective fixture 
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within the American political economy. Together, they pressed for reforms which would 
promote the use of Federal Reserve notes domestically (dollarization); concentrate gold 
in the reserve banks; compel state banks to join the system; and establish a fiscal agency 
monopoly.   
McAdoo’s Populist Bid for Supremacy 
 Treasury Secretary William McAdoo’s institutional power peaked in 1914. In that 
year he served on the three-member Reserve Bank Organization Committee (RBOC) 
which determined the number and location of Federal Reserve Banks. He also retained 
expiring emergency currency-issuing authority granted by the 1908 Aldrich-Vreeland 
Act. Beyond these formal powers, McAdoo also inherited an office which had accrued 
expansive discretionary powers over the previous decade.169 During the spring and 
summer of 1914, McAdoo wielded his formidable powers to shape the Federal Reserve 
System and stave off financial crisis.  
The Federal Reserve Act delegated the task of determining the number and 
location of Federal Reserve Banks to the Reserve Bank Organization Committee 
(RBOC), a three-member body composed of the secretaries of treasury and agriculture 
and the Comptroller of the Currency. Congress appropriated $100,000 dollars for RBOC 
operations. These funds were used to survey the country’s seven thousand nationally-
chartered banks regarding their reserve bank preferences and to fund a 10,000 mile 
“listening tour” where RBOC members visited 18 cities vying for a Federal Reserve 
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Bank.170 McAdoo portrayed the RBOC’s mission as technocratic, calling its decisions 
“an economic and not a political problem.”171 This view supported the statutory mandate 
that “districts shall be apportioned with due regard to the convenience and customary 
course of business.” Others were skeptical. One Republican senator commented that the 
RBOC would “leave on the new system a deep partisan mark.”172  
The RBOC announced its decision on April 2nd, 1914. It authorized incorporation 
of twelve Federal Reserve Banks, the maximum allowable by law. Federal Reserve 
Banks were to be established in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, 
Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, St. Louis, Kansas City, Minneapolis, and San Francisco. For 
McAdoo, an ambitious populist Democrat, the placement of three reserve banks in the 
capital-poor but solidly Democratic South was good politics.173 For his mapmaking 
endeavor to pay political dividends, however, McAdoo believed he needed to establish 
control over the system (see figure 2). 
As the RBOC prepared to announce its final decisions, a different political battle 
was being waged inside the White House over the president’s pending appointments to 
the inaugural Federal Reserve Board. McAdoo and Colonel E.M. House, Wilson’s 
confidant, competed to shape the president’s appointments. McAdoo urged the President 
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to appoint populists who would support his bid to dismantle the money trust.174 House 
accused McAdoo of trying to subordinate the new system. He urged the president to 
make conservative appointments which would win the confidence of the nation’s 
business and financial communities.175  
Figure 2: Map of the Federal Reserve System  
 
 
On May 4th, 1914, Wilson submitted his initial nominations to the Senate. The 
appointments were shockingly conservative, composed of prominent industrialists and 
bankers.176 A fresh battle with the Senate Finance Committee broke out, as it had to 
approve Wilson’s nominations. Populists on the committee were especially incensed by 
Wilson’s nomination of Thomas D. Jones, an International Harvester Company director, 
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and Paul M. Warburg, a known central banking advocate. Senators Reed (D-MO) and 
Hitchcock (D-NB) demanded that Jones and Warburg testify before the committee. 
Under hostile questioning, Jones admitted that he had approved of all of Harvester 
International’s policies since joining the company in 1909.177 At the time, the company 
was under Federal investigation. Reed and Hitchcock demanded Wilson withdraw his 
nomination. Once again, Wilson asked William Jennings Bryan to intervene on Jones’ 
behalf. Bryan reluctantly did so.178 This time, he was unable sway the irate senators. 
Wilson angrily withdrew the nomination. 
Although Warburg’s role in crafting the Aldrich Plan remained unknown, his 
position as a prominent central banking advocate made him an easy target for populists. 
Warburg refused to appear before the Senate Finance Committee and asked Wilson to 
withdraw his nomination. Wilson refused. Sen. Hitchcock (D-NB), satisfied with having 
forced the withdrawal of Jones’ nomination, reached out to Warburg and promised his 
testimony would be a friendly “conference” rather than an interrogation. Warburg met 
with the committee on August 1st and 3rd, 1914. His nomination was confirmed on 
August 7th. On August 10th, the inaugural Federal Reserve Board was sworn in. 
 McAdoo’s political influence peaked in the summer of 1914, months before the 
Federal Reserve Banks opened their doors. The outbreak of WWI in Europe presented a 
major shock to the American economy. European belligerents canceled their orders for 
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American exports and requisitioned their citizens’ American securities, which they began 
liquidating. At the same time, large volumes of short-term American loans were maturing 
in Europe. Without export-generated foreign exchange, Americans needed to make large 
gold shipments across the Atlantic to satisfy creditors. WWI complicated this was task as 
German warships made transatlantic journeys unsafe. The U.S. dollar began falling on 
foreign exchange markets.  
 On July 31st, McAdoo ordered the closure of the New York Stock Exchange. He 
also authorized commercial banks to issue Aldrich-Vreeland emergency currency and 
worked with bankers to organize a $108 million dollar gold fund for settling international 
payments. The establishment of this fund was sufficient to quell speculation against the 
dollar, which rose to par against sterling by November 11th.179 McAdoo’s intervention 
averted a U.S. currency crisis and sowed the seeds for the US’s dramatic emergence as a 
creditor nation. The crisis had largely passed when the Federal Reserve Banks opened for 
business on November 16th, 1914.   
 As Col. House had warned, McAdoo intended to dominate the Federal Reserve 
System. To do so, he asserted authoritative claims over the Board and the reserve banks. 
McAdoo drew upon a selective reading of the Federal Reserve Act which seemed to 
leave open the possibility of Treasury control. Section 10 stated:  
Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed as taking away any powers 
heretofore vested by law in the Secretary of the Treasury which relate to the 
                                                 
179 Once the New York stock exchange was closed, European belligerents offloaded securities at fire sale 
prices, representing a de facto capital transfer from Europeans to Americans. McAdoo also attempted to 
open the Federal Reserve Banks early, but Benjamin Strong and Paul Warburg forcefully opposed this 
initiative. Silber, William L. 2007. When Washington Shut Down Wall Street: The Great Financial Crisis 
of 1914 and the Origins of America's Monetary Supremacy. Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2-17. 
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supervision, management, and control of the Treasury Department and bureaus 
under such department, and wherever any power vested by this Act in the 
Federal Reserve Board or the Federal reserve agent appears to conflict with the 
powers of the Secretary of the Treasury, such powers shall be exercised subject 
to the supervision and control of the Secretary. 
As the Board’s ex officio chairman, McAdoo considered himself its ranking 
officer. As Board members began arriving in Washington, D.C., they made inquiries 
regarding the status associated with their positions. McAdoo lampooned their efforts 
in a conversation with Wilson, “They must swim in the luminous ether close to the 
sun!” McAdoo suggested that Board members be given an inferior rank equivalent to 
assistant secretaries. Perhaps not recognizing McAdoo’s subversive goals, Wilson 
joked that Board members should be given a position in D.C.’s social orbit “just 
below the fire department.”180   
The Federal Reserve Act was ambiguous regarding the Treasury Secretary’s 
actual delegated authority as ex officio chairman of the Board. The act also called for 
one presidential appointee be given the title of Governor and serve as the Board’s 
administrative officer. This dueling executive problem extended to the reserve banks. 
The Federal Reserve Act instructed the Board to appoint three Class C directors to 
each reserve bank and designate one the Federal Reserve Agent, who was also given 
the title of Chairman. The Preliminary Committee on Organization had deemed that 
each reserve bank should select its own executive officers, however.181 So each 
bank’s nine-member Board of Directors, six of whom were selected by member 
banks, also selected an executive officer titled Governor.  
                                                 
180 Kettl, Donald. 1986. Leadership at the Fed. New Haven: Yale University Press: 25. 
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McAdoo intervened in the reserve bank officer selection processes to ensure 
that the Federal Reserve Agent, whom he considered his subordinate, would 
dominate each reserve bank. In the St. Louis case, he wrote Rolla Wells, a prominent 
local businessman, urging him to accept the governorship. In his telegram, McAdoo 
presented the position as ceremonial and suggested the bank’s day-to-day operations 
would be handled by the Federal Reserve Agent.182 This controversy was resolved in 
the Federal Reserve Board’s 1914 Annual Report which declared that the Federal 
Reserve Act had intended for each bank to be self-administering, making the 
governor the top officer.183  
To establish dominance over the Board, McAdoo demanded it meet in the 
Treasury Building.184 H. Parker Willis, the Board’s inaugural secretary, considered 
this a brazen attempt to subordinate the Board. He suggested the Board would have 
been better off if it had met outside of Washington, D.C., in locations where the 
Treasury Secretary and Comptroller were less likely to attend. When the Board 
began its work, it was immediately divided into two factions: one supporting 
McAdoo’s attempt to subordinate the Board and another seeking to establish the 
agency’s autonomy from the Treasury. In December, 1914, the Attorney General 
                                                 
182 The telegram stated, “You will render great public service by so doing. I do not think it will burden you 
heavily, and it will not be necessary for you to give up your business interests or investments.” Quoted in 
Primm 1989, 55. In St. Louis, the Federal Reserve Agent did temporarily establish himself as the bank’s 
leading officer, but disputes continued in other reserve banks. Governor Benjamin Strong quickly 
established himself as the top officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Chandler 1958, 67. 
 
183 See discussion in Harding, William. 1925. The Formative Period of the Federal Reserve System. 
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ruled that the Board was independent of the Treasury.185 Undeterred, McAdoo 
continued his quest for domination. His further attempts are explored from the 
perspective of his two leading critics within the system, Paul Warburg and Benjamin 
Strong. 
Warburg’s Progressive Vision 
Paul Warburg entered the Federal Reserve System with an established 
transformative agenda. He believed the system could develop into an effective institution 
by eliminating marginal reserve banks and establishing the Board as a prestigious, non-
partisan organization. Writing from Europe in the fall of 1913, while the Federal Reserve 
Act wound through Congress, Warburg warned that the proposed twelve bank structure 
was too decentralized to accomplish its organizational goals of developing U.S. financial 
markets and improving gold standard management.186 Warburg believed that the core 
defect of the crisis-prone U.S. financial system lied in its reliance upon the call-loan 
market as the ultimate reservoir for banking capital. To overcome this defect, Warburg 
desired an institution capable of developing deep and liquid secondary commercial debt 
markets.187 While he first championed the creation of a corporate central bank as the 
surest means of cultivating these markets, over time Warburg warmed to the regionalized 
reserve system idea. He considered a 12 bank structure too decentralized to be effective, 
                                                 
185 Beckhart, Benjamin Haggott. 1972. Federal Reserve System. New York: American Institute of Banking: 
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however. Such a system would inevitably create inequalities among the reserve banks 
which would politicize intra-system credit transfers. Warburg preferred a four bank 
system, but believed up to six reserve banks would be workable.188 Coordination among a 
smaller number of more equal reserve banks would depoliticize policy decisions and 
promote financial market development. Under the 12 bank structure, Warburg feared that 
the Board would ultimately determine intra-system interest rates based on political 
calculations: 189 
…the result of the division of the country into twelve Federal Reserve Banks, 
under the Owen-Glass plan, would be the destruction of a reliable and strong 
discount market, the weakening of the reserve power of the country, the undoing 
of the hope of developing on a broad basis the American bank acceptance, and 
the sacrificing of a strong and efficient foreign exchange and gold policy. On the 
other hand, while all these advantages of a frank centralization have been lost, 
the Owen-Glass plan cannot avoid the same degree of centralization which, 
however, it brings about by conferring autocratic powers upon a small group of 
men. 
Warburg undertook two broad entrepreneurial initiatives to transform the Federal 
Reserve. First, he sought to establish the Federal Reserve System as an effective and 
prestigious institution by enlisting high-caliber bankers to serve within the system. He 
also sought to establish the Federal Reserve Board as a non-partisan, technocratic body 
which would advise Congress on desirable banking reforms.190 Warburg’s attempt to 
                                                 
188  Since U.S. banking capital was heavily concentrated in the northeast, Warburg argued the creation of 
more than six reserve banks was destined to generate inequalities across reserve banks. Reserve banks 
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those located in agricultural backwaters would remain indebted to the system. These inequalities would 
make the interest rate charged on intra-system credit transfers a political issue which would stunt secondary 
market development.  
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establish Board independence brought him into direct conflict with McAdoo, as did 
Warburg’s second major initiative. He led a subcommittee which sought to redraw 
Federal Reserve districts and eliminate marginal reserve banks. In 1914, Governor 
Hamlin (Board) appointed a subcommittee composed of Warburg, Frederic Delano, and 
WPG Harding to consider redistricting. Adolph Miller joined this subcommittee’s three 
members in recommending a reduction in the number of reserve banks, giving them a 
four to three Board majority.191 Lacking sufficient support on the Board, McAdoo asked 
the Attorney General to weigh in on the matter. In November, 1915, the Attorney General 
ruled that established reserve banks couldn’t be eliminated.192 
Strong’s Hegemonic Ambition 
 When the FRBNY’s directors asked Benjamin Strong to serve as the bank’s 
Governor, he wrote Paul Warburg telling him he wished to decline.193 Strong believed the 
system faced long odds of successfully establishing itself as a permanent fixture in the 
American political economy. Strong considered the Board “politicized” due to its ex 
officio cabinet members and considered a twelve bank system too decentralized.194 He 
thought such a fragmented institution was poorly suited for advancing his international 
goals and invited inflation. After receiving Strong’s letter, Warburg spent a weekend in 
the country convincing Strong the system needed his expertise.195 Once at work inside, 
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Strong devoted his life to overcoming the Federal Reserve Act’s deficiencies and 
establishing the Federal Reserve as a powerful and effective institution. Strong undertook 
two broad entrepreneurial initiatives to reshape the system. First, he sought to organize 
the reserve bank governors to promote shared practices and coordinate policies. Second, 
he worked with Warburg to lobby Congress to reform the Federal Reserve Act to enhance 
and clarify the system’s delegated authorities.  
 In October, 1914, the Board invited the reserve bank governors to Washington, 
D.C., for a conference devoted to organizing the reserve banks. Out of this meeting grew 
the governors conference, an ongoing forum of the twelve reserve bank governors.196 
Strong organized the conference and used it to build trust, shared practices, and to 
coordinate policies. This extralegal organization quickly came into conflict with the 
Board, however, which considered it a rival.197 The Board and the governors conference 
feuded over policymaking jurisdiction and the governors’ authority to organize 
themselves independently. Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act granted the reserve 
banks the right to “establish from time to time, subject to review and determination of the 
Federal Reserve Board, rates of discount to be charged by the Federal Reserve Bank for 
each class of paper, which shall be fixed with a view of accommodating commerce and 
business.” This vague language could be interpreted as meaning either the reserve banks 
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or the Board ultimately retained control over policy changes.198 On November 18th, 1914, 
the Board’s secretary sent a letter to the reserve banks informing them that they could not 
announce or change discount rates before receiving Board approval.199 It also 
subsequently pressured individual reserve banks to lower their discount rates.  
In early 1915, the governors conference approved a resolution stating the reserve 
banks would initiate rate changes “without pressure from the Federal Reserve Board.”200 
It also established a standing executive committee headed by Strong and hired a 
permanent secretary. In January 1916, the Board’s second governor, WPG Harding, 
moved to abolish this executive committee. He denied funds for its secretary’s salary and 
as well as for governors’ travel expenses which weren’t initiated by the Board.201 Some 
Board members believed the governors conference was attempting to subvert the Federal 
Reserve Act by functioning as a de facto central bank. The governors similarly 
complained the Board was overreaching its legal authority. Despite the Board’s attempts 
to curtail its activities, the governors conference continued meeting quarterly until the 
U.S. entered WWI in April, 1917, when it suspended its meetings for the duration of the 
war. In 1916, Strong pushed his fellow governors to establish a centralized committee to 
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coordinate the reserve banks’ purchases and sales of government securities.202 Although 
this effort initially failed, the next chapter explores how establishment of such a 
committee in the 1920s made the system more central bank-like. 
Collaborating to Reform the Federal Reserve Act 
Strong and Warburg worked together to convince Congress to make several 
amendments to the Federal Reserve Act. First, they considered the system’s currency and 
reserve provisions inadequate. They considered replacing other currencies in circulation 
with Federal Reserve notes an essential step in centralizing national gold reserves and 
promoting financial stability.203 Their ability to do so was limited, however, by 
provisions which authorized reserve banks to issue currency only against discounted 
commercial paper, not directly against gold. Strong developed an extra-legal device for 
issuing Federal Reserve notes against gold.204 The Board’s 1916 and 1917 annual reports 
recommended legalizing gold-backed Federal Reserve notes.205  
 Strong and Warburg considered a second major deficiency the Federal Reserve’s 
lack of authority to induce or compel banks to join the system. Federally-chartered 
commercial banks were obligated to join, but they retained the right to re-charter as state 
banks and thereby exit the system. State-chartered banks and trust companies had the 
option of joining, but most considered the costs of joining too high relative to the 
                                                 
202 The Federal Reserve Act required the system to be self-funding. Consequently, the Federal Reserve 
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potential benefits.206 Strong believed the system would remain vulnerable as long as 
state-chartered banks and trust companies, which housed half of the nation’s deposits, 
weren’t forced to join.207 In a 1917 speech, Warburg argued that it was unfair to expect 
the 7,500 members of the Federal Reserve System to provide the emergency reserve base 
for the country’s 27,000 commercial banks and trust companies.208 
 The last major weakness Strong identified was the system’s lack of defined fiscal 
agency functions. 209 Section 15 of the Federal Reserve Act authorized the Secretary of 
the Treasury to name the reserve banks as fiscal agents, but it did not compel him to do 
so. Strong wanted the reserve banks to gain a fiscal agency monopoly by replacing the 
Independent Treasury System, which the Federal Reserve Act left in place. This agency 
provided the treasury secretary patronage opportunities, however, and allowed the 
Treasury to earn interest on government funds deposited in national banks.210 McAdoo 
waited until January, 1916, to name the reserve banks fiscal agents. He didn’t place large 
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government deposits into the system until March, 1917, however, as President Wilson 
prepared to lead the country into WWI.211 
Conclusion: Assessing Federal Reserve System Development (1913-1916) 
 Scholars have expended considerable energy theorizing the exact moment of the 
Federal Reserve’s design. The now conventional view dates it to the 1910 Jekyll Island 
meeting and the resulting Aldrich Plan.212 Dissenting political scientists have pointed to 
other moments to explain salient aspects of the system’s design. One suggests that after 
the Aldrich Plan was submitted into Congress, numerically-dominant agrarians 
“Bryanized” the plan and established a decentralized, government-controlled, central 
banking system.213 A different view focuses on the bill’s difficult journey through the 
Senate and analyzes roll call votes on proposed amendments to argue that geographically-
dispersed interests supported the Board’s independence.214 A third view focuses on post-
enactment politics and argues that partisan control of the RBOC presented an irresistible 
patronage opportunity which led to the construction of an excessively decentralized 
reserve bank structure aimed at delivering benefits to southern Democrats.215 
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 Each of these views does a good job of explaining discrete aspects of the Federal 
Reserve’s design, but fail in explaining the system’s overall fragmentation. This chapter 
has argued the Federal Reserve System’s fragmented structure is best understood as the 
result of an elite partisan compromise which crystallized in June, 1913. Its design 
reflected the cross-pressures facing the Democratic Party’s leadership of appeasing the 
party’s populist base while attracting western progressives into a durable, Democratic 
partisan coalition. The Progressives who followed Theodore Roosevelt were more 
conservative than the Progressives who followed William Jennings Bryan. Bryan 
repeatedly abandoned his own publicly-stated reform principles by urging his followers 
to support Wilson’s right-leaning reforms.  
The design concessions made to populists were significant, but hardly represented 
the “Bryanization” portrayed by contemporary Republicans and financiers.216 The 
system’s decentralized structure appealed to conservative and populist Democrats and 
Progressive Party members alike.217The government currency liability concession to 
Bryan had little real effect as Federal Reserve Banks were required to hold assets and 
gold as backing for currency issues. The spirit of Wilson’s other concession to Bryan, 
removing banker representation from the Board, was annulled by Wilson’s appointments 
                                                 
216 While the legislation was being debated in the Senate in October 1913, former Sen. Aldrich gave a 
speech at the Academy of Political Science criticizing the bill. He argued that the act’s currency provisions 
were “radical and revolutionary in their character.”  He continued, “The ascription by Mr. Bryan of 
transcendent importance to the issue of government notes by a government board… is but the first step in a 
revolutionary program… if carried to its conclusion, would result in unbounded inflation.” Aldrich warned 
the Federal Reserve Act “will be the first and most important step toward changing our form of government 
from a democracy to an autocracy.” 
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of Warburg and Harding. Although both were required to relinquish their personal 
banking interests, few would argue they were no longer bankers. It is remarkable that 
Bryan intervened in support of the president’s conservative Board appointments since 
they undermined his personal agreement with Wilson. Sanders is correct in arguing that 
agrarian populists weren’t “duped” into establishing a central bank, but the institution 
they created was far more creditor-friendly than they desired.218  
Even before the Federal Reserve System was up and running, a “struggle for 
power” was underway to control it. Critics-cum-agents entered the system with 
transformative agendas. Populists and financial elites alike preferred a centralized 
institution they could control to reshape the U.S. financial system. Over the system’s first 
two and a half years of operations, the power struggle went nowhere. Warburg’s push for 
bureaucratic autonomy was undermined by, and thwarted, McAdoo’s attempt to capture 
the Board. Strong’s attempt to organize the reserve banks was curtailed by the Board’s 
attempt to reign in the governors conference. Until April, 1917, the system’s 
constitutional restraints prevailed.219 
U.S. entrance into WWI in April 1917 reshaped the Federal Reserve System. 
Treasury Secretary McAdoo entered into a Hamiltonian alliance with the FRBNY, 
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bypassing other claimants to monetary policymaking authority.220 McAdoo granted the 
reserve banks enhanced fiscal agency duties. Congress also amended the Federal Reserve 
Act in ways Strong and Warburg suggested. President Wilson made patriotic appeals to 
state banks and trust companies to join the system.221 
WWI had both passing and permanent effects on the Federal Reserve System (see 
Table 2). The war caused a temporary centralization of authority within the system as the 
Board and the governors conference were effectively shut out of the monetary 
policymaking process. After the war ended, however, the system’s latent power struggle 
would reemerge as excluded agents sought to reassert claims to governing authority, 
resulting in increased fragmentation. This renewed struggle was exacerbated by 
Warburg’s 1918 departure from the Board and a subsequent decline in the quality of 
Board appointments.222 The next chapter analyzes how this struggle unfolded in the 
1920s and its implications for both the domestic and international political economies.  
Table 2: Wartime Reforms of the Federal Reserve Act 
Reform Goal 
Agent 
Supporters 
Demand Voiced Enactment 
Currency 
Liberalization 
Warburg, 
Strong 
Warburg - 10/22/15 
Strong  6/24/1915 
6/21/1917 
Modify Member 
Reserve 
Requirements 
Warburg, 
Strong 
Warburg - 10/22/15 
Strong  - 6/24/1915 
6/21/1917 
Inducements for 
State-chartered 
Banks to Join 
Warburg, 
Strong 
Warburg - 6/9/1916  
Strong - 5/14/1915 
6/21/1917 
Fiscal Agency 
Monopoly 
Strong Strong - 4/22/1917 
Disestablishment of the 
Independent Treasury 
System - 5/29/1920 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE FED’S STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND THE INTERWAR 
GOLD EXCHANGE STANDARD  
 This chapter develops a new interpretation of the US’s role in the rise and fall of 
the interwar gold exchange standard. Extant scholarship focuses on the rise of social 
democracy in Europe and great power politics to explain the failure of the interwar fixed 
exchange rate regime.223 This chapter instead focuses on how the restoration of earlier 
modes of American governance, Republican rule and Federal Reserve fragmentation, 
undermined international currency instability. I argue these two domestic variables 
shaped the extent to which US policies stabilized the international currency regime from 
1922 to 1931. The 1920s return of Republican rule led to official head-in-the-sand 
positions toward the vexing international questions of the day. Submerged within an 
inward-looking state, a struggle for power unfolded within the Federal Reserve. In 1922, 
a new policy instrument was discovered, open market operations, which enabled the 
system to shape market interest rates. Once this instrument’s power became known, 
however, a fight broke out over who should control it. One outcome of this struggle was 
the creation of the Open Market Investment Committee, a compact body representing the 
regional economies most integrated into the transatlantic economy, which stood to gain 
the most from European currency stabilization. By 1928, however, excluded agents began 
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lobbying for a more inclusive policymaking process, resulting in the 1930 transfer of 
authority to the 12-governor Open Market Policy Conference. This structure 
disempowered the central bankers who pushed for expansionary policies to fight 
deflation and preserve the gold exchange standard. Combined with a Republican regime 
whose “household remedy” for crisis was increased protectionism, the Fed’s fragmented 
structure doomed the interwar gold exchange standard.224 
The Friedman and Schwartz Hypothesis Revisited 
I myself believe very strongly that this depression was almost wholly 
preventable, and that it would have been prevented if Governor Strong had 
lived… He discovered… that open-market operations would stabilize – he 
discovered for himself what was necessary to cure the deflation that started in 
May 1920 and to prevent an inflation… only a few of us knew what he was 
doing. His colleagues did not understand it.225 
     Irving Fisher, Congressional Testimony, 1935 
Few central bankers have proved as legendary as Benjamin Strong, the inaugural 
FRBNY Governor who served until his death in October, 1928. Scholars ranging from 
Milton Friedman to Charles Kindleberger have lamented Strong’s passing as contributing 
to the onset and depth of the Great Depression. Scholars’ reasons for mourning Strong 
vary dramatically, however. For quantity theorists like Irving Fisher or Milton Friedman, 
Strong was a visionary pioneer who developed open market operations as a tool for 
stabilizing the U.S. domestic economy.226 For Kindleberger, Strong was one of the only 
U.S. policymakers willing to recognize the U.S.’s hegemonic responsibility to stabilize 
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the international economy.227 This chapter demonstrates that in the minds of the 
FRBNY’s leading officers, domestic and international prosperity were intimately linked, 
and enlightened Federal Reserve policies could promote both. This institutionally-
embedded belief survived Strong’s death and the Great Depression.  
Although they didn’t think explicitly in these terms, I argue FRBNY officials 
preferred open market policies which promoted dollar exchange rate stability. Given the 
U.S.’s ascendant position in the international economy, a steady dollar was a necessary 
anchor for maintenance of a fixed exchange rate regime. Throughout the 1920s, U.S. 
protectionism and persistent budget surpluses promoted a strong (undervalued) dollar and 
exported deflationary pressures abroad. Central bankers recognized that expansionary 
credit policies provided a second-best means of countering these deflationary pressures. 
In 1924, 1927, and for much of 1929-1932, FRBNY officials proposed expansionary 
policies to stabilize foreign currencies, funnel American capital abroad, and increase 
European purchasing power for American exports. When implemented in 1924 and 1927, 
system wide expansionary policies achieved these objectives. After the 1929 stock 
market crash, the FRBNY enacted its own expansionary policy which achieved similarly 
beneficial international effects. After a January 1930 regime change which increased the 
open market committee’s fragmentation, however, FRBNY officials continued pushing 
for expansionary policies, but their proposals were continually delayed, scaled down, and 
vetoed by other system officials urging caution. The Fed alone could not have saved the 
gold exchange standard, but a vigorous expansionary program could have preserved the 
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kept the fixed exchange rate system afloat while politicians addressed the underlying 
adjustment problems which plagued the international economy.  
This chapter follows recent scholars in arguing Strong’s influence has been 
exaggerated.228 It advances a refined version of Friedman and Schwartz’s seminal 
argument which focuses on institutional fragmentation as a source of policy rigidity. 
Friedman and Schwartz make two overlapping claims regarding why a Strong-led 
Federal Reserve would have prevented a deflationary spiral. Their first hypothesis 
focuses on Strong’s advanced understanding of central banking, which they argue maps 
onto their own (monetarist).229 They argue a Strong-led Fed would have implemented an 
expansionary open market operations policy which would have countered domestic 
deflation. Their second claim has to do with Strong’s “leadership,” operationalized as a 
unique ability to centralize power and prevent institutional changes. Strong’s death 
allegedly caused power to disperse throughout the system, manifested as the transfer of 
open market authority to the Open Market Policy Conference (OMPC):230  
Open market operations now depended upon a majority of twelve rather than five 
governors and the twelve ‘came instructed by their directors’ rather than ready to 
follow the leadership of New York as the five had been when Strong was 
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Policy, 1924-1933. Cambridge University Press, 1991; Wood 2005; Mark Toma, Monetary Policy and the 
Onset of the Great Depression: The Myth of Benjamin Strong as Decisive Leader. Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013. 
 
229 This view has already been discredited in the literature. See, Wicker, Elmus. 1966. Federal Reserve 
Monetary Policy, 1917-1933. New York: Random House; Brunner, Karl, and Allan H. Meltzer. 1968. 
“What did we Learn from the Monetary Experience of the United States in the Great Depression?” The 
Canadian Journal of Economics 1 (2): 334-348; Wheelock 1991; Meltzer 2003; Wood 2005. 
 
230 Friedman and Schwartz 1963, 414. Friedman and Schwartz admit that Strong’s successor, George L. 
Harrison, pushed for two years for the kinds of expansionary open market policies they believe would have 
staved off crisis, but subsequently “reverted to his natural character, that of an extremely competent lawyer 
and excellent administrator, who… placed great value in conciliating opposing points of view and 
achieving harmony.” Brunner and Meltzer (1968, 337) claim "[Harrison] lacked the ability to lead and was 
unable to persuade the majority to accept his views, as Strong would have done had he lived.” 
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governor… the shift in the locus of power… surely would not have occurred 
when it did if Strong had lived…    
This chapter casts doubt on Strong’s ability to prevent institutional changes. 
When Strong passed in October 1928, he had been suffering from tuberculosis for over a 
decade, often taking extended leaves for recovery and travel. In Strong’s absence, other 
Federal Reserve agents often tried to change the rules governing monetary policy 
decisions, and they sometimes succeeded. Friedman and Schwartz err by arguing that a 
single man could sustain a particular institutional order. Institutions are inherently 
collaborative projects which remain open to contestation and change over time.231 The 
last chapter demonstrated that the Federal Reserve Act left crucial governance questions 
unresolved, inviting a struggle for power. This chapter charts the continuation of that 
struggle after the system regained operational independence in 1920. One outcome in this 
struggle was the creation of Open Market Investment Committee (OMIC), which was 
well-suited for promoting currency stability. Its successor, the OMPC, was not. 
My analytical approach to the interwar gold standard varies from scholars who 
prioritize domestic or international factors in explaining exchange rate policy 
decisions.232 Instead, I focus on central bankers as uniquely-positioned agents who 
navigate international and domestic political constraints in real time. To support the 
restoration of the international gold standard, central bankers needed to find collaborative 
                                                 
231 Orren and Skowronek 1994; Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen, eds. 2009. Explaining Institutional 
Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. New York: Cambridge University Press; Berk, Gerald, Dennis C. 
Galvan, and Victoria Hattam, eds. 2013. Political Creativity: Reconfiguring Institutional Order and 
Change. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
232 For a representative example of the former, see Simmons, Beth A. 1997. Who Adjusts? Domestic 
Sources of Foreign Economic Policy during the Interwar Years. Princeton: Princeton University Press. For 
the latter, see Kindleberger 1973. 
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solutions for distributing international adjustment costs. Because the U.S. was the first 
state to restore gold convertibility after WWI, the gold-dollar link exposed Europeans to 
U.S. macroeconomic disturbances at an unprecedented level.233 Due to its dominant 
economic position, the U.S. was the state most capable of absorbing international 
adjustment costs. The Republican-controlled state, however, implemented mercantilist 
policies which pushed adjustment costs onto others. The FRBNY’s central bankers 
understood that U.S. protectionism undermined long-run prosperity. In the 1920s, they 
were able to strike international bargains and change policies to absorb adjustment costs 
despite a hostile political order. The 1930 erection of new institutional barriers inside the 
Fed, however, decreased the system’s capacity to absorb adjustment costs and thereby 
promote currency stability abroad. 
The argument is developed as follows. First, I examine how mercantilist U.S. 
policies undermined post-WWI liberal international order-building initiatives. Second, I 
theorize how the geographic dispersion of U.S. sectoral interests shaped the distribution 
of exchange rate and monetary policy preferences across the Federal Reserve Banks. The 
OMIC empowered a subset of reserve bank governors who represented regions which 
stood to benefit disproportionately from European currency stabilization. The OMPC 
disempowered these agents. Third, I analyze the impacts of system’s internal struggle and 
the FRBNY’s international diplomacy in shaping Federal Reserve policies from 1922 
through the 1931 flotation of the British pound. 
                                                 
233 WWI had transformed the US from a net debtor country, with net liabilities of over $3.7 billion in 1914, 
to the world’s foremost creditor, with net assets of $3.5 billion in 1919. Eichengreen (1992) focuses on how 
the interwar gold exchange standard transmitted the effects of domestic macroeconomic economic policies 
abroad.  
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U.S. Mercantilism and the Post-WWI International Political Economy 
President Wilson led the United States into WWI to shape the postwar peace.234 He 
wanted to craft a liberal international order centered on a new collective security 
organization called a League of Nations. Wilson hoped to gain European support for the 
League while negotiating a “peace without victory” which would limit postwar 
reparations. At the Versailles peace conference, however, Wilson conceded to allied 
demands for a large German indemnity in exchange for support for the League. British 
representative John Maynard Keynes angrily left the negotiations early to pen The 
Economic Consequences of the Peace, where Keynes predicted that reparations would 
handicap the restoration of European prosperity and a lasting peace.235  
When Wilson returned to the US, he encountered an American dilemma. American 
presidents can negotiate international agreements, but a 2/3 Senate supermajority is 
required for ratification. Wilson returned home to fierce Senate opposition to the treaty 
and U.S. membership in the League. The Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. 
Consequently, U.S. participation in the international regime Wilson designed died on the 
shoals of domestic politics and a constitutional order resistant to change.  
Non-ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was part of a broader mercantilist turn in 
US postwar foreign policy. In May, 1920, Republican presidential candidate Warren G. 
Harding famously declared in his “Return to Normalcy” speech that Americans desired 
“…not submergence in internationality, but sustainment in triumphant nationality… 
                                                 
234 Link, Arthur S. 1954. Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era. New York: Harper & Row: Chapter 
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tranquility at home is more precious than peace abroad…”236 Harding’s message 
resonated across an American society which widely believed the U.S. had already 
sacrificed enough for Europeans and shouldn’t bind itself to intervene in Europe’s ancient 
conflicts. In the same speech, Harding charged the Wilson administration with fiscal 
recklessness, arguing “If we put an end to false economics which lure humanity to utter 
chaos, ours will be the commanding example of world leadership today…” WWI’s 
prosecution had caused the nation’s price level to double and the national debt to explode 
from $1 billion to $25 billion.237 40% of this national debt had been leant to US allies 
abroad. Republicans dominated the 1920 elections, gaining unified control of 
government. A new era of Republican partisan rule had begun.     
By the time Republicans took office in April, 1921, the postwar boom had turned 
to bust. The economy was contracting sharply and the wholesale price level had fallen by 
39 percent.238 Newfound fiscal surpluses and high Federal Reserve discount rates formed 
a restrictive macroeconomic policy mix, exporting deflationary pressures abroad through 
the gold-dollar link. Floating European currencies quickly depreciated on foreign 
exchange markets.239 Domestically, American farmers bore the brunt of falling prices due 
to flooded agricultural markets and diminished European purchasing power. 
Congressmen representing distressed rural districts introduced legislation calling for 
                                                 
236 Warren G. Harding, Return to Normalcy Speech. Boston, MA. 5/14/1920. 
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mandated reductions in Federal Reserve discount rates; adoption of a new Federal 
Reserve price stability mandate; and “emergency” tariff legislation. The latter was passed 
and signed into law within three months of Republicans taking office.  
The Republican administrations of the 1920s chose not to participate in 
international economic conferences. They feared US participation would inevitably result 
in calls for allied war debt forgiveness and tariff reductions. Many Europeans and 
American financiers viewed cancellation of allied war debts as the only path toward 
reducing Germany’s reparation burden, which was widely understood as a major obstacle 
for restoring international prosperity. Since the allies relied upon German reparation 
payments to service their US war debts, and the US occupied a position of unrivaled 
economic strength, a haircut of official American debts was widely considered desirable 
from a global standpoint. War debt cancellation was extremely unpopular among U.S. 
society, however.240 Republican administrations throughout the twenties consistently 
denied the link between war debts and reparations, insisting its former allies repay the 
U.S. in full. They similarly resisted external calls to lower trade barriers. Instead, unified 
Republican governments raised tariffs in 1921, 1922, and disastrously, in 1930. 
The tale of interwar US mercantilism is well known, but less attention has been 
paid to the refraction of deflationary US macroeconomic policies through the dollar’s link 
to gold. Republicans were committed to paying down the unprecedentedly-large national 
debt, requiring budget surpluses. Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, a hyper-wealthy 
industrialist, also desired income tax reductions. As income taxes fell, tariffs were raised, 
                                                 
240 To Republicans’ credit, insistence on full war debt repayment was popular across the US. See 
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and war debts were collected, the burden of paying down the U.S. national debt shifted 
from wealthy to poorer Americans and distressed Europeans. Restrictive fiscal and trade 
policies exported deflationary pressures abroad, helping the US become “a great sinkhole 
for gold.”241 Between April 1920 and mid-1924, US gold reserves increased 70% to $4.2 
billion, nearly half of the world’s monetary gold stock. Persistent trade and budget 
surpluses throughout the decade supported gold inflows (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3: U.S. Fiscal and Trade Surpluses and Gold Reserves (1920-1930)   
             Source: Fred Database (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/) 
 
Despite remaining wedded to protectionism, many Republican leaders desired the 
restoration of a more liberal international economic order.242 Lacking support for official 
initiatives, they turned to the “diplomacy of the dollar,” relying on private American 
capital to aid European reconstruction.243 One aspect of this strategy included tacit 
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administration support for the Federal Reserve’s collaboration with European central 
banks to restore the international gold standard. At an October 1921 meeting of the 
Federal Reserve Board, Benjamin Strong informed his colleagues “whether we want to or 
not we are going to have to take some part in this situation abroad. We probably won’t do 
it politically, but we have to do it financially and economically.”244 Gov. Norris 
(Philadelphia) agreed:  
I think the three great opportunities that we have had to accomplish the 
stabilization of foreign exchange were, first, to go into the League of Nations; 
second, to make a readjustment of our tariff… and the third was to empower the 
Secretary of the Treasury to deal in an intelligent way with refunding of foreign 
obligations… But because we have lost those three it does not follow… that we 
ought to throw aside and discard all others… It seems to me that the proposition 
[Strong] has suggested is one that undoubtedly has merit and may be reasonably 
be expected to accomplish some results. 
As will be demonstrated below, Benjamin Strong eventually convinced his OMIC 
colleagues, a majority of Board members, and Treasury Secretary Mellon, to support 
system wide policies aimed at restoring currency convertibility abroad. First, however, I 
theorize how the geographic dispersion of U.S. sectoral interests shaped this era’s 
national political economy and the monetary and exchange rate policy preferences of the 
Federal Reserve Bank Governors.    
Economic Geography and the Limits of Federal Reserve Internationalism 
Many analysts of interwar US economic policy focus on a domestic struggle 
between opposing “internationalist” and “isolationist” coalitions.245 The former was 
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245 See Ferguson, Thomas. 1984. “From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, 
and American Public Policy in the Great Depression." International Organization 38 (1): 41-94; 
Gourevitch, Peter. 1986. Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic 
Crises. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; Frieden 1988; Trubowitz 1998. 
 90 
 
 
composed of international financiers, export-oriented producers, and foreign direct 
investors.246 It favored policies which would help restore and stabilize a liberal 
international economy, including foreign currency stabilization. The isolationist coalition, 
by contrast, was composed of import-competing sectors and producers of nontradeable 
goods and services. This coalition preferred trade protectionism and was critical of US 
interventions in foreign affairs. 
The geographic dispersion of these opposing interests gave isolationists the upper 
hand in crafting state policies. Virtually the entire constellation of internationalist 
interests was located in northeastern U.S. cities, which had come to occupy a hegemonic 
position in the global economy.247 The cotton-dominated southern economy, whose 
markets lied primarily in Europe, also favored liberalization. Outside of these pockets of 
internationalism, however, “most of the economy remained as inward looking as ever.”248 
The 1920s agricultural crisis gave western farmers “little incentive to support government 
efforts to liberalize and stabilize the international system.”249 Furthermore, southern and 
western manufacturers looked to domestic markets. Isolationists asserted their dominance 
over Congress and the Presidency through electoral mechanisms which systematically 
favor dispersed over concentrated geographic interests.250  
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Preferences over monetary and exchange rate policy also mapped onto this broad 
geographic divide. In an open economy characterized by high levels of cross-border trade 
and investment, as was the case in the 1920s, “internationally oriented economic actors 
should be especially concerned to ensure currency stability, [whereas] domestically 
oriented actors [should be] indifferent or opposed.”251 Support for international currency 
stabilization initiatives was strongest among internationally-oriented interests, which 
were concentrated in the northeast. 
This geographic dispersion of interests was consequential for Federal Reserve 
officials’ institutional and policy preferences. Building off of the macroeconomic 
trilemma, Jeff Frieden theorizes a preference trade-off between international currency 
stability and domestic monetary policy autonomy.252 The Federal Reserve’s fragmented 
structure partially devolved policymaking authority to the regional level, allowing for 
regional variation in discount rates.253 In 1922, the reserve bank governors discovered a 
new policy instrument, open market operations, which threatened to overwhelm the 
system’s decentralized structure. When open market operations were wielded centrally 
for policy purposes, the system influenced market interest rates directly, and acted as a 
                                                 
251 Frieden, Jeffry. 1996. “Economic Integration and the Politics of Monetary Policy in the United 
States.” In Internationalization and Domestic Politics, eds. Keohane and Milner. Cambridge University 
Press, New York: 116.  See also, Jeffry A. Frieden, 1991.   
 
252 This builds off the well-known macroeconomic trilemma which suggests states can only achieve two of 
three financial goals simultaneously: exchange rate stability; capital mobility; and domestic monetary 
policy autonomy. In a high-capital mobility world, states must choose between fixed exchange rates and 
monetary policy autonomy. See Frieden 1991.   
 
253 Wheelock 1998. 
 
 92 
 
 
unified central bank.254 For reserve bank governors who hoped to retain policymaking 
autonomy, open market operations threatened their institutional sovereignty.  
Although they didn’t realize it at the time, reserve bank governors’ institutional 
preferences often reflected their preference for “domestic” monetary policy autonomy 
over international currency stability (see Figure 4). By fighting to keep credit policy 
decisions decentralized, they expressed their preference for domestic (regional) autonomy 
over international currency stability. Governors from inwardly-focused regional 
economies were more concerned with local conditions than monetary stability abroad. 
They feared domination by the FRBNY or the Board more than currency instability. Not 
all agents held coherent institutional and policy preferences, however. Benjamin Strong 
and his successor, for example, championed systemic policies to support European 
currency stabilization while simultaneously defending reserve bank autonomy. 
Figure 4: Institutional and Policy Preferences across the Federal Reserve Banks 
 
                                                 
254 Board Member Adolph Miller testified before the Senate in 1931, “…whenever the Federal Reserve 
System operates through the open-market committee, it operates, in effect, as a central bank… You strip 
your regional banks of their separate control of credit in their several districts when you operate with their 
resources in the central money market of the country.” Cited in Wheelock 1991, 70. 
 93 
 
 
In the next section, I analyze the struggle for power over open market operations 
and Federal Reserve policies from 1922-1931. One outcome of the system’s struggle was 
the creation of the OMIC, which was composed of reserve bank governors from New 
York, Boston, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Cleveland. These governors represented 
regional economies housing the majority of U.S. sectoral interests with a strong 
preference for currency stability.255 The addition of the seven remaining governors to the 
OMPC in 1930, however, drastically altered the distribution of monetary and exchange 
rate policy preferences on the open market committee. The new members were skeptical 
of bold open market policies designed to stabilize the international currency regime. 
Beyond changing the committee’s preference structure, the new regime was more 
fragmented than its predecessor. When FRBNY officials proposed bold expansionary 
policies to combat global deflation, they were inevitably met with obstruction. 
In addition to disagreeing with the merits of the FRBNY’s policy proposals on the 
OMPC, some governors also resented the secular growth of the FRBNY’s power within 
the system. Paul Warburg had warned at the system’s origin that a twelve bank structure 
would lead to wide inequalities across reserve banks.256 Despite the reserve banks’ de 
jure equality, variations in the resources each wielded inevitably led to a skewed 
distribution of institutional power (see Figure 5). While extant scholarship has focused on 
excluded reserve bank governors’ resentment of the authority New York wielded on the 
                                                 
255 Agricultural producers which relied on foreign markets exclusively, like cotton growers, also stood to 
benefit from currency stability abroad.  
 
256 Paul Warburg served on the Federal Reserve Board until 1918 when he asked not to be reappointed by 
President Wilson due to his fear that his German heritage would make him a political target. Warburg’s 
departure from the Board undermined his bid to establish that agency as an autonomous and expert body. In 
the 1920s, the quality of Board appointments declined. 
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OMIC, excluded governors also begrudged the FRBNY’s growing market power, which 
made it a hegemonic presence inside the system and in the international economy. 
Figure 5: Paid-In Capital of the Federal Reserve Banks (millions) 
 
           Source: Annual Reports of the Federal Reserve Board  
The Fed’s Struggle and the Interwar Gold Exchange Standard 
Resurrecting the international gold standard was an urgent postwar priority for many 
central bankers. Shortly after the 1918 armistice, Bank of England (BOE) Governor 
Montagu Norman suggested Britain restore gold convertibility immediately. The British 
government still had a large floating debt, however, and was unwilling to return to gold 
because it feared increased borrowing costs. This condition was ubiquitous across 
Europe. After the U.S. ended its gold embargo in June 1919, Europeans were slow to 
follow suit.  
Although Benjamin Strong (FRBNY) and Montagu Norman (BOE) were close 
friends and shared a broad central banking philosophy, they held differing visions of the 
best means of restoring the international gold standard. 257 Strong preferred a pragmatic 
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approach focused on restoring convertibility among the great powers. In 1919, Strong 
wrote Norman suggesting that if Britain, France, and Germany quickly returned to gold, 
“anything further would [not] be required or desirable for many years to come.”258 Three 
years later when Europeans still hadn’t returned to gold, Strong wrote Norman suggesting 
the Federal Reserve could help by establishing an international stabilization fund which 
would use the Federal Reserve’s abundant capital to help European central bankers 
stabilize their currencies and return to gold.259  
Norman responded “artificial means” wouldn’t be “practicable until the [war] debts 
have been settled, the Reparations adjusted, and free Gold Markets [restored]…” at which 
point things could be handled the “…old-fashioned way” of central bankers responding to 
market signals.260 Although Norman’s response struck an orthodox tone, he actually 
championed establishment of a novel monetary order, a League of Nations-centered gold 
exchange standard. Under this system, leading countries would hold their reserves strictly 
in gold, but secondary states would hold both gold and foreign currencies as reserves.261 
Under this plan central banks would agree to adjust credit policies to stabilize domestic 
prices in terms of gold. Strong worried about the implications of Norman’s proposal for 
Federal Reserve policies:262  
…the United States, with its currency at a premium he world over, should… 
regulate credit policies as to expand credit and currency to a point where the 
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value of our currency would decline and consequently other currencies would 
approach the value of ours… From the standpoint of this country, we must be 
assured that we are not suggesting… handing a blank check to some 
impoverished nations of the world… and especially to those whose government 
finances are in complete disorder… the domestic functions of the bank of issue 
are paramount to everything… anything in the nature of a league or alliance, 
with world conditions as they are, is necessarily filled with peril.  
Without active US support, Norman’s League-centered monetary order stood little 
chance of gaining traction. Norman hoped to hold a large conference of central bankers to 
negotiate a coordinated return to gold, but Strong resisted.263 As the representative of the 
world’s leading creditor, Strong feared he would be overwhelmed with requests for 
extraordinary assistance.264 With Strong and Norman at an impasse, the interwar 
monetary regime developed along parallel tracks. As Norman desired, central banks 
began holding sterling and US dollars as reserves, leading to the de facto emergence of a 
gold exchange standard. As Strong desired, European gold convertibility was restored 
pragmatically on a case-by-case basis.  
 In 1921, Strong suggested to Norman they “adopt a policy of complete 
understanding, and exchange of information and views, and to cooperate where our 
respective interests made it possible.”265 Strong was willing to push his colleagues to 
adopt internationally-oriented policies if he believed they would promote the U.S.’s long-
term interests. When Norman suggested an increase in U.S. prices might ease Britain’s 
return to gold, Strong replied tersely, “You may be sure that inflation has no charms 
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which have not been analyzed by Reserve Bank men and rejected as spurious.”266 
Strong’s fear of stoking domestic inflation was rooted in the political backlash against the 
Federal Reserve which followed the postwar boom and bust. Members of Congress 
introduced bills which threatened the reserve banks’ autonomy and suggested imposing a 
price stability mandate on the system. Although Strong believed price stability was a 
worthy goal, he considered such a mandate incompatible with American institutions:267 
What I can’t understand is the willingness of thoughtful, studious men who… 
have been brought up in the spirit of American institutions… proposing a 
scheme to Congress which in effect delegates avowedly and consciously this 
vast power of responsibility for price fixing to a small group of men who, in an 
economic sense, might come to be regarded as nothing short of a super-
government. It is undemocratic, absolutely contrary to the spirit of American 
institutions, and so dangerous in its possible ultimate developments that I cannot 
see the slightest merit in the proposal.   
Strong was not dogmatic. He was an astute actor navigating dangerous political 
terrain. Strong firmly believed the key to long-run price stability lied in the restoration of 
the international gold standard. He recognized that credit policy could not effectively 
control all prices and therefore considered a price stability mandate “criminal suicide.”268 
Strong explained his situation to Norman, “In the face of a powerfully organized 
antagonism in Congress, the Federal Reserve must… rely for its protection against 
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political attack and interference upon the present administration…”269 He recognized the 
administration had incentives to push for “cheap money, abundant credit, and good 
business…” but recognized the “The effect of unlocking the door which this particular 
key fits is rising prices…”270 Strong would eventually gain Treasury Secretary Andrew 
Mellon’s institutional support. First, however, he would battle Mellon over the reserve 
banks’ right to buy and sell government securities. 
The Discovery and Politicization of Open Market Operations 
Section 14 of the 1913 Federal Reserve Act states: “Any Federal reserve bank 
may, under rules and regulations prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board, purchase and 
sell in the open market…cable transfers and bankers acceptances and bills of exchange… 
[and] bonds and notes of the United States.” Congress required the system to be self-
funding and granted the reserve banks the right to buy securities to cover their operating 
expenses.271 During the 1920-21 recession high discount rates led member banks to repay 
their discount loans, reducing reserve banks’ earning assets. In late 1921, they began 
individually buying government bonds to bolster their earnings. By June, these purchases 
exceeded $350 million dollars.272 FRBNY officials quickly discovered security purchases 
added reserves to the banking system which indirectly lowered market interest rates.273 
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In March, 1922, Mellon complained to Strong that the reserve banks’ government 
security purchases were making Treasury financing operations difficult.274 Mellon 
demanded the reserve banks sell all of their government securities. At the May 2nd 
Governors Conference, Strong voiced Mellon’s concerns and called his colleagues to 
action, warning “if we do not do something they will. The… Board has power to regulate 
this matter.”275 The governors conference established a “Committee of Governors on 
Centralized Execution of Purchases and Sales of Government Securities by Federal 
Reserve Banks.” This body consisted of the New York, Boston, Chicago, and 
Philadelphia reserve bank governors. Its purpose was to centralize  and coordinate the 
reserve banks’ open market operations. Centralization enabled the committee to 
coordinate with the Treasury and minimize the disruptive effects of systemic operations. 
In the face of relentless gold inflows from Europe, which fueled domestic credit 
growth, Strong proposed to the governors conference on October 10th, 1922, that the 
governors committee become an active policymaking body which would sterilize gold 
flows. Over the summer, the FRBNY began its own sterilization program by selling its 
own securities to offset the expansionary influence of gold inflows.276 Strong urged his 
colleagues to empower the governors committee to develop open market operations into a 
policy instrument and adopt a system wide sterilization policy, to prevent gold inflows 
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from stoking inflation. The governors agreed to make the governors committee a 
policymaking body, but didn’t endorse gold sterilization. 277 The conference also 
approved a Federal Advisory Council proposal to broaden the Governors Committee’s 
membership by adding the Cleveland reserve bank governor.278  
Some participants were uneasy about this delegation of policymaking authority. 
Gov. McDougal (Chicago) argued that a systemic open market policy would be a radical 
departure from the tradition of autonomous portfolio management.279 Seay (Richmond) 
likewise voiced “…reservation toward the control of the Federal Reserve System as a 
whole by the judgment of any committee… whose suggestions may… override the 
independent judgment of any particular Federal Reserve Bank.”280 Board Member 
Adolph Miller was visibly angered by the prospect of establishing a policymaking 
committee which excluded the Board. 
In February, 1923, Strong was forced to take six months leave to recover from a 
bout of tuberculosis in Colorado. In Strong’s absence, the Board moved to assert control 
over open market operations.281 At the March 26th governors conference, Adolph Miller 
proposed a regulation reconstituting the governors committee as the Open Market 
Investment Committee (OMIC). This new body would retain the old committee’s 
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membership, but its policy decisions would be subject to Board approval. Miller argued 
sections 13 and 14 of the Federal Reserve Act granted the Board “authority to limit and 
otherwise determine the securities and investments purchased by Federal Reserve 
Banks…” Henceforth, he declared, open market operations would be limited “primarily 
[to] commercial investments,” not government securities.282 Gov. Harding (Boston), who 
until recently served as the Board’s Governor, voiced the governors’ opposition:283  
It is very doubtful… whether the Federal Reserve Board has specific power to 
fix a definite limit as to the amount of the legitimate open-market operations that 
a Federal Reserve Bank may engage in… nowhere is the Federal Reserve Board 
given specific power to limit the amount of bonds and notes of the United States 
that the Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve Bank may wish to buy.  
Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) accused Miller of subverting the Federal Reserve Act, 
“General authority would mean that the law created a central bank, in Washington, with 
the reserve banks as operating branches.”284 Miller admitted that the Board’s jurisdiction 
was unclear, but asserted that the Board was the proper locus of authority because it had a 
national, rather than a regional, perspective. Miller ultimately found himself without 
allies, however. He lamented, “I think we have got the power; to me it is almost as clear 
as though it were there.” The governors accepted the Board’s right to reconstitute the 
committee and supervise its operations. Charles Hamlin (Board) agreed to remove the 
offending paragraphs from Miller’s regulation. Upon hearing of Miller’s power grab, 
Strong wrote the FRBNY’s acting governor, “The Federal Reserve Board had no right to 
discharge the committee and wouldn’t have done so had I had a crack at them… Every 
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time the Board assumes some power like this, we approach nearer to actual management 
(instead of supervision) by a political body.”285  
Orchestrating Great Britain’s Return to Gold 
Strong returned from his Colorado rehabilitation in November 1923. In his 
absence, Mellon and the Board continued demanding the OMIC sell government 
securities, which coincided with the committee’s goal of sterilizing gold inflows. 
Between April and July, the system sold over $138 million in government securities. 
When Strong returned, he gained approval for creating a “special investment account” at 
the FRBNY for OMIC securities.286 At the end of November, FRBNY officer WR 
Burgess explained the case for using open market operations as a countercyclical 
economic stabilization instrument:287 
There would be very general agreement to the principle that the Reserve Banks 
should purchase securities at periods when liquidation in business seems to be 
going faster than fundamental conditions warrant, and that obversely we should 
sell securities when business is moving forward so rapidly that the tendency has 
become unduly speculative in nature. 
FRBNY Deputy Governor J.H. Case informed Strong that a 1924 business recession was 
likely, but argued continued gold inflows and Mellon’s proposed income tax reduction 
would provide sufficient stimulus to combat it.288 Strong worried about the system’s 
depleted stock of securities, however. At the December 3 OMIC meeting, Strong gained 
approval to buy “a suitable volume of Government securities of short maturities… so as 
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to be in a position to exert an influence from time to time by the purchase and sale of 
such securities in the open market.” 289 By February, the FRBNY had purchased $51 
million of Treasury bonds for the system account.  
What began as a security stockpiling initiative quickly developed into a deliberate 
expansionary program. Strong had grown frustrated by persistent gold inflows and 
believed capital would continue pouring into the US until Europeans restored gold 
convertibility. The U.S. recession provided a useful pretext for launching an 
expansionary program which promoted Strong’s international objectives. Strong realized, 
however, that for the system’s policies to effectively repel capital inflows and encourage 
Americans to invest abroad, open market purchases would need to be complemented by 
discount rate reductions, which were publicly announced and highly visible. In March, 
Strong explained the logic of a coordinated easing program to Norman, “The effect of 
changes in the discount rate is more like a sledgehammer blow to sentiment, while the 
effect of our transactions in the open market is much gentler.”290 
On February 25, the OMIC authorized the FRBNY to purchase $100 million more 
in government securities for the system account.291 On April 22nd, it authorized another 
$50 million in purchases, noting “We have a situation where easier money is likely to 
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help rather than hinder a normal rate of business activity… a gradual program of 
purchases will tend to ease rates somewhat further. It also seems probable that… the 
credit situation may lead to lower discount rates at some of the Federal Reserve 
Banks.”292 
Shortly thereafter, Strong departed for London. While Strong was away, Gov. 
Harding (Boston) told Charles Hamlin (Board) he was “certain that the movement for 
lower rates at New York was inspired by Governor Strong, now sick in Governor 
Norman’s house in London; that Norman wanted inflation in United States to put us more 
nearly on a parity with Great Britain.”293 Harding’s intuition proved correct. When Strong 
returned in late May, he embarked on a broad campaign to convince Federal Reserve 
officials and Treasury Secretary Mellon that an aggressive easing policy would hasten 
sterling’s return to gold. Strong wrote Mellon:294 
Our own interests demand that no effort be spared to secure a return to the gold 
standard, and so arrest the flood of gold which threatens in time to plunge us 
into inflation. We now hold one-half of the world’s monetary gold, and our 
holdings increase steadily… Nor [should] our own trade advantage resulting 
from monetary stability [abroad] be minimized… Stable exchange rates will 
facilitate foreign trade just as greatly as stable credit facilitates domestic trade. 
Strong argued that floating European currencies reduced European purchasing power and 
caused gold to flow into the US. Since weak European currencies bought fewer goods, 
floating rates had a “withering influence” on trade, harming American exporters.295 
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Strong’s argument was easily absorbed by Mellon, one of the U.S.’s wealthiest 
industrialists.296 By Strong’s calculations, the U.S. price level remained 10% below Great 
Britain’s. To restore sterling to its prewar parity of $4.86, Strong argued this gap would 
have to be eliminated. Strong suggested the US would need to bear the adjustment 
burden, arguing it would “be difficult politically and socially for the British government 
and the Bank of England to force a price liquidation in England beyond what they have 
already experienced…” so the adjustment burden “must fall more largely on us than upon 
them.”297 Strong stressed the extraordinary nature of this international collaboration and 
promised that once the international gold standard was restored, further central bank 
cooperation would be unnecessary.298 Strong persuaded Mellon, who thereafter supported 
Strong’s initiatives on the Board and in successive Republican administrations. 
On May 22nd, Strong told the Board “he rather inclined to lower New York rates 
to 3 ½%; that while this might have little or no effect upon domestic conditions, it might 
bring about much borrowing from abroad; that it was a great opportunity for the U.S. to 
become the money market of the world.”299 On May 29, Strong presented the OMIC with 
a report from FRBNY officer W.R. Burgess which argued the recession was deepening 
and called for more aggressive purchases, despite heavy gold inflows.300 The OMIC 
                                                 
296 Mellon’s northeastern industrial and banking enterprises stood to benefit from a buoyant international 
economy. 
 
297 Strong letter to Mellon 5/27/1924. Cited in Chandler 1958, 266-267; Clarke 75-76. 
 
298 Eichengreen (1992, 161) points out “With little experience in central banking under the gold standard, 
Strong and his fellow countrymen both in and out of the Fed clung to an exaggerated view of the 
institution’s automaticity.” 
 
299 Hamlin’s Diary 5/22/1924. Quoted in Wicker 1966, 85. 
 
300 OMIC minutes 5/29/1924. Riefler’s compilation, 15. 
 106 
 
 
authorized an additional $150 million in security purchases for the system account and 
$100 million for the FRBNY’s own account. On June 4th, the Board endorsed the 
OMIC’s directive. Between June and August, the FRBNY purchased $215 million in 
government bonds for the system’s account. 
Strong hoped to establish an interest rate differential between New York and 
London.301 He believed that wealthy Americans would be persuaded to invest abroad if 
New York rates were lower than London’s. Over the summer, open market purchases 
pushed down U.S. market interest rates. The FRBNY also received Board approval for 
three ½ point discount rate reductions. By September, its rate was a full percentage point 
lower than the BOE’s (see Figure 6).  
Figure 6: New York and London Interest Rates (1923-1925) 
 
                  Source: Fred Database 
The international effects of the system’s expansionary program were dramatic. In 
the second half of 1924, transatlantic capital flows reversed their direction. The US 
balance-of-payments shifted into deficit for the first time in five years. Americans 
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purchased large quantities foreign bond issues, including Dawes Plan bonds to assist 
Germany’s currency stabilization. Europeans repatriated funds deposited in American 
banks.302 The FRBNY’s 10th Annual Report credited U.S. capital outflows with 
increasing European purchasing power, leading to buoyant US agricultural exports, and 
rising farm incomes.303   
Capital flowed from the U.S. to London, strengthening the Bank of England’s 
gold position.304 Early in 1924, Norman recommended that Parliament not extend the 
wartime authorization of sterling’s non-convertibility beyond 1925.305 By July, however, 
Strong suspected that Norman was dragging his feet. A number of smaller European 
states had already returned to gold. On July 9th, Strong wrote Norman suggesting, 
“…sterling is… now rather far behind in the procession.”306 Norman replied that a 
transition from a Labour to a Conservative government was slowing sterling’s 
restoration. A public proclamation “would have been difficult and perhaps dangerous… 
we have been wise so far to hurry slowly…”307 By December, U.S. inflationary pressures 
were mounting and Strong was tired of waiting. He cabled Norman on December 4th 
informing him that the FRBNY might need to increase its discount rate by ½ percent to 
restrain credit growth.308 He asked if Norman wanted to raise the BOE’s discount rate 
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simultaneously, to prevent capital from moving from London to New York. Norman 
replied that the BOE would increase its rate by 1% if the FRBNY changed its rate, but 
preferred to wait to “appear to have our hands forced by you.”309  
The FRBNY and BOE’s coordinated policy adjustments helped realize Strong and 
Norman’s shared objective of restoring sterling to its prewar parity. Sterling had traded in 
the $4.30 range in March, 1924, and was trading around $4.50 by October.310 In early 
1925, Norman made a covert trip to New York which was made public, increasing 
speculation that sterling’s restoration was imminent. Speculators bought sterling in 
anticipation of an exchange rate appreciation. By April, sterling was trading at its prewar 
parity and British prices had fallen 3% below the US’s.311 That month Winston Churchill, 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, announced sterling’s return to gold at the prewar parity. 
Churchill’s announcement was lauded by London’s financiers. It was not universally 
endorsed, however. John Maynard Keynes forcefully argued against restoring sterling to 
its prewar parity, suggesting it would require prolonged austerity to force down domestic 
wages and bring about industrial restructuring.312 Keynes subsequently published a 
critique of the decision titled The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill.313  
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Managing the Interwar Gold Exchange Standard (1925-1927) 
 Once sterling was restored, Strong quickly discovered that sustaining the 
international gold exchange standard would require more active management than he had 
anticipated. Britain’s vulnerable external position was quickly exposed. Norman wanted 
to maintain a restrictive credit policy to promote domestic price adjustments and 
industrial restructuring. Norman creatively used the gold standard’s “rules of the game” 
to appease domestic demands for cheaper credit by temporarily lowering the BOE’s 
discount rate from 5% to 4% between July and October.314 As Norman expected, rate 
reductions triggered large gold outflows from London. Responding to these highly visible 
outflows, Norman used gold standard orthodoxy as rhetorical cover for justifying 
restoration of the 5% bank rate the following month. 
 In August, Strong pondered the implications of BOE rate reductions for Federal 
Reserve policy in a letter to FRBNY Deputy Governor JH Case:315 
…up to a certain point we should make every effort to accommodate our policy 
to theirs. If they feel it necessary in meeting domestic conditions to reduce their 
rate… they must do so, but should not necessarily expect us to go down with 
them if our domestic situation would render it perilous to do so… an increase in 
our rate, in the face of rate reductions among the gold standard countries of 
Europe, will be some transfers of funds to the United States… we cannot then 
escape further shipments of gold…  
In the second half of 1925, the OMIC sterilized resurgent gold inflows with 
offsetting bond sales. Between January and November 1925, the system account was 
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reduced from $500 million to $210 million. On November 2nd, Strong reported to the 
governors conference what he considered alarming economic trends: unsustainable 
construction industry growth; stock market speculation; and growing use of installment 
credit for consumer purchases.316 Strong suggested discount rate hikes were possibly in 
order, but cautioned against further security sales so the system would retain a large 
enough security portfolio “to deal with any emergency situation.” 
The Board considered the OMIC’s report on November 23rd. Adolph Miller objected 
to suspending security sales. He proposed that the Board compel the OMIC to sell at least 
$100 million of government securities, and work toward reducing the aggregate size of 
the system account to $50 million. Miller’s motion was struck down by a 4-3 vote.317 
Instead, the Board passed a resolution urging the OMIC to meet again as soon as 
possible. On December, 1st, Strong told the OMIC that Miller wanted to bring about 
deflation “pure and simple.” He cautioned a tightening policy would trigger gold inflows 
and undermine the BOE’s position.318 The OMIC unanimously reaffirmed their decision 
to keep the system account stable. The next day, Miller proposed that the Board compel 
the reserve banks to raise their discount rates. All but one Board member rejected 
Miller’s proposal because it ran counter to the system’s established practice of reserve 
banks’ initiating discount rate changes. 
During 1926, system policies remained fairly stable. On January 8th, the FRBNY 
received permission from the Board to increase its discount rate to 4%. At the March 20 
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OMIC meeting, Strong suggested that the US was entering a recession and open market 
purchases would be helpful up to the point that member banks in the principal money 
markets, New York and Chicago, paid off their discount window borrowings.319 The 
OMIC voted to increase the system account to $300 million, which the Board narrowly 
approved.320 In the fall, the OMIC sold $60 million of securities. The system “applied its 
credit brakes gently… and the economy slowed.”321 
By the end of 1926, international gold standard restoration seemed to be making 
rapid progress. Sterling was strong on foreign exchange markets and 18 countries had 
returned to gold.322 France was the only major country still off of gold, but it was making 
rapid strides in that direction. Testifying before Congress in early April, Strong restated 
his belief that gold standard restoration would reduce the need for central bank discretion 
and cooperation:323  
…when the time comes to conduct these things as they were in former years, a 
lot of the need for the type of management which has to be applied in the present 
situation will be eliminated. It will be more automatic. We won’t have to depend 
so much on judgment, and we can rely more upon the play of natural forces and 
their reaction on price… 
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Adjustment problems lurked beneath the veneer of international tranquility. 
Sterling’s late 1926 strength was due to French capital flight, not its competitive 
economic position.324 When France de facto stabilized the franc in December 1926, gold 
flows reversed. French authorities set the franc’s exchange rate at 25 francs per dollar, far 
below the prewar parity. Frenchmen repatriated their foreign balances, leading to a drain 
on London banks. This drain was fueled by speculation that the franc would be 
appreciated to its prewar parity when the gold standard was legally restored. Inside 
France, a struggle raged between factions who wanted to restore the franc to its prewar 
parity and those who hoped to legalize the depreciated rate. Prime Minister Raymond 
Poincaré led the faction calling for revaluation. Émile Moreau, Governor of the Banque 
de France, believed France needed to learn from Britain’s “mistake” and formally peg the 
franc at the lower rate to maintain France’s competitive international position.325 
Large capital inflows into Germany and France created new problems for those 
countries’ central banks. Hjalmar Schacht, President of the German Reichsbank, 
complained that foreign capital was being funneled into unproductive municipal 
investments, creating a “fools paradise.”326 He believed that only investments which 
increased Germany’s export capacity were beneficial. Both Germany and France 
responded to surging capital inflows by purchasing gold.327 London remained the center 
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of the international gold market, as its colonies produced much of the world’s monetary 
gold. Large purchases by the Banque de France and the Reichsbank overwhelmed this 
market by early 1927, however, and the BOE was forced to cover residual demands. In 
late 1926, Norman complained to Strong, “Schacht… already sucked 6 ½ million pounds 
in gold out of London.”328  
Pressures mounted on the BOE in 1927. Holding large sterling balances, the Banque 
de France found itself in an unprecedented position of strength. The French government 
wanted the Banque de France to convert its sterling balances into gold. Norman warned 
Moreau that heavy gold withdrawals might force Britain off of the gold standard. In May, 
Moreau suggested that Norman stem the gold outflow by raising the BOE’s bank rate. 
Norman replied he could not “without causing a riot.”329 The stalemate was broken when 
Strong intervened by brokering a deal which included the Federal Reserve supplying £12 
million pounds worth of gold to the Banque de France. Strong also agreed that “a quiet 
meeting of some of the heads of the central banks might be useful.”330  
That meeting famously came to pass at the home of U.S. Treasury Undersecretary 
Ogden Mills on Long Island from July 1st-6th in July, 1927.331 Strong, Norman, Schacht, 
and Rist, the Banque de France’s Deputy Governor, were in attendance, as were the 
OMIC governors and Gov. Crissinger (Board). At this covert conference, the central 
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bankers discussed four major questions: (1) whether an easing of Federal Reserve credit 
policies would decrease pressure on the BOE and the Reichsbank, (2) whether gold 
standard countries’ credit policies were supporting commodity price deflation, (3) how to 
unwind the Banque de France’s large outstanding New York and London balances, and 
(4) whether Paris’s gold demands could be met in New York rather than London. 
According to Clarke, “The principal outcome of these discussions was Strong’s second 
great effort in support of sterling.”332  
 Strong took on the major adjustment burden by agreeing to ease the Federal 
Reserve’s credit policies.333 To enact his expansionary program, however, Strong needed 
to build a supportive coalition throughout the Federal Reserve. He had already been in 
the process of building such a coalition for months. In February, 1927, the FRBNY 
directors requested a discount rate reduction, but was denied by the Board.334 At the 
March 21st OMIC meeting, Strong developed a three-pronged argument in favor of 
terminating open market sales and beginning a purchasing campaign: “1. A portfolio of 
securities is a protection against inflation, and its size should not be reduced without good 
cause. 2. Higher rates here would tend to attract foreign balances and gold from countries 
which need them to us who do not want them. 3. Higher rates here would force higher 
rates abroad and continue the pressure on world commodity prices.”335 The OMIC 
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directive cautiously called for replacement of $25 million of maturing government 
securities and authorizing an additional $50 million in purchases “if and when a situation 
develops that would seem to justify such action.” The Board approved replacement of 
maturing securities, but insisted on being consulted prior to new security purchases.  
On May 9th, the OMIC issued a report warning that if the system continued 
sterilizing gold inflows, the system’s account would soon fall below $100 million 
dollars.336 Rather than issuing a policy directive, the OMIC asked the Board to join 
them to voice their opinions. After the meeting, the OMIC recommended a policy of 
halting open market sales and instead making purchases until the system account reached 
$250 million. On May 13th, Adolph Miller (Board) argued new purchases would fuel 
stock market speculation. Instead, he proposed the Board approve termination of open 
market sales, without authorizing increased purchases. Miller’s proposal gained no 
support.337 Platt proposed approving the OMIC’s directive with the caveat that securities 
be acquired “gradually.” Only Miller dissented. 
On July 27th, three weeks after the secret meeting on Long Island, the OMIC met 
with the Board and the St. Louis and Minneapolis reserve bank governors. At this 
meeting, Strong drew attention to the high interest rates prevailing in Europe and the 
looming American harvest season.338 He argued that unless the Federal Reserve met 
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seasonal credit demands by making additional reserves available through open market 
purchases and discount rate reductions, global money market conditions would tighten, 
decreasing Europeans’ capacity to purchase American crops. According to OMIC 
Secretary Riefler, “"All present at the meeting recognized that these developments would 
necessarily have a depressing effect upon business abroad and might tend to restrict the 
freedom of purchases of goods in this country at the usual season.” The OMIC and Board 
authorized $50 million in security purchases and it was agreed that the reserve banks 
would collectively lower their discount rates to 3.5%. Many interior governors suggested 
conditions in their district didn’t warrant a discount rate reduction, but pledged support 
for the program because it was in the “national interest.”339 Miller again argued an 
expansionary policy would fuel stock speculation. Platt acknowledged Miller’s concern 
while summarizing the group decision, “Lower [the discount rate] in New York first and 
to hell with the stock market.”340  
 Compared the 1924 program, the 1927 easing campaign was slight (see Figure 7). 
The domestic recession was milder, with a peak to trough decline in industrial production 
of only 6% compared to 18% in 1923-1924.341 In the earlier episode, the FRBNY’s 
discount rate was reduced in three steps by a total of 1.5%, whereas this time there was 
only a single half point reduction. After adjusting for gold exports and increased currency 
in circulation, the open market purchasing program’s aggregate stimulus was $278 
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million less than in the earlier episode, a vast sum when considering the system’s account 
rarely exceeded $500 million at this time.  
Figure 7: New York and London Interest Rates (1927) 
 
                   Source: Fred Database 
Despite its lighter footprint, the 1927 easing program achieved its international 
objectives.342 At the November 2nd OMIC meeting, Strong summarized recent 
developments: 1) domestic agricultural needs were smoothly financed; 2) sterling had 
appreciated on foreign exchange markets; 3) the US was a net gold exporter in 
September; 4) stock market speculation had increased; 5) the domestic volume of credit 
had grown; and 6) commodity prices had increased.343 Although his assessment was 
positive overall, Strong admitted “a less favorable result of easier money… one which 
was anticipated, has been some stimulation of stock exchange speculation…”344 Adolph 
                                                 
342 According to the 14th Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board (1927, 9), “For this reason it has been 
a matter of great importance to the Federal Reserve System to restore those influences upon international 
gold movements under which traditional central bank policies have been developed and tested by 
experience… The effectiveness of these factors in determining the flow of gold between countries depends 
primarily upon the existence of a fixed relationship between the value of currencies and gold. They year 
1927 has witnessed important progress in reestablishing such a relationship.” 
 
343 Strong was quick to link the system’s easing to climbing agricultural prices, which were “partly 
[attributable] to success in marketing surplus production abroad.” 
 
344 Strong was unwilling to judge, however, “how far this recent rise in stock prices represents excessive 
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Miller and his Georgetown neighbor, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, were 
quick to jump on the link between the system’s 1927 easy money campaign and the 
subsequent New York Stock Exchange boom. The next section examines how the 
Board’s heavy-handed enforcement of the 1927 easing policy and the stock market boom 
reignited the system’s power struggle, decreasing the system’s capacity to absorb 
international adjustment costs and thereby stabilize the gold standard.  
The Chicago Discount Rate Controversy  
 Many years after the covert 1927 central banker conference, Charles Rist wrote 
E.A. Goldenweiser, “You probably know that the decision to lower the discount rate was 
taken directly in a conversation between Montagu Norman and Benjamin Strong, by 
themselves. All the rest of us had to do was to approve it later. Once more in this case 
English monetary policy was decisive for the rest of the world.”345 Whether or not the 
1927 international bargain was really struck by Strong and Norman alone is less 
important than the widespread perception that the decision was reached in an impolitic 
manner. After the 1927 program, international tensions quickly resurfaced. Although 
sterling appreciated on foreign exchange markets, Britain’s underlying economic 
adjustment process progressed slowly.346 Capital poured into France to take advantage of 
its strong growth prospects and to speculate on a franc revaluation. The Banque de 
                                                 
larger profits, higher commodity prices, and a lower basic interest rate level than for some years past.” 
OMIC Minutes 11/2/1927. Riefler’s Collection, 147. 
 
345 Letter from Rist to Goldenweiser 11/13/1949. Cited in Wicker 1966, 112. 
 
346 According to Clarke (1967, 140), “Although those who knew the severity of the May 1927 crisis were 
keenly aware of the urgent need for economic adjustment, the general public was at best indifferent; when 
it was directly affected, it was often openly hostile to change.” 
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France continued holding large balances in London and New York with “unmistakable 
reluctance.”347 France and Germany were shifting their reserves into gold and moving 
away from the gold exchange standard. 
Suspicion about the circumstances surrounding the 1927 central bank collaboration 
reignited the power struggle within the Federal Reserve. On July 25th, Charles Hamlin 
(Board) recorded his reaction to learning of the secret central banker meeting:348 
Governor Crissinger told me that there was a formal conference in New York… 
all the Governors representing Open Market Committee were there, and others; 
that it was in every sense a formal conference although Governor Crissinger did 
not know this until he got there; that Governor Norman unbosomed himself and 
told in what a critical position the Bank of England was as regards gold, that it 
must put its discount rate to the injury of business, commerce etc., unless the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York should reduce its rate…  
 
Hamlin concluded “Strong was very short sighted in ignoring the Federal Reserve 
Board… It will give some of the members, already sore, a reason for continuing so.” 
Despite Board members feeling slighted, Strong’s selective invitation of Federal Reserve 
officials was a shrewd political maneuver. The conference would have been pointless if 
Norman was unwilling to “unbosom” himself and plead for help in front of dozens of US 
officials of uneven financial expertise and social acumen. Adolph Miller’s obstructionism 
alone could have stalled negotiations. Strong calculated that if the US were to bear the 
international adjustment burden, he faced better odds negotiating the agreement himself 
and then convincing his colleagues that it represented their interests, which he earnestly 
believed was the case.  
                                                 
347 Clarke 1967, 142. 
 
348 Hamlin’s Diary 7/25/1927. Cited in Degen 1987, 49. 
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 In September, a clash occurred between the Board and reserve banks which 
wanted to abstain from the system wide discount rate reduction. At the July 27th meeting, 
Gov. McDougal (Chicago) declared that his bank did not plan on lowering its discount 
rate because local conditions did not warrant a decrease. After the meeting, most reserve 
banks requested and received authorization to reduce their discount rates to 3.5%. The 
directors of the Chicago, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Minneapolis reserve banks 
voted to sustain their higher rates, however. On August 19th, Strong wrote Gov. 
Crissinger (Board) complaining about the disruptive effects of Chicago’s higher rate 
while insisting “that is a matter for them to decide.”349 Strong also wrote Norris 
(Philadelphia) and McDougal (Chicago) asking them to lower their rates. McDougal 
replied tersely, insisting Chicago would lower its rate “if and when it seemed expedient 
to do so.”350 Strong wrote back appealing to McDougal’s sense of humor:351 
I have read that austere letter of yours… and after finishing it feel as though I 
were sitting in an unheated church in midwinter somewhere in Alaska. The fact 
is, my dear Mac... I do believe… that the objects which we sought to accomplish 
by our rate reduction are mainly for the benefit of the producers of exportable 
crops in your district and the other districts, and that their ability to find their 
markets for the surplus of their crops in Europe... In other words, it is neither a 
New York question nor a Chicago question nor a district question, but a national 
question bearing upon our markets in Europe, consequently an international 
question…  
Strong’s personal appeal might have worked, but the Board decided to intervene. 
Gov. Crissinger informed the Board on September 6th that Chicago’s chairman had 
written him suggesting Chicago’s executive committee might vote to reduce its rate on 
                                                 
349 Strong letter to Crissinger. 8/19/1927. Cited in Meltzer 2003, 222. 
 
350 MacDougal letter to Strong. 8/24/1927. Cited in Chandler 1958, 445. 
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September 9th. Cunningham moved to assert the Board’s authority, however, by 
compelling Chicago to reduce its rate. Hamlin proposed waiting until after the 9th, but his 
measure failed. The Board voted 4-3 to instruct the Chicago reserve bank to lower its rate 
to 3.5%.352 Hamlin was frustrated by this turn of events, which he considered a breach of 
Federal Reserve protocol. He explained his July 27th support for the system wide easing 
program because an expansionary policy would “[help] English purchasing power for our 
exports thus benefiting agriculture.” He now felt the Board shouldn’t establish a rate 
“solely for international reasons…” instead, rates should be set for “local reasons – a 
desire to help farmers move their crops… [and] somewhat doubted [the Board’s] power 
to put in a uniform rate in order to help New York help the English situation.”   
The Board’s decision to compel a Chicago rate reduction was controversial. Gov. 
Crissinger resigned shortly thereafter, which many interpreted as signaling the decision’s 
illegitimacy.353 President Coolidge appointed Gov. Roy Young (Minneapolis) to replace 
Crissinger as Board Governor. Minneapolis had been the last reserve bank to reduce its 
discount rate, so many considered his appointment an endorsement of greater reserve 
bank autonomy and a weak Board.354 The St. Louis Star suggested Young would make a 
great governor so long as he kept “his Western atmosphere enough to realize that all of 
                                                 
352 Federal Reserve Board Minutes. 9/6/1927. Those dissenting in both cases were Platt, Hamlin, and 
Miller. The Board also voted to compel San Francisco to lower its rate. See Wicker 1966, 112-113; Kettl 
1986, 32; Degen 1987, 49; Eichengreen 1992, 26; Meltzer 2003, 222-223. 
 
353 In a cable to Norman, Strong suggested the timing of Crissinger’s resignation was poor, as he had 
decided to resign prior to the Chicago controversy, but waited to announce his decision formally until after 
Mellon and President Coolidge returned from abroad. Strong cable to Norman, 9/16/1927. Cited in Wicker 
1966, 114.  
 
354 Riefler’s compilation, 136 
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the banks and all of the money are not in New York, nor all of the nation’s industries in 
Wall Street.”355  
The New York Stock Market Boom and Wall Street’s Capital Vortex 
By 1928, Strong’s dream of restoring the international gold standard was nearly 
complete.356 In June, France legalized its depreciated exchange rate, ending speculative 
capital inflows. By locking in its competitive exchange rate, however, France ensured a 
steady stream of trade surpluses. Like the US, France sterilized its gold imports, 
exporting deflationary pressures. Between 1927 and 1932, France’s share of global 
monetary gold reserves rose from 7% to 27% (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8: Comparative National Monetary Gold Stock, $ Millions USD  
 
Source: League of Nations Statistical Tables 
The New York Stock Exchange’s famous 1928-29 bull market placed new strains 
on the international financial system and revealed the limits of Federal Reserve 
internationalism. The gold exchange standard, as constituted in 1928, depended on the 
US running balance-of-payments deficits to provide international reserves. To do so, U.S. 
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capital exports need to outstrip persistent trade surpluses. As New York call loan rates 
rose above European interest rates, global investors and U.S. corporations increasingly 
began loaning funds to Wall Street.  
For the first time since the discovery of open market operations, international and 
domestic conditions came into conflict in shaping Federal Reserve policy.357 The 
international situation called for expansionary credit policies to push down US interest 
rates and relieve pressure on European central banks. Adolph Miller and Benjamin 
Strong alike had argued, however, that combatting stock market speculation should be an 
objective of Federal Reserve policy. On January 12th, the OMIC initiated an open market 
sales program to curb stock market speculation, commenting “European money markets 
are now in a position largely to take care of themselves.”358 By July 18th, the system’s 
account had been reduced by $301 million to $75 million.359 In February, the FRBNY 
began a series of discount rate hikes, raising it in three steps from 3.5% to 5%. By 
summer, Federal Reserve policymakers found themselves in a “classic monetary 
dilemma.”360 The system had tightened credit enough to raise US interest rates above 
those prevailing in Europe, but was unwilling to make credit so dear as to burst the stock 
market bubble.361 Soaring call loan rates pulled global capital toward Wall Street (see 
Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: New York and London Interest Rates (1928-1929) 
 
         Source: Fred Database 
Benjamin Strong spent the summer of 1928, his last, in Europe. He had been sick 
and out of action for much of the year, leaving Deputy Governor George L. Harrison in 
charge of the FRBNY and the OMIC. When Strong returned to the U.S. in August, he 
informed the FRBNY directors that he was resigning based on doctor’s orders. That fall, 
the OMIC and the Board decided to meet seasonal credit needs by establishing a 
preferential discount rate for trade acceptances, rather than buying securities on the open 
market or lowering discount rates, which they believed would fuel stock market 
speculation.362 The harvest season passed without a crisis, but call loan rates kept 
climbing. Strong passed away on October 22nd.  
 In 1927 and the first half of 1928, the U.S.’s annualized balance-of-payments 
deficit stood around $1 billion. In 1929, it dropped to $53 million.363 As U.S. capital 
exports slowed, the external position of European central banks, other than the Banque de 
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France, grew increasingly precarious.364 In January 1929, Norman visited New York.365 
Norman suggested a sharp FRBNY discount rate hike to pop the stock market bubble. 
Although an increase would place tremendous short-term pressure on the BOE, Norman 
believed that once stock speculation ended, U.S. interest rates would decline and capital 
exports would resume. The FRBNY directors agreed. 
 On February 5th, Harrison pleaded with the Board “…we should increase discount 
rates and through sharp incisive action quickly control the long continued expansion in 
the total volume of credit so that we might then adopt a system policy of easing rates.”366 
The Board disagreed. On February 2nd, the Board sent a letter instructing the reserve 
banks to apply “direct pressure” on member banks to prevent them from using discount 
window loans to lend funds out on the call loan market.367 The FRBNY directors 
considered direct pressure ineffective. More so than other system officials, they 
recognized credit’s fluidity across money markets. In Strong’s words, the system “cannot 
control [credit] once it leaves our doors.”368 
                                                 
364 Eichengreen (1992, 222) argues, “… the decline in U.S. foreign lending had a devastating effect on their 
external positions. Often a draconian compression of domestic spending was the only option consistent 
with continued maintenance of the gold standard.” 
 
365 Clarke 1967, 151-152. 
 
366 The same day, Harrison counseled Secretary Mellon against a simultaneous move with the BOE. 
Although coordinated action “‘would have the greatest effect upon the control of credit… [Harrison] 
feared… such concerted action might be misinterpreted and severely criticized to the point of militating 
against our effective cooperation with foreign banks of issue.” Cited in Clarke 1967, 154. 
 
367 This particular “direct pressure” program was Adolph Miller and Charles Hamlin’s idea, but the Board 
had demanded a similar campaign in 1919. See Wicker 1966, 131; Chandler 1971, 84-85; Wheelock 1991, 
79; Meltzer 2003, 249. 
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 The direct pressure controversy paralyzed the system from January through 
August. On February 14th, the FRBNY requested a discount rate increase from 5% to 6%. 
The Board denied this request and ten consecutive follow up requests stretching into 
June. On March 15th, Harrison expressed his frustration in a cable to a FRBNY 
director:369 
We have tried everything but the bank-rate... With nearly $1,000,000,000 in 
discounts in the Federal Reserve System I believe we still have control and that 
sharp incisive and if necessary repeated increases will be effective. Of course 
such a procedure may be costly and will require courage but will it be more 
costly or require more courage than to do nothing in the face of the likelihood of 
a long continuation of present or even higher market rates with their inevitable 
effect upon economic and monetary conditions both here and abroad? 
 Harrison “campaigned directly by phone, telegraph, and meetings, and indirectly 
through the Treasury… to get the Board to approve a rise in rates. He was supported by 
virtually the entire Federal Reserve System outside Washington. The Governors 
Conference and the Federal Advisory Council unanimously recommended higher 
rates.”370 Chafing at Harrison’s relentless campaign, Gov. Young (Board) complained to 
Hamlin that Harrison “lived and breathed for Norman.”371 Young and Hamlin believed 
Harrison had promised Norman a rate increase. EA Goldenweiser, the Board’s Statistical 
Director, dismissed this charge, however, stating Harrison merely “desired to play the 
world game.”372 In April, Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) wrote Hamlin expressing his 
frustration with the direct pressure program, “Our 5 percent rate is equivalent to hanging 
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a sign out over our door, ‘come in,’ and then we have to stand in the doorway and shout 
‘keep out.’ It puts us in an absurd and impossible position.”373 Over time, internal 
opposition within the Board mounted to the direct pressure program. Platt, Mellon, and 
Young eventually voted to approve rate increases.374 On June 12th, the direct pressure 
program was suspended.  
 The standoff between the Board and the FRBNY resulted in a policy stalemate 
which achieved neither’s objectives.375 Market rates continued to climb, stock market 
speculation continued, and European central banks faced relentless pressure. By June, the 
FRBNY and the Board agreed that the system would need to ease credit to avoid a crisis 
during the fall harvest season. A compromise was reached at an August 8th joint meeting 
of the Board and the Governors Conference that the FRBNY would raise its discount rate 
to 6%, other reserve banks would keep their rates stable, and the FRBNY would lower its 
bill buying rate and purchase large volumes of trade-related securities to provide a 
sufficient volume of seasonal credit.376 Harrison cabled European central bank governors 
on August 10th explaining the decision, “As you know our discount rate has been below 
open market rates for many months… While our domestic situation calls for such a 
policy we of course have in mind the need of the European economy also for lower 
interest rates in New York and believe that our present program will work towards that 
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end more quickly and more safely than a program of relaxation without the protection of 
an effective discount rate.”377  From August to October, the system purchased over $300 
million in trade acceptances.378 On September 29th, the OMIC and the Board approved a 
program of purchasing $25 million per week in government securities.379 
The New York Fed’s Swift Response to the Stock Market Crash 
On October 23rd, the New York Stock Exchange began its infamous crash. The 
next day, the FRBNY requested a discount rate reduction from 6 to 5 ½%, which was 
denied unanimously by the Board.380 After a day of severe liquidation on October 28th, 
Harrison stayed up all night worrying about a proper policy response. After consulting 
with a couple FRBNY directors, Harrison instructed his open market desk agent at 3 am 
to purchase $100 million worth of government securities for the FRBNY’s account 
before the day’s trading began.381 The FRBNY also made it known that the “discount 
window [was] wide open… member banks might borrow freely to establish the reserves 
required against the large increase in deposits resulting from the taking over the loans 
called by others.” As interior banks and foreigners rapidly withdrew funds from the call 
loan market, New York banks absorbed over $1 billion in call loans and extended another 
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380 It approved a follow up request on November 1st to reduce its discount rate to 5%. On the 14th, the Board 
approved a further reduction to 4.5%. Chandler 1971, 78. 
 
381 These purchases ended up amounting to $132 million. Wood 2005, 197. 
 
 129 
 
 
$300 million in new loans. According to Friedman and Schwartz, the FRBNY’s rapid 
response prevented the crash from spiraling into a broader banking and financial crisis.382 
 Adolph Miller was “indignant” when he learned of the FRBNY’s purchases and 
argued member banks should have been forced to borrow from the discount window. 
Hamlin was “inclined to agree… but excused the New York bank on grounds that it was 
a critical emergency.”383 The Board passed a regulation on November 5th forbidding 
reserve banks from making independent open market purchases without first obtaining 
the Board’s approval.384 Two days later, the Board’s counsel informed Young he held 
“considerable doubt of its legality.” 
 On November 12th, the OMIC directive declared that recent liquidations posed “a 
serious threat to business stability… [Indicating] the need of having the Federal Reserve 
System do all within its power toward assuring the ready availability of money for 
business at reasonable rates.” The committee requested authorization to purchase up to 
$200 million in securities, while noting that it might have to buy government securities 
since trade-related bills were in high demand.385 The Board refused, replying “In the 
event that an emergency should arise with such suddenness and be so acute that it is not 
practicable to confer with the Governor, the Board will interpose no objection to a 
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purchase operation being undertaken, with the understanding, however, that prompt 
advice of such purchase be furnished the Board.”  
 In the aftermath of the Board’s rejection of the OMIC directive, the FRBNY’s 
directors voted to unilaterally purchase an additional $50 million in securities. This move 
further inflamed the Board. On November 24th, Gov. Young (Board) announced he had 
reached an agreement with Harrison (FRBNY) that that the Board would endorse the 
OMIC’s recent directive to purchase up to $200 million in securities, in exchange for the 
FRBNY no longer making unilateral purchases without prior Board approval.386 Harrison 
entered this agreement reluctantly. He protested to Young, “more and more the Board has 
taken to itself not supervisory powers but the equivalent of operating functions and the 
responsibility for the detailed transactions of the various Federal Reserve Banks… the 
logical consequence… was that the Federal Reserve Board would become a central bank 
operating in Washington…” Young responded “the Federal Reserve Board had been 
given most extraordinarily wide powers, that as long as the Board had those powers, they 
would feel free to exercise them and Congress could determine whether they objected to 
having a central bank operating in Washington.”387 In December, the FRBNY purchased 
$155 million in government securities for the system account. 
 New York’s stock market crash and the FRBNY’s aggressive easing policy 
produced beneficial international effects.388 Norman cabled Harrison on October 24 
informing him, “Recent liquidation in your stock market and reduction in call money 
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rates have been satisfactory and have helped to re-establish international position.”389 As 
call loan rates collapsed, foreigners repatriated their capital, New York’s foreign bond 
market revived, and U.S. capital once again began flowing abroad. The US exported gold 
from December through February. European currencies strengthened and European 
central banks adopted easier monetary policies. Completion of Young Plan negotiations 
to restructure German reparations payments triggered renewed optimism about European 
growth prospects, buoying capital outflows.390 The Young Plan also created a new 
international organization, the Bank for International Settlements, which was tasked with 
administering German reparations payments. Domestic opposition prevented the Federal 
Reserve System from joining this new central bankers’ club, foreclosing the possibility of 
a near-term institutionalized commitment to international financial cooperation.391 
Central Bank Fragmentation in the Gold Exchange Standard’s Twilight 
As U.S. capital exports surged in the opening months of 1930, the institutional 
roots of the Federal Reserve’s open market policy activism were being demolished. 
Adolph Miller took advantage of growing discord within the system to revive an earlier 
Federal Advisory Council proposal to expand the open market committee to include all 
twelve reserve bank governors.392 On January 16th, 1930, Miller introduced a proposal to 
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the time. Earlier in the spring of 1928, Miller had unsuccessfully proposed that open-market operations 
only be allowed by an affirmative vote of at least five members of the Board, so they would be used “only 
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reconstitute the OMIC as the Open Market Policy Conference (OMPC), a committee 
composed of all twelve governors.393 The Board passed this resolution by a vote of 6 to 1. 
Afterward, Gov. Young explained his dissenting vote by stating that he had recently 
reached an agreement with Treasury Secretary Mellon and the FRBNY’s directors that no 
reorganization of the open market committee would take place at that time. Hamlin 
proposed overturning the Board’s previous decision based on Young’s explanation, but 
the vote to reconsider was lost on a 3-3 tie.394 On January 23rd, the Board sent the reserve 
banks a letter informing them of the institutional change.  
 The directors of the FRBNY recognized that the OMPC was an unpromising 
venue for forming an active open market operations policy. Many formerly-excluded 
reserve bank governors agreed with Adolph Miller’s charge that “whenever the Federal 
Reserve System operates through the open-market committee, it operates, in effect, as a 
central bank… You strip your regional banks of their separate control of credit in their 
several districts when you operate with their resources in the central money market of the 
country.”395 They were highly reluctant to endorse activist open market policies which 
would sacrifice their own discretion. In January, the FRBNY directors circulated a letter 
to the other reserve banks informing them that they had considered withdrawing from the 
conference:  
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…there is still a real difference of opinion,  among those deemed capable of 
forming a judgment, as to the power of cheap and abundant credit, alone, to 
bring about improvement in business and in commodity prices… Our directors 
have believed… that whatever steps the Reserve System may take… to facilitate 
a more active and stronger bond market through which capital funds may be 
made available for new enterprise or distributed to those parts of the world 
where purchasing power is now seriously curtailed, should be taken promptly 
and courageously… 
The letter concluded by stating that the FRBNY’s directors chose to remain in the OMPC 
because they “preferred persuasion and further discussion to independent action.” 396  
At the OMPC’s first meeting on January 28th, Harrison began a lonely campaign 
of pushing for a system wide easing policy.397 The Board attended the meeting and 
expressed its opposition to any additional credit easing beyond purchases of trade-related 
bills. Board members left, however, when the governors decided the policy directive. 
Harrison proposed an ambitious “affirmative ease” program of open market purchases 
and discount rate reductions.398 Govs. Black (Atlanta) and Seay (Richmond) supported 
Harrison’s proposal. The remaining eight governors urged caution, however. Gov. Norris 
(Philadelphia) summarized the majority view:  
…we feel that it is better that the situations should clear up further, that the 
extent and duration of this recession should be more ascertainable… rather than 
to exhaust our ammunition now in what may be perhaps a vain attempt to stem 
an inevitable recession.   
On March 5th, E.A. Goldenweiser delivered a “very pessimistic” report on 
business conditions to the Board.399 The report swayed Miller, who confessed “the 
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depression was much graver than he anticipated and… we ought to consider whether the 
System could not be helpful… he would approve a rate reduction to 3.5%.” The rest of 
the Board, over Miller’s objection, agreed to propose that the FRBNY purchase $50 
million in government securities for its own account, stating “no harm could be done and 
some good could be accomplished.”400 The FRBNY directors approved the purchases 
unanimously. On March 14th, the Board granted the FRBNY’s request to lower its 
discount rate to 3.5%. 
When the OMPC met on March 24th, the other governors deemed New York’s 
purchases “unwise” and approved no further bond acquisitions.401 The OMPC also 
implemented a new open market policy procedure. Henceforth, open market policy 
decisions would be made by the OMPC, submitted to the Board, and then sent to the 
reserve banks for consideration as to whether or not each bank would choose to 
participate.402 Between OMPC meetings, policy implementation authority would be 
delegated to a five-member Executive Committee.403  
In late April, the FRBNY requested a discount rate reduction to 3%. Harrison 
argued the change was necessary for “reviving” the bond and mortgage markets which 
“historically and logically appear to be a precedent or a necessary accompaniment of 
                                                 
400 Riefler’s compilation, 414-416. 
 
401 Some scholars have argued this meeting was a critical juncture and that adoption of an expansionary 
open market policy at this point could have led to recovery. See Kindleberger 1973, 137; Meltzer 2003, 
297-298; Shull 2005, 98. 
 
402 Riefler’s compilation, 425-430. 
 
403 This Executive Committee would retain the OMIC’s membership for one year but was scheduled to 
rotate thereafter. 
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recovery in business and prices after a period of depression.”404 The Board unanimously 
denied the request. A week later, Gov. Young announced he had changed his mind and 
led a narrow 4-3 coalition approving New York’s request.405 Hamlin suggested some 
Board members removed their opposition because the BOE and Banque de France had 
lowered their rates to 3% the week before.406  
On May 14th, Harrison told the Board that a government security buying program 
could combat the deepening recession.407 The OMPC met on May 21st. Harrison’s 
preliminary report suggested there was no “no material evidence of recovery” as 
commodity prices had declined “to new low levels [not witnessed] since 1916…”408 The 
next day Harrison reported to the Board that the conference discussed declining 
commodity prices and trade at length, but ultimately decided against an expansionary 
open market program. Uncharacteristically, Adolph Miller pointed out that aggregate 
Federal Reserve credit outstanding was at its lowest level since 1924. He was alarmed by 
the “contraction of the basis of fundamental credit, whose effects would be felt not only 
in the United States but throughout the Western World.”409 Miller proposed that 
                                                 
404 Harrison told the FRBNY directors that production and trade had declined in March, foreign trade had 
declined in the first quarter, and that gold continued flowing into the US, weakening European exchanges. 
See discussion in Meltzer 2003, 299. 
 
405 Federal Reserve Board Minutes 5/2/1930. Those dissenting were Miller, Cunningham and James. 
 
406 Hamlin’s Diary. Cited in Wicker 1966, 151. 
 
407 Gov. Young (Board) approved Harrison’s proposal to call an OMPC meeting. Federal Reserve Board 
Minutes. 5/14/1930. See discussion in Wood 2005, 199. 
 
408 The report pointed out that the stock market had rallied dramatically in April, but had tumbled since. It 
also noted that gold and currency inflows had been used to pay off discount window borrowing, rather than 
extending new loans. OMPC Minutes 5/21/1930. Riefler’s compilation, 444-450. 
 
409 Joint Meeting of the OMPC and Board. 5/22/1930. Riefler’s Compilation, 452-453. 
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government securities be bought until aggregate system assets (discount loans and 
securities held) reached $1 billion dollars. Harrison replied the FRBNY’s directors 
“would look with favor upon an early purchase of Government securities” to strengthen 
the bond market. Other governors doubted whether the system had responsibility for 
supporting the bond market, however.410 No further purchases were approved.  
  On May 29th, the FRBNY’s directors unanimously agreed to request 
authorization to buy government securities, noting “even a slight addition to the available 
reserve funds might prove helpful both from the point of view of its direct influence on 
the bond market and in the psychological benefit.” On June 3rd, Harrison informed the 
Board that a majority of the OMPC’s reserve banks supported authorizing the FRBNY to 
purchase $50 million in government securities over two weeks.411 The Board approved 
this authorization by a vote of 4-3.412 
On June 16th, the FRBNY directors requested permission to lower its discount rate 
to 2.5%. Harrison explained his directors’ views, “They are particularly concerned about 
the export trade which has such a direct effect upon commodity prices and feel that a 
revival of our foreign markets depends largely upon the bond market, and that hopes of 
                                                 
410 Gov. Calkins (San Francisco) explained his opposition to a campaign to strengthen the bond market 
earlier in a letter to Harrison on 1/7/1930, “It is… futile to apply the word artificial to credit conditions, but 
it appears to us that the policy pursued has resulted in an artificial condition, and as we are not in sympathy 
with the view that artificial conditions should be created for the purpose of promoting a bond market, we 
are still reluctant to go along.” Cited in Chandler 1971,137. 
 
411 Approving banks included New York, Boston, Cleveland, Richmond, Atlanta, Minneapolis, and Kansas 
City. Dallas, Philadelphia, Chicago, and San Francisco disapproved. St. Louis posed no objection. Riefler’s 
compilation, 457-458. 
 
412 Federal Reserve Board Minutes. 6/3/1930. The dissenting votes were Miller, James, and Cunninham. 
Intriguingly, Miller proposed alternatively that the Board grant the OMPC a permanent standing 
authorization to purchase government securities until outstanding Federal Reserve credit reached $1 billion, 
but this proposal was roundly defeated. 
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getting a strong bond market rest upon a continued ease in the short-time money market 
more than anything else.” The Board approved the rate reduction by a vote of 3-2. Platt 
noted that he voted yes despite a “good deal of doubt as to [the reduction’s] wisdom” as 
he felt that its “psychological effects might be unfavorable, giving the impression that 
conditions are worse than they really are.”413  
Harrison noted in his preliminary report for the June 23rd OMPC Executive 
Committee meeting that the bond market had revived in the year’s first half, but argued 
increased issues were due to pent up demand for capital, not abundant supply.414 Harrison 
argued in favor of purchasing securities because, historically, system purchases often led 
banks to absorb more bond issues. All four other governors opposed further purchases, 
however.  
Gov. Young (Board) then presented to the Executive Committee Gov. Calkins’ 
(San Francisco) letter explaining why his bank didn’t participate in the recent $50 million 
buying program: “With credit cheap and redundant we do not believe that business 
recovery will be accelerated by making credit cheaper and more redundant… We find no 
reason to believe that excessively cheap money will promote or create a bond market, 
seeing evidence in the recent past to the contrary, and, further, do not consider the 
promotion or creation of a bond market one of the functions of the Federal Reserve 
System…” Platt then asked if any governors wanted to comment. Harrison said New 
                                                 
413 Federal Reserve Board Minutes. 6/18/1930. Miller was not in attendance at this meeting. James and 
Cunningham voted against. 
 
414 Harrison noted, “There has been no evidence that domestic corporations are over supplied for capital, 
but rather there has been an increase in the demand for capital, especially from railroad and public utility 
corporations, and the bond market has not been strong enough to furnish all the funds which could be 
used.” OMPC Executive Committee Minutes. 6/23/1930. Riefler’s compilation, 466-467. Also see 
discussion in Wicker 1966, 152. 
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York’s directors unanimously believed the bond buying program should continue for at 
least another two weeks because of its beneficial international effects:  
…a good part of the difficulty at the present time is lack of purchasing power in 
various parts of the world which are not in a position to purchase or take up 
surplus commodities off the markets of the world… everything possible should 
be done to revive buying power for our surplus products through the export of 
long time capital to those parts of the world where purchasing power has been 
curtailed. Purchases of Government securities… would do no harm and might 
do some good in reviving the bond market…  
Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) replied that the other Executive Committee members agreed 
with Calkins that the system had no responsibility “to develop or foster the bond market.” 
Having lost his appeal before the Executive Committee, Harrison reached out to the other 
governors. On July 3rd, he circulated a letter explaining the FRBNY directors’ support for 
renewed purchases: 415  
The United States and most other countries of the world are in the midst of a 
severe business depression. The decline in business activity has been great as 
judged by almost every available index. Unemployment is serious… it must be 
agreed that there is a surplus of many basic commodities awaiting distribution, 
commodities which are wanted and needed in many sections of the world which 
have not the power to purchase them… Anything, therefore, that can be done to 
stimulate economic activity and thus provide a market for that surplus… 
whatever steps the Reserve System may take… should be taken promptly and 
courageously.  
 The other governors remained unmoved. Gov. McDougal (Chicago) wrote 
Harrison back, “I am not in agreement with your view that the placing of additional 
reserve credit in the market under conditions now current ‘can do no harm’… I believe 
that it should be the policy of the Federal Reserve System to maintain a position of 
strength, in readiness to meet future demands.”416 On August 6th, the OMPC Executive 
                                                 
415Harrison further argued the coming harvest season would strain financial markets and the system should 
combat tightening. He ended with a plea for “continued and frank exchange of views among the Federal 
Reserve Banks and the Board, especially at such a critical time as the present.” Riefler’s compilation, 480. 
 
416 McDougal letter to Harrison. 7/10/1930. Cited in Chandler 1971, 135. 
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Committee agreed to buy an additional $25 million in government securities to offset 
gold exports, not as additional stimulus.417 
 Harrison’s preliminary memo for the September 25th OMPC meeting pointed out 
that the gold position of many European central banks had improved in 1930, but the 
improvement was explained by decreased currency in circulation due to the business 
depression, which was the worst of any witnessed since the 1880s.418 Despite his clear 
alarm, Harrison sided with the 9-3 majority calling to keep the open market account 
stable, rather than making more purchases. Gov. McDougal (Chicago) explained his 
dissenting vote by stating he preferred open market sales because “banks in the cities are 
possessed of an enormous amount of surplus funds.” Adolph Miller suggested “purchases 
of Government securities by the Federal reserve banks…” to “force banks and others to 
seek new investments… [which] might eventually lead to the injection into new 
enterprise of funds which could not otherwise be employed.” After years of opposing 
open market purchases, Miller now embraced such a policy.419 Recently appointed Gov. 
                                                 
417 On September 3rd, the Board considered Harrison’s telegram informing them that an OMPC majority 
had approved by telephone an authorization to purchase up to $50 million in government securities, “only if 
necessary as a supplement to bill purchases in offsetting seasonal demands for credit, gold exports, or other 
influences towards firmer money which might interfere with the continuance of present money conditions.” 
The Board also considered Gov. Calkins’ (San Francisco) letter which objected to Harrison’s 
communication procedure. “I do not believe that it is possible to reach a reasoned conclusion without 
discussion, and it is obviously impossible to have adequate discussion over long distance telephone, 
discussion that involves twelve or more individuals.” The Board authorized the purchases, but agreed with 
Calkins that future policy decisions should be made at OMPC meetings. The authorization was not used. 
Riefler’s compilation, 488-489 
 
418 At this meeting, Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) shared a memo prepared by his directors criticizing the 
system’s recent policies for having remained easy for too long: “We believe that the correction must come 
about through reduced production, reduced inventories, the gradual reduction of consumer credit, the 
liquidation of security loans, and the accumulation of savings through the exercise of thrift. These are slow 
and simple remedies… [Easy money policies] have doubtless avoided greater evils that might have 
occurred, but it is our judgment that they have been carried too far and too long.” Riefler’s compilation, 
494. 
 
419 OMPC Minutes. 9/25/1930. Riefler’s compilation, 513. 
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Eugene Meyer (Board) objected, stating “psychologically it would make people think we 
had entered on a campaign of inflation…”420 The Executive Committee was given 
authority to buy or sell up to $100 million in government securities to sustain present 
easy conditions in the principal money markets with the understanding that it likely 
wouldn’t exercise the authority. 
 Harrison was criticized within the FRBNY for excessive caution. In September, 
two of the bank’s leading officers, WR Burgess and Carl Snyder, endorsed a more 
aggressive bond buying campaign.421 Snyder proposed large government security 
purchases to fight credit deflation. Burgess said if he controlled the system, he would add 
surplus funds into the banking system to force banks to find ways of putting them to use. 
Harrison countered that since New York and Chicago member banks were out of debt to 
the system, additional funds would fuel “forced investments… the dangers of such a 
policy of ‘inflation’ were great and the advantages doubtful.” He also pointed out that 
persuading other OMPC members would be difficult.422  
After June, U.S. capital exports slowed to a third of their robust early 1930 
pace.423 That month, Herbert Hoover signed into law the protectionist Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff over the public opposition of a 1,028 economists. Smoot-Hawley negotiations had 
dragged on for over a year and a half. 34 countries had officially denounced the 
                                                 
420 Hamlin’s Diary. See discussion in Wicker 1966, 161. 
 
421 Wicker 1966, 157; Kindleberger 1973, 136. 
 
422 By November, a majority of FRBNY directors endorsed an open market buying campaign. Harrison 
argued purchases might stimulate capital outflows to France where “it would be less useful, from a world 
standpoint, than in this country.” 
 
423 Clarke 1967, 173. 
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legislation.424 In late 1930, bank failure rates spiked in the US and France, shaking 
investor confidence and leading to US currency hoarding.425 Mounting fiscal deficits in 
the US, Germany, and Britain further eroded confidence. 
At the December 20th OMPC Executive Committee meeting, Harrison pointed out 
that the recent failure of the New York-based Bank of United States, the largest 
commercial bank failure in US history, had triggered a panic in the New York market. 
$150 million dollars had been withdrawn from New York City banks, requiring an 
offsetting increase in Federal Reserve credit. The FRBNY had purchased $123 million in 
government securities in response, $43 million for its own account. The Executive 
Committee approved these purchases retroactively, but suggested the full OMPC should 
meet in January to discuss whether or not to sell the recently-purchased securities.426 On 
December 24th, the FRBNY received Board approval to reduce its discount rate to 2% to 
help combat its incipient banking crisis. 
The 1931 Global Crisis and Sterling’s Collapse  
In 1931, the interwar gold exchange standard came tumbling down. In a slow-
moving drama, financial instability first emerged in central Europe, moved to Germany, 
and culminated in a run on sterling which was floated in September. Over the summer, 
Harrison remained in close contact with his European counterparts and worked to provide 
                                                 
424 Kindleberger 1973, 133. 
 
425 Wicker 1966, 160; Kindleberger 1973, 146. Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 309-310) consider the late 
1930 panic a discrete shock which the Federal Reserve failed to adequately respond to. Elmus Wicker 
(1996, 24-59) argues, contrastingly, that the bank failures in 1930 were localized and did not constitute a 
nationwide panic. Wicker, Elmus. 1996. The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
  
426 OMPC Executive Committee Minutes. 12/20/1930. Reifler’s compilation, 523-527. See Chandler 1971, 
154. 
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emergency support for the German Reichsbank and the BOE. Harrison also worked to 
sustain the gold exchange standard by proposing expansionary open market purchases to 
revive the bond market. These efforts failed, however, as entrenched opposition within 
the OMPC preempted expansionary policies. After sterling’s September float, a global 
run on the dollar commenced as the US fell into a prolonged banking and financial crisis 
which developed into a currency crisis. 
 On January 21st, 1931, Harrison told his OMPC colleagues that the U.S.’s 
balance-of-payments surplus was draining reserves from Europe:427 
…the world owes the United States on balance about $600,000,000 each year, 
and that payment has to be made in gold, in imports from foreign countries to 
us, or by borrowing from us. These countries were unable to send us much more 
gold, their exports to us were now limited and new financing curtailed. Their 
only alternative was to diminish their purchases of goods from us, which was 
now being done to our detriment… the people he met abroad appeared to 
believe that recovery from the present business depression depends largely on 
America, partly for psychological reasons and partly because of the importance 
of exports to us and borrowing from us…  
It was agreed at this meeting that the depression was deepening and the US market for 
new foreign bond issues was virtually non-existent. WR Burgess, now the FRBNY’s 
Deputy Governor, proposed a $1 billion dollar government security buying campaign to 
revive the bond market, but was ignored.428 Gov. McDougal (Chicago) argued that the 
system’s easy money policy had failed to help and was doing more harm than good. He 
supported Gov. Calkins’ (San Francisco) proposal to sell $100-$200 million of securities 
on the open market. Harrison voted with the majority that “in these circumstances it 
would be desirable to dispose of some of the System holdings of government securities as 
                                                 
427 OMPC Minutes. 1/21/1931. Reifler’s compilation, 538-544. 
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and when opportunity affords itself to do this without disturbance or any tightening of the 
money position.” At the OMPC-Board meeting the next day, Gov. Meyer (Board) voiced 
his opposition to security sales, suggesting the public would interpret sales as a tightening 
policy which was inappropriate in light of the recent banking panic. No securities were 
sold beyond those purchased in December. 
 In March, Harrison told the FRBNY directors he saw no compelling reasons for 
further open market purchases. FRBNY officer Carl Snyder disagreed. He told EA 
Goldenweiser “[the] continued purchase of securities was absolutely necessary and that 
the only reason for not buying them was the Board’s apparent desire to see a large army 
of unemployed.”429 Whether Harrison actually believed purchases were unnecessary or 
merely politically infeasible is hard to judge.  
 The OMPC met in Washington on April 29th. Harrison’s preliminary memo 
emphasized continued weakness in the US and abroad. He noted that although system’s 
account was large by historical standards, purchases were “not pursued with the idea 
that… any vigorous stimulant might be given to business or finance.” Instead, they 
merely offset the contractionary effects of the stock market bust. Harrison argued 
mounting international political disturbances and high US tariff barriers were scaring 
Americans away from purchasing foreign bonds, leaving Europeans starved for capital.430 
He regretfully noted that since 1930, France and the US shared the “distinction of acting 
as a magnet to draw gold from countries which sorely needed it to money markets where 
it was already excessive.” He concluded, “…it is clear that the seriousness of the present 
                                                 
429 Quoted in Wicker 1966, 161. 
 
430 OMPC Meeting Minutes. 4/27/1931. Riefler’s Compilation, 554-654. 
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world situation and the central position of the United States in the whole world picture 
makes it desirable to tax our ingenuity that the Federal Reserve System may put forth 
every possible effort within its power towards maintaining a measure of credit stability 
throughout the world and towards eventual business recovery." Harrison asked for 
authority to purchase up to $100 million in government securities, with the understanding 
that these purchases would only be made if the system was unable to buy trade-related 
bills. Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) finally softened his opposition, saying he “saw no 
probability of any bad results from the policy.” Norris even suggested he was willing to 
lower Philadelphia’s discount rate, but feared that the system might be too slow to tighten 
policy in the future if speculative forces took hold. Fancher (Cleveland) stated “the 
economic situation throughout the world has seriously changed in the past year and is 
perhaps more serious than ever; the gold flow is most important; and… the System can 
lend its efforts to make money so cheap as to put it to work…” Even McDougal 
(Chicago) admitted gold was “the big question before us.” Although he “does not see 
how cheaper rates will stimulate business, nevertheless it may serve to move gold 
elsewhere.” Martin (St. Louis) noted there was “no historical precedent for the present 
situation” but “was in favor of trying the experiment.” The OMPC and Board endorsed 
Harrison’s program. The Board also approved the FRBNY’s request to reduce its 
discount rate to 1.5%.431  
 On May 8th, Harvard Economist OMW Sprague wrote Harrison regarding New 
York’s rate reduction, “It is an historic event – the lowest rate that has been established 
                                                 
431 The Board also approved reductions at the Chicago, Cleveland, St. Louis, and Dallas reserve banks. 
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by a central bank in any country. It signifies, I suppose, that we are experiencing the 
worst depression that has ever been recorded.”432 A day earlier, the German Ambassador 
had arrived in Washington, D.C., warning of a “disastrously developing financial 
situation” in Germany.433 Later that month, the failure of Austria’s largest bank increased 
speculative pressure on Germany.434 On June 5th, Germany’s Bruning-led government 
issued a decree announcing civil servant salaries and unemployment assistance would be 
reduced and a crisis tax would be implemented. Five days later, the Communist, 
Socialist, and Center parties demanded the Reichstag convene to rescind Bruning’s 
authorization to govern by decree. Gold poured out of Germany. On June 13th, the 
Reichsbank raised its discount rate from 5 to 7%, slowing the outflow. Between June 1st 
and June 17th, the Reichsbank lost over 1,400 million RM of gold, half of its reserves. 
 On June 20th, U.S. President Herbert Hoover announced a one-year moratorium 
on all intergovernmental payments, including reparations and war debts. The German and 
British governments immediately accepted the moratorium. Financial markets calmed. In 
France, however, the moratorium was received as a “bombshell.”435 Treasury Secretary 
Mellon traveled to Paris to negotiate French acceptance. On June 25th, an agreement was 
reached for a $100 million dollar joint credit to be extended to Germany from the BOE, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the Banque de France, and the FRBNY. By July 
5th, this credit was exhausted. Norman cabled Harrison, “The position in Germany has 
                                                 
432 OMW Sprague letter to Harrison 5/8/1931. Cited in Chandler 1971, 156. 
 
433 Kindleberger 1973, 152. 
 
434 The bank was called the Credit Anstalt.  See Chandler 1971, 164; Kindleberger 1973, 148. 
 
435 Kindleberger 1973, 156-157. 
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worsened because, while folks have been talking and arguing in Paris, the Reichsbank 
has been bleeding to death.”436  
France finally accepted the moratorium on July 6th, but it was too late to save 
Germany. Reichsbank President Hans Luther sought a $1 billion international loan to 
quell Germany’s banking crisis and restore confidence, but “in such unpropitious 
circumstances that it was brushed aside as completely impractical.”437 French authorities 
demanded heavy political concessions in exchange for support and President Hoover 
claimed Congress would never authorize a large loan when the US was running a $1.6 
billion dollar deficit.438 That month Germany imposed draconian capital controls, 
effectively abandoning the gold standard. 
 Harrison noted in his preliminary report for the June 22nd OMPC Executive 
Committee meeting that gold inflows from Germany and Argentina were coming “at 
considerable cost to those countries” and were been effectively sterilized by increased US 
currency hoarding.439 Harrison argued “the events of the past two weeks were in some 
ways the most critical which the world has passed through since the war, that there had 
been a threat of a general moratorium and a possible breakdown of capitalism in 
Europe… it seem[s] desirable to take every possible measure available to the Federal 
Reserve System for improving the situation. He could see no risk in buying governments 
                                                 
436 Norman Cable to Harrison 7/4/1931. Cited in Chandler 1971, 165.  
 
437 Clarke 1967, 44. 
 
438 Among other demands, France wanted Germany to renounce a customs union with Austria. 
Kindleberger 156-157. 
 
439 OMPC Executive Committee Minutes. 6/21/1931. Riefler’s compilation, 576.  
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at this time, but considerable advantage…” Harrison demanded an urgent response to 
reinforce the psychological effect of Hoover’s moratorium announcement two days prior. 
Gov. Black (Atlanta) agreed, “The President… had taken a constructive step which 
should be backed up to the limit…”440 The committee approved $50 million in 
government security purchases. Gov. Meyer (Board) argued more purchases might be 
needed.441 
 In July, speculation shifted to England. In the first half of 1931, the BOE gained 
$125 million in gold. Its position quickly reversed after mid-July, however. The 
MacMillan report was released on the 13th, revealing that foreign sterling balances, short-
term liabilities for the BOE, were much larger than anticipated.442 On July 26th, the May 
Committee’s report was released, predicting Britain’s budget deficit in the coming fiscal 
year would exceed £120 million sterling. In the second half of July, the BOE lost $200 
million in gold. It raised its bank rate in two steps from 2.5% to 4.5%. On July 29th, 
Norman collapsed from illness and exhaustion. His diary entry from two days earlier 
ominously stated “danger of suspension of gold payments.” 
 On August 1st, a £100 million sterling loan was announced from the FRBNY and 
the Banque de France. British elites quickly agreed, however, that a much larger foreign 
loan would be necessary to sustain gold convertibility. They considered such loans 
                                                 
440 Black was committed to using expansionary policies to combat the crisis. Richardson and Troost (2009) 
argue Black’s proactive approach prevented bank failures in his district following the 1929 crash. See Gary 
Richardson and William Troost, "Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics during the Great 
Depression: Quasi‐Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve District Border, 1929–1933." Journal of 
Political Economy 117.6 (2009): 1031-1073. 
 
441 Gov. Young (Boston) voted against this authorization. Gov. Norris (Philadelphia) abstained from voting. 
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unobtainable, however, prior to announcement of a balanced budget package. The May 
Committee report had recommended closing the deficit with steep cuts to unemployment 
benefits. A “classic political struggle” broke out within the divided Labour government 
among factions calling for slashed social expenditures, tariff hikes, and taxing the rich.443  
 On August 11th, the OMPC and Board met for a final time prior to sterling’s 
collapse.444 Harrison pointed out that the reserve banks still had $750 million in free gold 
among them which could be deployed to buy securities. Harrison proposed a major 
government bond buying program. Gov. Meyer (Board) said the Board was prepared to 
approve purchases of up to $200 to $300 million in government securities. Gov. Fancher 
(Cleveland) proposed a smaller program of $120 million in purchases. The OMPC 
approved this smaller package with only Harrison and Young (Boston) dissenting. Young 
was opposed to government bond purchases, believing they benefited money center 
banks disproportionately. Harrison argued only a “bold stroke” might succeed. Miller 
agreed, “…skeptical as he might be toward Open Market Policy as an instrument of the 
Federal Reserve System… if there ever had been a justification for its bold, experimental 
use, even though it might only serve to demonstrate the limits of… such a policy, that 
situation exists at present time.” The smaller $120 million package was implemented. 
  On August 24th, Labour Prime Minister MacDonald resigned and formed a new 
national government with the sole mission of saving the pound.445 On September 10th, the 
government announced an austerity budget with £80 million pounds in new taxes and £70 
                                                 
443 Kindleberger 1973, 159-160. 
 
444 Federal Reserve Board Minutes. 8/11/1931. Cited in Wicker 1966, 162; Chandler 1971, 145. 
 
445 Chandler 1971, 166; Kindleberger 1973, 160-162. 
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million pounds in budget “economies.” It then secured a $4 billion dollar private loan 
from creditors in New York and Paris. These loans slowed the BOE’s reserve drain, but 
by mid-September the run on sterling resumed. On Saturday, September 19th, British 
authorities announced sterling’s gold convertibility suspension effective on Monday. 
Since July, $1 billion dollars’ worth of funds had been withdrawn from London. The 
BOE’s gold reserve was down to £180 million pounds. Within four days of being floated, 
the pound had dropped 25% on foreign exchange markets.  
 On September 22nd, a run on US gold reserves commenced as investors became 
convinced that a dollar convertibility suspension was inevitable. On that day, the US lost 
$116 million dollars’ worth of gold, the largest daily loss ever sustained by the US.446 
Initially, the FRBNY’s directors wanted to sustain that bank’s low discount rate policy to 
protect the bond market and avoid reinforcing investors’ perceptions that the US’s gold 
position was vulnerable.447 WR Burgess, who was attending a conference in Europe, 
cabled the FRBNY cautioning against a rate increase, pointing out that gold withdrawals 
had not effected the system’s free gold position. Gov. Meyer (Board) intervened and 
informed the FRBNY he expected a discount rate increase. On October 1st, the FRBNY’s 
discount rate was increased to 2%. Two weeks later, the FRBNY raised its rate to 3.5% 
when Meyer told its directors “that an advance in the rate was called for by every known 
rule… foreigners would regard it as a lack of courage if the rate were not advanced.”  
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 The Federal Reserve’s tightening magnified the restrictive effect of gold exports 
and currency hoarding. 827 American banks failed in September and October. Currency 
in circulation rose by $393 billion and the gold stock declined by $727 million, reducing 
bank reserves by $1,120 million. In November, gold exports slowed, but a new wave of 
bank failures across the Mid-Atlantic region created a “credit blockade” as banks 
scrambled to increase their liquidity.448 Over the last four months of 1931, the US 
monetary gold stock declined by 11%. Commercial bank suspensions increased 86% 
from the second half of 1930 and defaults on foreign dollar-denominated bonds increased 
seventeenfold.449 In the six months following sterling’s suspension, the US “witnessed 
the most rapid contraction of bank credit and the money supply ever experienced in 
America.”450 When Franklin Roosevelt became president in March, 1933, dollar 
suspension was inevitable as the FRBNY lacked gold to export.451 Its gold reserve ratio 
had been reduced to 24%, 16% below its mandated legal minimum.452 
Conclusion: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions  
The Republican Party has just introduced the long-expected tariff bill… [which] 
proceeds upon the essentially unsound and vicious doctrine, that a nation can 
grow rich out of its export trade… This is an age and era of people of 
inconsistency. We say to the nations of Europe – pay us the eleven billions that 
you owe us – and then we make it impossible for them to pay it by the 
prohibitive tariff… this tariff bill… will come back some day and work the 
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destruction of the political party that adopts it… It strikes me as being 
economically unsound, politically unwise, and likely to be suicidal in its effect.  
Benjamin Strong, letter to Will H. Hays, July 1, 
1921. 
The interwar gold exchange standard, like all fixed exchange rate regimes, was a 
house of cards. This particular monetary order, however, was built on the shakiest of 
foundations. Strong, Norman, Keynes and other contemporaries catalogued the myriad 
barriers preventing restoration of a prosperous liberal international order: simmering 
great power hostilities; the reparations-war debt payments connection; U.S. protectionism 
and official aloofness; the strong dollar and America’s mountain of gold; misaligned 
European exchange rates; and social opposition to economic adjustment processes. 
Clarke concludes central bank cooperation’s decline after 1928 “was only part of the 
larger failure of the Western democracies to deal successfully with the economic and 
political problems of their time.”453 
The fact that the interwar gold exchange standard came into existence at all was a 
miracle. The U.S. emerged from WWI economically-dominant, but its fragmented 
institutions systematically dispersed power, giving geographically-dispersed 
“isolationists” the upper hand in crafting state policies. As Benjamin Strong pointed out 
in 1921, protectionism was incompatible with the goal of collecting war debts, since 
shielding U.S. markets from imports left Europeans no means of earning foreign 
exchange. Strong predicted mercantilist foreign economic policies would prove 
“suicidal” for the Republican Party. Eventually they did. In hindsight, it is remarkable 
that U.S. policies didn’t cause an international crisis earlier. Throughout the period, U.S. 
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fiscal and trade surpluses and enforced war debt collections placed a deflationary drag on 
the international economy.454 Europeans were right to criticize the Federal Reserve’s gold 
sterilization policies as it effectively removed U.S. gold imports from the monetary gold 
stock. When France copied this policy in 1928, the global economy was trapped in a 
deflationary vice. 
Monetarist scholars are wrong in concluding that gold sterilization proves that 
Federal Reserve policymakers focused narrowly on domestic macroeconomic 
stabilization objectives, however. As was demonstrated above, many of the system’s 
central bankers, especially those from New York, believed the fates of the national and 
international economies were intertwined. In 1924 and 1927, majorities on the open 
market committee and the Board endorsed system wide easing policies to support gold 
restoration abroad and increase European purchasing power. These stopgap measures 
were highly successful in staving off an international crisis. 
I have argued that the 1927 program opened a rift within the system which 
paralyzed Federal Reserve policymaking and ultimately led to increased institutional 
fragmentation. With the exception of the FRBNY’s unilateral response to the 1929 stock 
market crash, the system stopped stabilizing the international economy after the summer 
of 1927. A cursory review of 1930-1931 open market policy debates reveals that the 
governors who formerly controlled the OMIC rarely supported Harrison’s expansionary 
proposals. This evidence seemingly casts doubt on the interest-based portion of my 
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theoretical explanation. In the context of a collapsing global economy, however, central 
bankers’ preferences over the currency stability–domestic policy autonomy trade-off can 
shift.455 In an increasingly autarchic world, foreign currency stabilization becomes less 
worthwhile even for those agents representing internationally-oriented interests. Below I 
will briefly review competing ideational and interest-based explanations of the Federal 
Reserve’s policy behavior from 1930-31 before defending my institutional explanation.  
There are three main ideational explanations of the system’s policy behavior 
during the onset of the depression. The first focuses on leadership. It argues Harrison was 
less persuasive in convincing his colleagues of the virtue of expansionary policies and 
less effective at preventing institutional changes than Strong would have been.456 The 
second explanation, the so-called “Riefler-Burgess doctrine” view, focuses on the 
system’s flawed policy indicators, namely money center member bank indebtedness and 
nominal interest rate levels, as supporting insufficiently expansionary policies.457 Both 
Strong and Harrison argued publicly that open market purchases provided effective 
stimulus up to the point where member banks in New York and Chicago paid off their 
discount window borrowings. In this view, the system’s open market strategy remained 
consistent from 1924 through 1933. The third view focuses on Federal Reserve 
policymakers’ flawed belief that open market policy was an ineffective means of 
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stimulating the economy.458 In this view, if more system officials understood monetary 
policy could provide effective stimulus, a more expansionary policy would have been 
implemented.  
An alternative view in the literature focuses on diverging interests within the 
system to explain why expansionary open market programs weren’t sustained. One 
version of this argument maintains that the Boston and Chicago reserve banks opposed 
expansionary open market purchasing programs to defend their member banks’ 
interests.459 In a world devoid of promising investment opportunities, government 
securities were an important source of income for commercial banks. Securities 
purchased by the Federal Reserve were unavailable to commercial banks, limiting their 
earning potential. According to this logic, the Boston and Chicago reserve bank 
governors opposed expansionary open market policies to protect their member banks’ 
portfolios. A second interest-based explanation focuses on how individual reserve banks’ 
endowments influenced their systemic policy preferences. Through 1935, reserve bank 
participation in systemic open market purchases remained voluntary. Beginning in 1931, 
the so-called free gold problem emerged.460 Each reserve bank was mandated to keep a 
mixture of gold and trade-related securities on hand as collateral for currency issues, with 
a maximum ratio of 60% trade-related instruments and 40% gold reserves. As global 
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trade collapsed, trade-related bills grew scarce and reserve banks had trouble attaining 
them. As their stocks of bills decreased, reserve banks had to increase their stock of gold 
on hand proportionally. Passage of the 1932 Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed reserve 
banks to hold government securities as collateral for currency, eased this constraint. A 
third way interests might have influenced policy has to do with exogenous changes in the 
openness of the international economy.461 When the international economy moves toward 
closure, agents which formerly believed they had a vested interest in currency stability 
abroad might now reorder their preferences and prioritize domestic monetary policy 
autonomy. For the former OMIC governors who watched the U.S. inexorably drift 
toward greater protectionism after Herbert Hoover promised in the 1928 presidential 
campaign to increase agricultural tariffs, which culminated after a year and a half of 
logrolling into the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff, they might have come to believe 
Federal Reserve was growing impotent in its attempts to sustain international purchasing 
power. In such an environment, they might have preferred to defend their own 
institutional autonomy, by relying on discount rate policy, rather than wasting systemic 
resources on a lost cause. It is easy to believe that no amount of credit stimulus would 
have convinced American investors to loan large sums abroad in the context a collapsing 
global economy. 
The ideational and interest-based hypotheses outlined above provide significant 
leverage in explaining the Federal Reserve’s timid response to the deepening global 
crisis. Absent a theory of how these factors worked to shape policy outcomes through 
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concrete institutional processes, however, they remain underdeveloped. Lester Chandler 
provides the clearest theory linking Federal Reserve institutions, central bankers’ 
preferences, and observed policy outcomes. He highlights the unsettled nature of the 
Federal Reserve Act as fueling the system’s power struggle. “Even the closest reading of 
the legislative history of the Act and of the Act itself as it existed in the late 1920s cannot 
yield a precise answer [regarding the system’s locus of authority]. A considerable 
decentralization of power was clearly intended. Congress had, after all, rejected proposals 
for a single central bank and had provided for a system of 8 to 12 regional Reserve 
banks.”462 The Federal Reserve Act was an invitation to struggle. Early debates about 
policy and normative governance often blurred. Agents fought not only over policy 
outcomes, but also over their right to shape policy in the first place. Strong and other 
would-be central bankers recognized at the system’s origin that its decentralized structure 
posed barriers to the formation of coherent policies. The creation of the compact OMIC 
in 1923 reduced the system’s fragmentation by delegating policymaking authority to the 
governors of the system’s best endowed reserve banks. Lacking a legal foundation for its 
delegated authority, however, and existing in an American political culture which de-
legitimated hierarchies, this extra-legal institution remained vulnerable to normative 
attack and redefinition. At a time when many officials still believed the Federal Reserve 
Act’s purpose was to disperse financial authority, the OMIC’s eventual displacement was 
inevitable. Many governors took Adolph Miller’s argument that open market operations 
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eroded reserve bank autonomy seriously. If there was one thing system officials could 
agree to at the time, it was that the system was not intended to be a central bank.  
Friedman and Schwartz argue that governors on the OMPC were less inclined to 
follow New York’s leadership because they came ‘instructed by their directors’ and 
wielded petty jealousies toward New York’s power.463 In reality, however, officials 
throughout the system held diverging and inconsistent ideas regarding the efficacy of 
monetary policy and represented markedly different constellations of interests. Since 
many officials outside of the FRBNY believed open market operations undermined their 
regional autonomy and held less coherent theories of monetary policy than their New 
York counterparts, the expansion of the open market committee inevitably led to greater 
caution in wielding that policy instrument. Even when individuals changed their minds, 
such as Adolph Miller’s late conversion to believing in the power of open market 
operations, preference shifts proved insignificant for policy outcomes. Fragmented and 
inconsistent policy preferences were a persistent brake on system expansion.464 
Institutional fragmentation, therefore, contributed to monetary policy timidity 
after 1927. In 1929, FRBNY officials requested discount rate hikes to curb stock market 
speculation eleven times and were shot down each time by the Board. After the 1929 
crash, FRBNY officials sought rapid discount rate reductions and expansionary open 
market operations policies to revive the bond market and promote US capital exports. 
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Although the FRBNY eventually lowered its discount rate to historically low levels, 
many reductions were initially vetoed by the Board. Had the FRBNY not been 
continually forced to solicit Board approval, it would have lowered its discount rate more 
rapidly. The same is true to an even greater extent for open market operations policy. The 
FRBNY reacted to the stock market crash with bold, unilateral, open market purchases. 
Harrison broke his own bank’s rules, consulting with only a few FRBNY directors before 
ordering purchases, in order to stave off crisis. Though his bank supported Harrison’s 
extraordinary maneuver, he was sanctioned by Board which now demanded the right to 
veto reserve banks’ individual portfolio decisions. They further censured him by voting 
to replace the centralized OMIC with the fragmented OMPC. Under the new regime, 
New York’s open market proposals were subject to a protracted institutional process 
governed by a sea of potential veto players. Harrison first pitched his expansionary 
programs to the full OMPC, where they invariably met stiff resistance. When he did gain 
the OMPC’s endorsement, the Board asserted its right to veto OMPC decisions. If 
Harrison cleared both of these institutional hurdles, policy implementation authority was 
delegated to the OMPC’s Executive Committee. There he often encountered resistance to 
rapidly acting on the committee’s delegated purchasing authority. Finally, even after 
open market purchases had been made, other reserve banks could choose not to 
participate in the purchasing programs. When certain reserve banks chose not to 
contribute, others became reluctant to participate because they feared having to buy more 
than their normally-allotted share. Over time, the FRBNY was left with growing residuals 
from OMPC purchasing campaigns. New York’s gold reserve ratio steadily deteriorated 
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while reserve banks which boycotted system purchases, such as Chicago, maintained 
large stocks of surplus gold.   
It is clear that if the FRBNY controlled the Fed, the system would have enacted 
expansionary policies more courageously during the opening years of the Great 
Depression. Even those who argue the system’s open market strategy remained consistent 
following Strong’s death agree “monetary policy would undoubtedly have been more 
responsive had New York retained its leadership position.”465 WR Burgess abandoned the 
Riefler-Burgess framework in 1930 and pushed for bold expansionary open market 
purchases despite low money center discount window indebtedness.466 Even Adolph 
Miller embraced the “experimental” use of expansionary open market operations by the 
fall of 1930. If he had controlled the Fed at that moment, a more expansionary policy 
would have been implemented. 
Instead, no one was in charge. Or perhaps more accurately, everyone was. In the 
context of a collapsing global economy and rampant institutional fragmentation, building 
and sustaining an expansionary coalition was impossible. Even if all system officials 
agreed that monetary policy could help revive the economy, they inevitably would have 
disagreed about the desirable degree of Federal Reserve stimulus. Reserve bank 
governors’ perceptions of the state of the economy were shaped by conditions prevailing 
in their districts. Even minor policy disagreements mapped onto protracted institutional 
processes would have limited policy adjustments. In New York and Atlanta alone did 
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Federal Reserve officials maintain a cosmopolitan outlook throughout the onset of the 
depression, equating U.S. economic prospects with conditions prevailing abroad.467 If the 
Aldrich Plan supporters had gotten the central bank they demanded two decades earlier, 
such a centralized institution would have likely responded more aggressively to the Great 
Depression’s deflationary spiral.468 
  
                                                 
467 Eugene Black, Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, was the only other steadfast supporter 
of expansionary open market policies on the OMPC. Black’s support is often explained as deriving from 
his belief in the “power” of monetary policy, but his district’s regional economic interests, centered on 
cotton exports to England, might have also shaped Black’s preferences. 
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CHAPTER V 
CENTRAL BANKERS AND THE FIGHT TO SAVE BRETTON 
WOODS  
This chapter analyzes the Federal Reserve’s failed attempt to stabilize the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate regime in the 1960s. When Bretton Woods was negotiated in 
1944, wartime state-building pressures had left the Fed a centralized Treasury adjunct. 
When the fixed exchange rate system came under severe pressure during the 1960s, 
however, the Federal Reserve was unable to respond decisively to the crisis due to the 
extreme decentralization of its decision-making structure. An historical irony is that the 
Federal Reserve central banker who had the strongest desire to preserve the fixed 
exchange rate system, Chairman William McChesney Martin, Jr., had earlier led the 
charge to dismantle the system’s war-inspired hierarchies after the system regained 
operational independence in 1951. In the early 1960s, Federal Reserve agents 
collaborated with European central bankers and the U.S. Treasury to “patch up” Bretton 
Woods by building new international financial architecture.469 Chairman William 
McChesney Martin, Jr., and FRBNY President Alfred Hayes led the international 
diplomatic charge while simultaneously pushing for tighter monetary policies inside the 
Fed to address the dollar’s underlying external weakness. They were frustrated in their 
attempts to tighten policy, however, by a fragmented policymaking process which took 
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into account the preferences of 19 Federal Reserve officials when determining policies. 
Timely policy adjustments would have reassured market participants, improved the 
credibility of the gold-dollar link, and thereby prolonged Bretton Woods. 
How Federal Reserve Institutions Hastened Bretton Woods’ Collapse  
 The Federal Reserve System is often ignored in international political economy 
(IPE) analyses of Bretton Woods’ collapse. Many scholars focus on expansionary US 
fiscal policies as driving progressive dollar overvaluation and thereby destabilizing the 
fixed exchange rate regime.470 Others emphasize international factors in explaining 
Bretton Woods’ breakdown. Robert Triffin famously predicted Bretton Woods’ collapse 
in 1960 due to the incongruity between rapidly growing international trade and a slowly 
growing global monetary gold stock.471 In this view, the U.S. needed to run balance-of-
payments deficits to provide global liquidity, but paradoxically cumulative deficits would 
undermine confidence in the dollar’s gold link. Another international perspective 
suggests the currency regime depended on “consensual American hegemony.” 472 In this 
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view, the U.S.’s trading partners tolerated its external deficits in exchange for the U.S. 
providing an international vehicle currency and foreign investment. 473  
 The Federal Reserve’s absence from these analyses is puzzling because the Fed’s 
central bankers played a leading international role in “patching up” Bretton Woods.474 
Harold James describes the 1960s as Bretton Woods’ “heyday” because central bank 
cooperation reemerged on a scale unseen since the 1920s.475 FRBNY agents attended 
monthly meetings at the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, 
and collaborated to construct new stability-enhancing institutions. Although central 
bankers were aware of Triffin’s dilemma, they “consciously believed that the breakdown 
of the system could be postponed indefinitely, or that the system could be made to 
survive until a better substitute could be worked out, as long as the holders of dollars 
exercised restraint in converting them into gold.”476 Central bankers were skeptical of 
schemes to replace Bretton Woods, such as Triffin’s proposal to create a new 
international reserve currency issued by a supranational central bank.477 Instead, they 
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believed Bretton Woods could be sustained indefinitely through central bank cooperation 
and macroeconomic restraint in persistent deficit countries.  
 Despite certain Federal Reserve agents’ persistent calls for tighter policies to 
defend the dollar, U.S. monetary policy changed slowly in the sixties. This chapter argues 
delayed U.S. monetary policy restraint contributed to Bretton Woods’ collapse. There is a 
burgeoning literature on the Fed’s complicity in the so-called Great Inflation of 1965-
1979.478 In this literature, the Fed’s overly expansionary monetary policies are commonly 
attributed to flawed Keynesian models and indicators.479 To the extent that Federal 
Reserve policies fueled escalating U.S. inflation rates, however, they also promoted 
exchange rate misalignment (see Figure 10). I argue that the interaction of institutional 
fragmentation and ideological polarization, not the flawed content of ideas alone, was the 
root of the system’s underwhelming attempt to tackle inflation and defend the dollar. The 
U.S. was already well on its way to abandoning the gold-dollar link by the time 
Keynesian economists gained control of the Federal Reserve Board in the mid-1960s. 
                                                 
478 One important exception is Barry Eichengreen and Michael Bordo’s recent argument that Federal 
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Figure 10: Federal Funds Rate and U.S. Monetary Gold Stock in Millions (1958-1968) 
  
              Source: Fred Database 
Although scholars traditionally date Bretton Woods’ collapse to 1971 or 1973, 
this chapter follows recent scholars by dating the effective end of the fixed exchange 
regime in 1968, when the London gold pool collapsed.480 This temporal reordering 
invites a reassessment of the underlying causes of Bretton Woods’ collapse. 
Policymakers throughout the western world grew alarmed by the U.S.’s rapidly declining 
gold reserves beginning after 1958. During the conservative Eisenhower administration, 
new economists were unable to gain a foothold in either the fiscal or monetary 
policymaking processes. Keynesians gained control of the Council of Economic Advisors 
under President Kennedy, but they lost a broader battle within the administration to chart 
national currency policy. Kennedy instead favored an old guard faction within the 
Treasury and the Federal Reserve which hoped to use U.S. macroeconomic policy 
instruments to defend the dollar’s gold parity. Keynesians gained greater influence over 
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currency policy under Lyndon Johnson, but cumulative non-adjustments of U.S. 
macroeconomic policies had already undermined the gold-dollar link’s credibility.  
 To understand how Federal Reserve institutions contributed to Bretton Woods’ 
collapse, one needs to understand how those institutions evolved in the period since 1931. 
This chapter begins by briefly overviewing the system’s institutional development from 
the Great Depression through the 1951 Fed-Treasury Accord, which restored the system’s 
operational independence. It then analyzes a post-Accord flaring of the system’s internal 
struggle which resulted in the creation of a fragmented, consensual monetary 
policymaking process where nineteen agents weighed in on policy decisions. The chapter 
then analyzes this regime’s performance from 1958-1968. It concludes by arguing that 
the Fed’s fragmented institutions played a key role in sustaining low U.S. interest rates 
low long after central bankers recognized that monetary restraint could help stabilize the 
dollar and prolong Bretton Woods. 
The Fed’s Rationalization, Capture, and Wartime Development  
 By 1933, monetary politics had escaped the confines of the Federal Reserve. In 
1932, the Hoover Administration supported the creation of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC), a governmental body tasked with recapitalizing illiquid banks and 
railroads.481 The 1932 Glass-Steagall Act authorized the Federal Reserve Banks to use 
government bonds as collateral for currency issues, eliminating the free-gold problem 
which had undermined previous bond-buying campaigns. In the context of severe 
congressional pressure, the OMPC embarked on an unprecedentedly-large $1 billion 
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dollar government bond-buying campaign. This program temporarily arrested the 
deflationary slide, but internal opposition from the Boston and Chicago reserve banks led 
to its early termination.482 The 1932 Glass-Steagall Act also forbade reserve banks from 
engaging in international diplomacy, delegating diplomatic authority to the Board.483  
 Between the November 1932 presidential election and Franklin Roosevelt’s 
March inauguration, the U.S. banking system collapsed.484 In January 1933, Congress 
required the RFC to publicly disclose which banks had borrowed from it during the first 
half of 1932, making banks hesitant to borrow from it and contributing to depositor 
uncertainty.485 On February 13th, negotiations between the RFC and the Guardian Group, 
a large Michigan banking conglomerate, broke down. In response, Michigan’s governor 
declared a statewide banking holiday on February 14th, temporarily closing all banks and 
freezing deposits. Michigan’s bank holiday announcement triggered bank runs in 
contiguous states. Depositors rushed to remove their deposits, and state authorities 
responded by implementing deposit withdrawal restrictions or announcing bank holidays 
of their own. By March 4th, bank holidays had been declared in 33 states; optional bank 
closings were implemented in five; and deposit restrictions were in place in ten.  
  Amidst the collapse, lame duck President Herbert Hoover reached out to 
Roosevelt and the Federal Reserve Board to negotiate a joint response to the banking 
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crisis, but was mutually rebuffed.486 In addition to the domestic currency drain, an 
external flight from the dollar had also taken root. Foreign depositors, uncertain about 
Roosevelt’s gold commitment, withdrew funds from American banks. Between January 
and March, the U.S. monetary gold stock declined by $299 million, or 7%. Although 
Hoover pushed Roosevelt to publicly commit to gold, Roosevelt replied that “mere 
statements” would do nothing to stop bank runs.487 On his first day in office, Roosevelt 
declared a national banking holiday and suspended international gold shipments.488 In an 
emergency session, Congress hurriedly passed the Emergency Banking Act, legalizing 
the bank holiday and providing a means for reopening solvent banks.489 In Roosevelt’s 
first fireside chat a week later, he explained his plan for reopening sound banks. When 
banks began reopening the next day, they were flooded by a sea of depositors. Although 
many wouldn’t reopen for months, the banking crisis was effectively over.490  
 In Roosevelt’s inaugural address, he signaled support for restoring international 
currency stability. In May, however, Congress passed the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
which granted the president discretionary authority to print up to $3 billion dollars of 
                                                 
486 Specifically, Hoover proposed that Roosevelt declare his commitment to sustaining the gold standard, 
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U.S. currency and devalue the dollar by up to 50% in terms of gold.491 Before the London 
Economic Conference began in June, the U.S. delegation attempted to negotiate a three-
way currency stabilization agreement with British and French authorities.492 An 
agreement was beyond reach, however. On July 3rd, Roosevelt “torpedoed” the London 
Economic Conference by issuing a public statement declaring the primacy of domestic 
price stabilization: “The sound internal economic situation of a nation is a greater factor 
in its well-being than the price of its currency… The old fetishes of so-called 
international bankers are being replaced by efforts to plan national currencies with the 
objective of giving those currencies a continuing purchasing power.”493 Although Charles 
Kindleberger famously blamed Roosevelt’s inflammatory rhetoric for scuttling the 
London Economic Conference, Barry Eichengreen has argued convincingly that trilateral 
negotiations among Britain, France, and the U.S. had already failed.494 
 With the domestic banking crisis contained and the dollar delinked from gold, the 
stage was set for a dramatic restructuring of the American state’s relationship with the 
domestic financial system and the international monetary regime. On June 16th, Roosevelt 
signed into law the Banking Act of 1933, the more well-known Glass-Steagall Act.495 
                                                 
491 When Roosevelt announced he would support the bill on April 18th, Budget Director Lewis Douglass 
said, “This is the end of Western Civilization.” See discussions in Kindleberger 1973, 202; Melzer 2003, 
428-429. 
 
492 With Roosevelt’s approval, the US delegation proposed the restoration of gold payments with a dollar 
devaluation of 15 to 25%. After US devaluation, currency stabilization would be managed by a three-way 
stabilization fund. Kindleberger 1973, 207. 
 
493 See Kindleberger 1973, 219. 
 
494 Eichengreen 2015, 236. 
 
495 See discussions in Chandler 1971, 270-71; Meltzer 2003, 429-434.  
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This law forbade banks from engaging in both commercial and investment banking 
activities.496 It also introduced a temporary national deposit insurance scheme, which was 
made permanent as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1935.497 The Glass-
Steagall Act also represented the Federal Reserve Act’s first major revision since WWI. 
It created Regulation Q, giving the Board authority to prohibit interest on demand 
deposits and impose interest rate ceilings on time deposits.498 The open market committee 
was legally recognized and reconstituted as the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). The new committee retained the OMPC’s membership until 1935.499  
 In the meantime, New Dealers moved to assert greater state control over securities 
markets and the dollar’s exchange rate. The Securities Act of 1933, known as the Truth-
in-Securities Act, required companies selling public stock to register with the government 
and disclose complete financial information. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought 
to curb manipulative trading practices and required publicly-listed companies to disclose 
their financial data. It created a new federal agency, the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
496 Banks were given one year to decide their subsequent specialization. Congress repealed these provisions 
in 1999.  
 
497 Deposit insurance represented a victory for small-town unit banks over money-center banks which 
preferred liberalized branching provisions. See Meltzer 2003, 432. Had the Senate version of the 1913 
Federal Reserve Act been made law, deposit insurance would have been introduced two decades earlier. 
Deposit insurance critics argue the US would have been better off if it liberalized branching provisions 
instead of insuring deposits. See, for example, Calomiris, Charles W. 2010. “The Political Lessons of 
Depression-era Banking Reform.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 26 (3): 540-560. 
 
498 Gilbert, R. Alton. 1986. “Requiem for Regulation Q: What it Did and Why it Passed Away.” Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. (February): 22-37. 
 
499 The Federal Reserve Board was also given responsibility to regulate bank holding companies, corporate 
entities which can own stock in multiple banks. Branch banking restrictions prevented banks from directly 
owning other banks. 
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Commission, to enforce its provisions and empowered the Federal Reserve Board to 
adjust call loan margin requirements. 
 The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 authorized the Treasury to negotiate international 
monetary agreements and to intervene in foreign exchange, gold, and government 
security markets.500 It mandated that the Federal Reserve Banks transfer their gold 
reserves to the Treasury. After the transfer occurred, the dollar was stabilized at a new 
gold parity of $35 per ounce, a 59% devaluation.501 $2 billion of the Treasury’s resulting 
$2.8 billion “profit” was used to capitalize an Exchange Stabilization Fund. Overnight, 
the Treasury gained control over a war chest rivalling the FOMC’s system account. 
Although the dollar devaluation’s legal foundations wouldn’t be secured until the 
Supreme Court’s 1935 Gold Clause Cases ruling, the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
increased the Treasury’s power vis-à-vis the Federal Reserve. A Board memo lamented 
the Treasury’s new “authority to assume complete control of general credit conditions 
and to negate any credit policies that the Federal Reserve System might adopt.”502  
 New Deal financial reforms culminated in a major restructuring of the Federal 
Reserve System. The 1935 Banking Act finally addressed the system’s underlying power 
struggle by centralizing power within the Board, which was reconstituted as the Board of 
Governors. The Board’s ex officio members were purged, making its administrative 
                                                 
500 See discussions in Henning, C. Randall. 1999. The Exchange Stabilization Fund: Slush Money or War 
Chest? Washington, D.C.: Peterson Institute; Carlson, Mark A. and David C. Wheelock. 2014. “Navigating 
Constraints: The Evolution of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1935-59.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis Working Paper Series 2014-013. 
 
501 Meltzer 2003, 457-458. 
 
502 Smead memo to Black. 1/17/1934. Cited in Meltzer 2003, 457. 
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officer (now titled Chairman) its undisputed leader.503 All Board members were now 
given the title of “Governor” and reserve bank executive officers were given the lesser 
title of “President.”504 Most importantly, the FOMC was reconstituted to give the Board 
prevailing authority over open market policy decisions. The Board’s seven governors 
gained permanent voting rights on the FOMC and the remaining five votes rotated among 
the twelve reserve bank presidents. The new structure represented a compromise between 
those who desired even greater centralization (Board Chairman Marriner Eccles) and 
those who defended the system’s decentralized, federal, structure (Sen. Carter Glass and 
the reserve bank presidents).505 Reserve bank participation in open market operations 
became mandatory. The Board was granted the power to increase member bank’s reserve 
ratios up to double their prevailing rates.506   
The Federal Reserve’s depression-era reforms gave the Board impressive new 
powers while increasing its structural independence (see Table 3).507 By weakening 
reserve bank autonomy and centralizing control within the Board, the system became 
                                                 
503 Previously, the Board’s administrative officer was titled “Governor” and the Treasury Secretary was the 
“Chairman.” 
 
504 Although in the US political system the President has long been considered more powerful than state 
governors, the top officers of European central banks were called governors. Thus, the Board’s 
reconstitution signaled that agency’s new primacy within the Federal Reserve System.  See Wells, Donald 
R. The Federal Reserve System: A History. Jefferson: McFarland, 2004: 68. 
 
505 Eccles suggested open market operations policy be made by a five-member committee composed of 
three Board governors and two reserve bank presidents. The American Bankers Association proposed the 
compromise 12 member structure actually adopted. See discussions in Meltzer 2003, 475-486; Wells 2004, 
61-76.  
 
506 It was also given veto authority over reserve bank executive officer appointments. 
 
507 Structural independence was increased by purging ex officio cabinet members and lengthening Board 
appointments to 14 years. For an alternative view which argues the system’s structural independence was 
secured at its origin, see Jeong et al 2009. 
 
 173 
 
 
more hierarchical and central bank-like. The simultaneous creation of a handful of new 
state financial agencies, however, meant the Fed operated within an increasingly crowded 
institutional order. Furthermore, the Treasury’s new powers consigned the system to “the 
backseat” of the monetary policymaking process through 1951.508 
Table 3: Depression-era Financial Reforms  
New State Agencies Established Board's New Powers Established 
Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation 
1932 
Negotiate International 
Agreements 
1932 
Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board 
1932 
Regulate Interest Rates Paid 
on Deposits (Regulation Q) 
1933 
Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
1933 
Adjust Call Loan Margin 
Requirements 
1934 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
1933 
Adjust Member Bank 
Reserve Ratios 
1935 
Bureau of Federal Credit 
Unions 
1934 
7/12 Votes on the Federal 
Open Market Committee 
1935 
  
Although the depression-era reforms were intended to increase the Board’s 
independence and institutional control, those changes did not prove durable. The 
rationalized Fed was quickly usurped by the Treasury. Furthermore, wartime state-
building drew the FRBNY and the Treasury closer together, as it had in the earlier world 
war. In 1942, the FRBNY President was made the FOMC’s ex officio Vice-Chairman and 
given permanent FOMC voting rights.509 In April 1942, the Federal Reserve announced 
                                                 
508In this period, the system only adjusted member banks’ required reserve levels to respond to 
macroeconomic disturbances. The Board doubled required reserve levels from 1936-37, possibility 
contributing to the 1937-38 double-dip recession. See Meltzer 2003, 600; Carlson and Wheelock 2014. 
 
509 It also became an ex officio member of FOMC’s five-member executive Committee, which implemented 
the FOMC’s policy directives. This institutional change was enacted by an act of Congress on July 7, 1942. 
See Twenty-Ninth Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 56; Wells 
2004, 68. 
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that it would fully cooperate with the Treasury in financing the war.510 To do so, it agreed 
to peg interest rates on government bonds. Short-dated bills were pegged at .375% and 
long term bonds were fixed at 2 ½%. Open market operations was reduced an 
administrative task of buying and selling enough Treasury bonds at various maturities to 
maintain a given interest rate structure. If Treasury bonds fell on secondary markets, the 
FOMC stepped in and bought bonds until they were pushed back up to par.  
After the war ended, the Treasury demanded the peg remain in place. Chairman 
Marriner Eccles called for tighter monetary policies to combat mounting inflation, but 
was denied by successive treasury secretaries. When he was replaced as chairman in 
1948, FRBNY President Allan Sproul assumed a more prominent role within the system 
and led the charge for greater independence.511 The postwar conflict between the Fed and 
the Treasury came to a head in the summer of 1950 as the U.S. prepared to fight the 
Korean War.512 Eccles testified before Congress in January, 1951, “As long as the 
Federal Reserve is required to buy government securities at the will of the market for the 
purpose of defending a fixed pattern of interest rates…This policy makes… the Federal 
Reserve System, an engine of inflation.”513 The Fed-Treasury Accord was announced on 
March 4th, restoring the Fed’s operational independence.514 
                                                 
510 The 1942 War Powers Act also empowered the system to purchase bonds directly from the Treasury, 
which it did on occasion. Meltzer 2003, 599; Wells 2004, 78-80. 
 
511 Meltzer 2003, 582. 
 
512 Kirshner, Jonathan. 2007. Appeasing Bankers: Financial Caution on the Road to War. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press: 122-154. 
 
513 Joint Committee on the Economic Report. U.S. Congress 1951, p. 158. 
 
514 See Epstein, Gerald A. and Juliet B. Schor. 1995. “The Federal Reserve-Treasury Accord and the 
Construction of the Postwar Monetary Regime.” Social Concept 7 (1): 7-48; Hetzel, Robert L. and Ralph 
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The Battle for the Heart of the Federal Reserve (1951-1955) 
This unique structure of the Federal Open Market Committee was hammered out after 
long experience and intense political debate... it exemplifies the unceasing search of the 
American democracy for forms of organization that combine centralized direction with 
decentralized control.        
Chairman William Martin, Flanders Hearings, 1954 
I am overlooking… the reiterated charge of Congressman Patman that Congress gave 
this great power of directing open market operations of the Federal Reserve Banks to 
twelve men, the twelve men gave it to five, the five gave it to one, and it ended up in 
the hands of Wall Street.  
FRBNY President Allan Sproul, FOMC, 6/22/55 
The 1951 restoration of operational independence reignited the system’s dormant 
power struggle.515 During the system’s long period of capture, open market authority had 
concentrated within the FOMC’s executive committee and the FRBNY’s trading desk. 
After operational independence was restored, the FOMC’s executive committee retained 
effective control over open market policy. This five-member body was composed of the 
presidents of the FRBNY and another reserve bank, the Chairman of the Board, and two 
other governors. The full FOMC met four times a year and approved broad policy 
guidelines for the executive committee, which met every few weeks. FRBNY President 
                                                 
Leach. 2001. “The Treasury-Fed Accord: A New Narrative Account.” FRB Richmond Economic 
Quarterly 87 (1): 33-56; Meltzer 2003, 699-713; Wells 2004, 91-95. 
 
515 See discussions in Clifford, Albert. 1965. The Independence of the Federal Reserve System. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press: 274; Hetzel, Robert L. and Ralph Leach. 2001. "After the 
Accord: Reminiscences on the Birth of the Modern Fed." FRB Richmond Economic Quarterly 87 (1): 57-
64; Bremner, Robert P. 2004. Chairman of the Fed: William McChesney Martin Jr., and the Creation of 
the Modern American Financial System. New Haven: Yale University Press: 97-113; Meltzer, Allan H. 
2009. A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 62-72. 
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Allan Sproul dominated the executive committee.516 Sproul was “the preeminent force, 
intellectual and political, within the Federal Reserve System.”517 
 After the accord, William McChesney Martin, Jr., was appointed Chairman of the 
Board of Governors. Since Martin had negotiated the accord on behalf of the Treasury, 
many pundits interpreted his appointment as a signal that the system would remain 
subservient to the Treasury. Martin was determined to defend the system’s autonomy, 
however. He worked with Sproul to advance the concept of the Federal Reserve System 
being “independent within government.” Martin and Sproul believed that the system 
should be free from Treasury domination, but that it remained obligated to help finance 
budget deficits approved by Congress and promote an “orderly market” in government 
securities. Beyond this agreement on the system’s external position, Martin and Sproul 
held conflicting visions of the system’s normative governance. Sproul believed that the 
system’s war-inspired hierarchies increased its capacity to decisively intervene in 
financial markets, shape market participants’ psychology, and thereby stabilize the 
economy.518 By delegating significant operational autonomy to the FRBNY’s trading 
desk, the system kept a continuous pulse on financial markets, increasing monetary 
policy’s credibility.  
                                                 
516 Clifford 1965, 279; Volcker, Paul A. and Toyoo Gyohten. 1992. Changing Fortunes: The World's 
Money and the Threat to American Leadership. New York: Times Books: 5; Bremner 2004, 112; Meltzer 
2009, 70. 
  
517 Sproul had served for twenty seven years in the FRBNY, regularly testified before Congress, and was 
the nation’s most prominent central banker internationally. See Kettl 1986, 85. 
 
518 Hetzel and Leach 2001, 61. 
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Martin, by contrast, believed hierarchy was inconsistent with the system’s 
traditions and the broader nature of American political institutions. Martin’s father was 
the foundational chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Martin remembered 
his father’s Federal Reserve as being more collegial and decentralized than the post-
accord Fed. Martin considered institutional fragmentation a source of strength and 
independence. He often reminisced about his childhood experiences of having Benjamin 
Strong and Carter Glass visit his house for dinner and engaging his father in theoretical 
and policy debates.519 Whereas Sproul considered hierarchy and discretion the keys to 
institutional success, Martin believed decentralized, participatory institutions were 
capable of yielding equally sound and more legitimate policy outcomes. Martin’s vision 
of a less centralized Federal Reserve wasn’t rooted solely in nostalgia. He also considered 
a New York-dominated Fed susceptible to capture by the Treasury or private interests. 
Furthermore, he believed that the New York Fed’s intervention in all segments of the 
government bond market prevented that market’s development. 
On May 17, 1951, Martin proposed that the FOMC form an ad hoc subcommittee to 
study the FOMC’s operations in the government securities market. The subcommittee 
was composed of Martin, Gov. Abbot L. Mills, and President Malcolm Bryan (Atlanta). 
All were newcomers to the system. The subcommittee submitted its final report to the 
FOMC on November 12, 1952. The report was critical of the FRBNY’s dominant 
position within the open market policymaking process and its practice of intervening in 
all segments of the government bond market. Martin and Sproul subsequently engaged in 
                                                 
519 Bremner 2004, 13. 
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a “gentlemanly but polarizing” governance debate which slowly transformed the Federal 
Reserve System.520 
The subcommittee’s report focused on two broad questions. What degree of 
freedom had the system actually gained from the Treasury’s debt-management 
prerogatives? And second, how would the system deal with the increased accountability 
which came along with operational independence? The ad hoc subcommittee’s report 
made four major recommendations.521 First, open market operations should be confined 
to short-dated Treasury bills. Second, open market operations should only be used to 
implement monetary policies, not to support Treasury financing objectives. Third, the full 
FOMC should supervise open market operations implementation rather than the 
executive committee. Finally, the FOMC should develop a separate operating budget and 
hire its own staff.522 
Each of the subcommittee’s recommendations called into question the prevailing 
authority of FRBNY President Allan Sproul. The report suggested Sproul came to FOMC 
meetings “not only as a contributor” to policy debates but also “as a protagonist for the 
actual day to day operation of the account.”523 Since Sproul personally supervised the 
                                                 
520 Bremner 2004, 102. 
 
521 Reprinted in U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Economic Report. Subcommittee on Economic 
Stabilization. 1954. United States Monetary Policy, Recent Thinking and Experience.83rd Cong., 2nd sess., 6 
December. Hereafter referred to as Flanders Committee Hearings. See discussions in Clifford 1965, 279-
84; Meltzer 2009, 56. 
  
522 To accomplish these goals, the report suggested giving the FOMC an operating budget, a full-time staff, 
making the desk agent an FOMC employee and making separate officials responsible for implementing 
open market operations policy and the system’s agency functions for the Treasury and foreign central 
banks. See Clifford 1965, 279. 
 
523 Flanders Committee Hearings, 281-283. 
 
 179 
 
 
trading desk manager, other committee members were “reluctant to seem critical of a 
colleague, [and might] hesitate to scrutinize adequately the technical operations of the 
account.” Furthermore, the concentration of power within the FRBNY could make the 
system susceptible to “banker domination.” The report suggested that the all FOMC 
members should learn the technical aspects of open market operations and take a more 
active role in supervising the desk agent “to carry out more effectively his individual 
statutory responsibility as a committee member.” 
In April 1953, Martin explained the ad hoc subcommittee report’s implications in 
a speech to the Economic Club of Detroit titled “The Transition to Free Markets.”524 
Martin argued wartime necessity had forced the system, “…to stabilize the price of 
Government securities in relation to a fixed pattern of yields, and in so doing found itself 
feeding the forces that make for inflation.” He argued a pegging policy was inappropriate 
during peacetime, “In a free market, rates can go down as well as up and thus perform 
their proper function in the price mechanism. Dictated money rates breed dictated prices 
all across the board. This is characteristic of dictatorships… It is not compatible with our 
institutions.” Martin argued that by confining open market operations to short-dated 
Treasury bills, market agents would be forced to take on a more active role in valuing 
government security issues. A “bills-only” policy would prevent the system from slipping 
back into pegging government securities while cultivating the growth of a Treasury bond 
market characterized by “depth, breadth, and resiliency.”  
                                                 
524 Federal Reserve Bulletin 39, April 1953, 330-335. 
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The FOMC considered the ad hoc subcommittee’s report on March 5, 1953.525 It 
voted unanimously to restrict the open market account manager to dealing in “bills-only” 
and changing its directive from “maintaining orderly conditions in the Government 
securities market” to “correcting a disorderly situation.”526 Before the next FOMC 
meeting, Sproul caucused with the other reserve bank presidents at the Richmond reserve 
bank and voiced his concerns regarding the new arrangements.527 At the June 11th FOMC 
meeting, two governors were absent, granting the reserve bank presidents a 5-4 voting 
majority. Sproul used this momentary advantage to revisit bills-only, arguing “we should 
reserve for ourselves maximum freedom to operate.”528 Sproul warned that the system 
shouldn’t restrict its operations based on a “doctrinaire attitude on free markets…” which 
would “be sacrificing credit policy to untried theory.” Instead, “the full Committee 
[should] give to the executive committee more authority than that embodied in the 
directive for correcting disorderly markets… the present prohibition puts a premium on 
sluggish action which would not meet the situations that may arise.” Martin “noted that 
only nine voting members of the full Committee were in attendance at this meeting, and 
he inquired whether any member of the Committee thought that on a question as grave as 
this one it was appropriate to put the matter to a vote.” Sproul refused to back down. He 
requested “that the restrictions on the executive committee against buying securities in 
                                                 
525 FOMC Minutes, 3/4/1953. 
  
526 Due to Sproul’s objection, Martin deferred discussion of amending the trading desk manager’s 
supervisory structure.   
 
527 Hetzel and Leach 2001, 60. 
 
528 Sproul argued bills-only proponents “told that operations in bills would have prompt and pervasive 
effects throughout the market. That was the theory of perfect fluidity - perfect arbitrage. I think historical 
records and current observation indicate that a prompt and invariable response between short and long 
markets cannot always be expected.” FOMC Minutes. 6/11/1953, 27. 
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other than the short term area except in correcting a disorderly market, and against certain 
purchases of securities during periods of Treasury financings, be rescinded.” The 5-4 vote 
split across institutional lines. Bills-only was removed from the policy directive. 
All governors were in attendance at the next FOMC meeting.529 Martin again 
brought up bills-only. He began the discussion by stating, “The thing I like most about 
the Federal Reserve is the word ‘System.’ The first two words don't make much 
difference but ‘System’ does… The essence of the problem we were struggling with was 
a matter of degree of discretion… we want the Manager of the Open Market Account to 
have adequate discretion but don't want to put him in the position of having more 
discretion than is necessary.” Gov. Mills then proposed reinstating bills-only. Martin then 
asked Sproul to weigh in. Sproul explained, “My position – and that of the New York 
Bank – is that the Federal Open Market Committee should lay down the general lines of 
credit policy, that the interpretation and direction of the policy under changing conditions 
is the job of the Executive Committee…What I have been objecting to as a matter of 
principle… is trying to write into a ‘constitution’ of the Open Market Committee, a 
prohibition against actions deemed undesirable by particular members of the Committee, 
holding particular views, at a particular time. We can't afford a freeze of ideas or 
practices… It was to avoid this straitjacket… that I proposed the June motion to rescind 
the March action.”  
Johns (St. Louis) then explained why he earlier voted to rescind bills-only, but 
now supported its reinstatement. In June, he had intended “to leave the executive 
committee a rather large area of discretion within which to make decisions which are 
                                                 
529 FOMC Minutes, 9/24/1953. 
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more than operating decisions and which involve considerable policy making 
prerogatives.”530 From “one point of view of good administration, it may be that such 
discretion can be more easily and possibly at times more quickly exercised by a smaller 
body such as the executive committee.” Johns now doubted this perspective, however. 
“If… the members of the Board of Governors… are at their posts and Mr. Sproul is at his 
post… the fact is that there are only four Presidents to be called in order to obtain action 
by the full Open Market Committee.” Given the ease of organizing the FOMC by 
telephone, Johns now “accept[ed] the proposal that the authority to modify the general 
instructions be retained in the hands of the full Open Market Committee.” Erickson 
(Boston), Fulton (Cleveland), and Leedy (Kansas City) agreed with Johns and endorsed 
Mills’ proposal.531   
Williams (Philadelphia) and Leach (Richmond) expressed concern that the 
proposal to reinstate bills-only carried too much of an air of permanence. Sproul agreed, 
“This carried with it… the implication of ‘writing a constitution’ for the open market 
operation.” Martin replied “no tablets of stone were being written.” The FOMC voted 9-2 
to reinstate bills-only.532  
In 1954, Martin and Sproul once again clashed over bills-only in congressional 
testimony before the Flanders Committee. Martin endorsed bills-only as a means of 
                                                 
530 He regretted the perception that his earlier vote indicated “my desire to vest in the management of the 
account or the New York Bank a large and almost unlimited discretion.” 
  
531 Leedy voiced skepticism over making large delegations to the extra-legal executive committee and 
“wondered what would be left for the full Committee if such decisions were to be turned over to the 
executive committee.” 
 
532 Only Sproul (New York) and Powell (Minneapolis) dissented. 
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forcing brokers to take on a greater market-making role for government securities.533 
Sproul doubted, however, that “the market could develop into a broad, impersonal 
mechanism… if only the System Account were out of the picture.” The U.S. was a 
“mixed Government-private economy… [without] a free market in government securities 
since… open market operations of the Federal Reserve System came to be used as a 
principal weapon of credit policy.”534 Sproul summarized his opposition, “a central bank, 
which [depends] for its effectiveness upon psychological as well as direct influences... 
[should not commit] for all time to the principles and procedures which have grown out 
of current experience… The principal uncertainty created by the Federal Reserve System 
stems from the possibility of shifts in its basic policy not from the areas of the market in 
which it might operate.” Sproul also objected to the subcommittee’s proposal to transfer 
supervisory authority over open market operations to the full FOMC, which “would seem 
to depart from the intent of the statute and also from the ‘Federal’ structure of the Federal 
Reserve System.”535 
Martin and Sproul both emphasized in their testimony that their feud was over 
operating procedures, rather than policy.536 Testifying against Martin was highly taxing 
on Sproul. He cherished the Federal Reserve’s hierarchy and respected Martin’s 
institutional position. The debate over bills-only was personal for him, however, as he 
                                                 
533 Flanders Committee Hearings, 15-25.   
 
534 Allan Sproul letter to Henry Alexander of J.P. Morgan & Co. 3/12/1954, Sproul Papers, FOMC 
correspondence, 1954, folder I, Federal Reserve Bank of New York library. 
 
535 Flanders Committee Hearings, 324. 
 
536 Flanders Committee Hearings, 224-228. 
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resented the insinuation that a discretion-wielding FRBNY would reinstate a government 
bond pegging policy. Martin considered bills-only a minimal form of central bank 
intervention on the opposite end of the spectrum from a maximal pegging policy.537  
After the Flanders Committee hearings, Martin pressed forward with his mission 
of transforming the FOMC. On March 2nd, 1955, the FOMC committee approved a broad 
directive for the executive committee.538 Johns (St. Louis) “inquired who would be 
making monetary policy if a directive, worded in the general terms stated, were given to 
the executive committee with the suggestion that the executive committee determine the 
level of free reserves on the basis of its appraisal of the needs of the economy.” Martin 
suggested Johns’ concerns had been raised in various forms in previous meetings and 
then proposed abolishing the executive committee. From a practical standpoint, “it would 
mean that only three additional Presidents… would need to come to Washington in order 
to have a meeting of the full Committee.” Martin continued, “I have consistently 
endeavored to emphasize the word ‘System’ in our activities. To me, that is the heart and 
core of what we are trying to build. If we do not work as a System, then we defeat the 
main purpose of our structure, which is really unique in terms of political science.”539 
Martin deferred further discussion of the proposal until the next FOMC meeting. 
                                                 
537 According to Ritter (1980, 15), “The implication, which Sproul resented, was that anyone who opposed 
‘bills only’ was somehow philosophically in league with the proponents of pegging and support 
operations.” Ritter, Lawrence S. ed. 1980. Selected Papers of Allan Sproul. New York: Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
 
538 FOMC Minutes, 3/2/1955. 
 
539 FOMC Minutes, 3/2/1955, 131. See discussion in Hetzel and Leach 2001, 61. 
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On May 10th, FOMC Secretary Winfield Riefler distributed a proposal drafted by 
the Board’s counsel to abolish the executive committee.540 The FOMC considered the 
proposal on June 22nd. Martin opened the discussion by stating “…the experience of the 
last few months gave further indication of the desirability of having the full Open Market 
Committee take the responsibility for decisions not only of policy but also as to open 
market operations.”541 Sproul derided Martin’s proposal as channeling congressional 
populism, “I am overlooking - or at least disregarding - the reiterated charge of 
Congressman Patman that Congress gave this great power of directing open market 
operations of the Federal Reserve Banks to twelve men, the twelve men gave it to five, 
the five gave it to one, and it ended up in the hands of Wall Street. I continue to cling to 
the belief that we shouldn't change our organizational structure in order to try to 
accommodate ourselves to the attacks of the Congressman.”542 Sproul defended the 
executive committee by suggesting emergency FOMC meetings were impractical, “There 
may be times when it will be desirable to have a properly constituted body which can be 
assembled in a matter of hours, not to make policy but to refine policy made by the full 
Committee… there may be emergency situations in which such a properly constituted 
body would be in a position to make policy, temporarily, on behalf of the full Committee 
on something better than an ad hoc basis.” Sproul considered telephone meetings “…no 
substitute for a face-to-face meeting at which ideas can be developed and debated, and 
the reaction of your associates to those ideas can be observed and taken into account. A 
                                                 
540 FOMC Minutes, 5/10/1955. 
 
541 FOMC Minutes, 6/22/1955, 3. 
 
542 FOMC Minutes, 6/22/1955, 7-8. 
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telephone canvass depends too much on who asks the question and how he asks it.” He 
concluded, “I do not think we have to abolish the executive committee in order to try to 
make sure that the full Committee accepts and discharges its responsibilities under the 
law, and there may be occasions when those responsibilities can be better discharged if 
an executive committee is kept in existence.” Martin countered that his proposal “was 
intended to give everybody more participation rather than less participation than they 
might have had in the past...”543 He pointed out that developments in commercial air 
travel had made frequent meetings of the full FOMC practical. Other FOMC members 
agreed and reminded Sproul that they had attended recent executive committee 
meetings.544 In the end, the FOMC voted unanimously to abolish the executive 
committee. Sproul retired the following June. 
The House that Martin Built: Policymaking on the Consensual FOMC 
Martin’s institutional reforms are often interpreted as centralizing policymaking 
authority within the Board of Governors in Washington, D.C.545 Martin’s biographer 
contends, however, that Martin oversaw a “historic democratization” of the FOMC, not 
the consolidation of a chairman’s dictatorship.546 He did so by asking all seven governors 
and twelve reserve bank presidents to weigh in on monetary policy decisions and by 
establishing consensual policymaking norms on the FOMC. Martin’s deliberative style 
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“meant that policy emerged slowly, but it also meant that no one FOMC member could 
dominate.”547 This chapter argues the egalitarian FOMC Martin crafted was ill-suited for 
making quick or decisive policy adjustments and it frustrated Martin’s future attempts to 
stabilize the dollar. “Martin… labored mightily to fashion a consensus-driven FOMC, 
and now he had to live with his creation.”548  
Martin’s participatory FOMC norms supported policy rigidity in three ways. First, 
Martin’s “go-round” meeting procedure minimized his agenda-setting authority. He 
started each meeting by asking all present FOMC members, including those currently 
without voting rights (up to 19 officials), to weigh in on the state of the economy and 
their policy preferences. After everyone spoke, Martin sought to summarize the group’s 
consensus and put it up for a vote. If and when there was no consensus to be found, 
Martin recommended no policy change be made. Second, the shift in formal decision-
making structure, from an executive committee where the FRBNY president and 
Chairman wielded two of five votes to the full FOMC where they wielded only two of 
twelve, limited those agents’ influence over policy outcomes. Since Martin and FRBNY 
President Hayes were among the system’s foremost inflation hawks in the 1960s, the 
greater influence they would have wielded on a still-existing executive committee would 
have likely translated into more restrained policies. Third, as Sproul had predicted, the 
system’s less centralized decision-making structure made it difficult to abandon 1950s 
precedents when they outlived their usefulness. Two of these proved highly salient during 
the 1960s. First, after the accord the system began a practice of maintaining an “even-
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keel,” or keeping market interest rates stable, during Treasury refunding operations. This 
commitment grew more onerous during the 1960s, when aggregate fiscal deficits tripled 
those of the 1950s. Stable interest rates interacted with growing fiscal deficits to form an 
inflationary macroeconomic policy mix.549 Second, bills-only developed a rule-like status 
and remained in place after it began creating problems for monetary authorities. Had 
institutional authority remained lodged in the FOMC’s executive committee, it would 
have been easier to abandon practices as they lost their usefulness.   
Economists at the Gates: Central Bankers in Bretton Woods’ Heyday 
By historical standards, U.S. monetary outcomes during the 1950s are considered 
strong. Domestic prices remained stable, the national economy expanded steadily, and 
recessions were short and mild. Some scholars have attributed successful monetary 
outcomes in this era to Chairman William McChesney Martin’s “sophisticated” monetary 
policy framework which foreshadowed modern inflation-targeting techniques.550 Others 
emphasize the Federal Reserve’s benign external environment as promoting monetary 
stability.551 A third view focuses on that era’s limited international capital mobility as 
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enabling policymakers to use macroeconomic policy levers for domestic stabilization 
purposes without sacrificing exchange rate stability.552 
This situation began changing rapidly in 1958, as European central banks began 
preparing for the dissolution of the European Payments Union (EPU).553 Under the EPU, 
international payments were settled multilaterally in dollars through the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). This regime allowed European central banks to 
economize on gold. European states agreed to dissolve the EPU as a means of restoring 
currency convertibility, however. In the post-EPU world, Europeans would settle their 
international accounts bilaterally, making dollars less useful. Consequently, the EPU’s 
demise restored a competitive element among monetary authorities over access to gold 
reserves which had been in retreat since the 1930s.554    
The tightening of international constraints in 1958 came at a bad time for 
American policymakers. In July, 1957, the U.S. had entered into a recession. The Federal 
Reserve responded by purchasing large quantities of Treasury bills, pushing their yield 
down from 3.4% at the recession’s onset to .88% a year later. Further complicating 
monetary management was a Treasury request for emergency assistance with a refunding 
campaign.555 Between April and July 1958, the system purchased $1.7 billion dollars in 
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government securities, injecting substantial new reserves into the banking system. The 
First National City Bank called it “a Herculean support of the refunding.”556 The 
recession also pushed the 1959 Federal budget into a large $12.5 billion dollar deficit, or 
15% of the overall budget.557 The U.S.’s unexpected expansionary macroeconomic policy 
interacted with an increased European gold demand to push U.S. capital abroad. As U.S. 
interest rates declined, investors moved their mobile capital abroad where they could earn 
higher returns.558 An astounding $2.2 billion dollars’ worth of gold left the U.S. in 1958, 
reducing the U.S. gold stock by 10%. Overall, the U.S. lost $3.4 billion in liquid assets 
and gold, while Europeans gained $3.7 billion.559 
Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic were alarmed by this sudden 
development. Just a few short years before, the U.S.’s massive gold reserves appeared 
impregnable and Europe was experiencing a dollar-shortage. With the restoration of 
convertibility, shortage turned to glut and the U.S.’s international economic dominance 
appeared to be waning. Previously in the 1950s, the U.S.’s balance-of-payment deficit 
had averaged $1.5 billion dollars, and in 1957 it actually produced a surplus. In 1958, 
however, the balance-of-payment deficit ballooned to $3.5 billion dollars.560 On 
December 22, 1958, President Eisenhower announced an austerity budget for fiscal year 
1960 which would record a small surplus, a remarkable turnaround from the previous 
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year’s large deficit.561 In July 1959, the State Department circulated a paper advocating 
an orthodox response to the U.S.’s external vulnerability, “Continued large balance-of-
payments deficits such as we are presently incurring cannot be permitted to continue for 
much longer… the postwar experience of Western Europe amply demonstrates… 
restrictive or discriminatory methods serve to suppress and conceal the symptoms of 
imbalance. They do not promote, and usually impede, sound adjustments in the balance 
of payments, which can only come about through the pressures of competitive market 
forces operating within a framework of sound fiscal and monetary policy.”562 As the U.S. 
economy began recovering, the Federal Reserve moved to do its part in promoting 
balance-of-payments adjustment by tightening monetary policy. Between July 1958 and 
December 1959, the Federal Funds rate climbed from .68% to 3.99%. Discount rates 
were raised three times. Despite austerity, the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit grew to 
$4.6 billion in 1959.563 Gold outflows declined by 60%, however. Dollar-holders were 
reassured by Eisenhower’s fiscal retrenchment and the Fed’s inflation-fighting resolve.564 
Not all informed observers agreed that restoring external balance should be a 
prerogative of U.S. macroeconomic policy, however. In February, 1959, Keynesian 
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economists Walter Heller and Paul Samuelson testified before the congressional Joint 
Economic Committee attacking Eisenhower’s austerity budget. Heller stated “the 
obsession with Federal expenditure cutbacks and early budget balance as a prerequisite to 
price stability is unfounded.”565 Samuelson advised “to put the major emphasis on growth 
of real income… not letting concern over price inflation dominate decisions.” Chairman 
Martin also testified in defense of Eisenhower’s budget and the primacy of the price 
stability objective.  He argued policy should “support sound credit expansion” so that 
“savers can have confidence in the future value of their investments.”566 Martin pledged 
that the Federal Reserve would continue “the battle against the debasement of the 
currency with all of its perils to free institutions.” 
Through 1960, old guard conservatives dominated macroeconomic policy 
decisions in the Eisenhower administration and the Federal Reserve. With the approach 
of the 1960 presidential election, however, Keynesian economists argued that 
macroeconomic policies should be geared toward increasing economic growth and 
employment rather than restoring external balance. In March, the U.S. economy once 
again entered into recession. Between March and August, the FOMC eased open market 
policy and the Board lowered discount rates and reserve requirements. By October, the 
Federal Funds rate had fallen nearly two full percentage points from its February peak of 
3.94%. In spite of the Fed’s aggressive easing, the economy remained in recession 
through the November elections. Both presidential candidates, John F. Kennedy and 
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Richard Nixon, criticized the Federal Reserve’s restrictive policies. Kennedy campaigned 
on a promise to increase the national economic growth rate to 5%.567 Whenever Kennedy 
encountered an economist, he asked them how he could achieve this goal.568  
Over the summer of 1960, speculation broke out surrounding the future of the 
U.S. dollar. Capital-holders feared that a Kennedy presidential victory would hand U.S. 
macroeconomic policy levers to expansion-hungry Keynesian economists, stoking 
inflation.569 Uncertainty was exacerbated by fears that the Berlin crisis would spiral into 
open hostilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.570 Dollar speculation manifested 
itself as rising prices on the London gold market. As the U.S. recession dragged on and a 
Kennedy victory appeared increasingly likely, the price of gold skyrocketed. The London 
gold price reached $40.60 per ounce on October 26th, five dollars over the dollar’s parity.  
Recognizing that uncertainty over the future course of economic policy was 
fueling dollar speculation, Kennedy made a public statement on October 31st declaring 
that his administration would maintain U.S.’s commitment to gold at the existing 
parity.571 Although Kennedy’s gold pledge temporarily eased speculative pressures, 
policymakers in the Eisenhower administration and the Federal Reserve remained 
convinced that drastic policy adjustments were necessary to restore confidence in the 
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dollar. From the administration’s perspective, the U.S.’s deteriorating payments position 
was driven primarily by Federal expenditures abroad to station U.S. troops in Europe. 
The administration believed that the payments deficit could be closed by either 
withdrawing U.S. troops or convincing its European allies to shoulder more of the fiscal 
burden of stationing them. On October 7th, President Eisenhower wrote West German 
Chancellor Adenauer requesting that his government pay the costs of stationing U.S. 
troops in Germany.572 Adenauer refused, claiming such a policy was politically infeasible 
in a German election year. Treasury Secretary Anderson warned the U.S. might “have to 
pay out gold for practically all of our balance of payment deficit… [in Anderson’s 
lifetime] we have not been faced by a problem as serious as the one facing us today.”573  
Chairman Martin believed Kennedy’s campaign pledge to accelerate economic 
growth worried foreign dollar-holders. On November 22, he told his FOMC colleagues, 
“Until the whole world has a clear understanding of what the new administration 
contemplates, there will be great difficulty in following a proper [monetary policy] 
course…. [T]he balance of payments problem is the most important problem for the 
country to deal with at this time.”574 At the next meeting, he warned that the Fed’s 
policies was exacerbating uncertainty, “The system is seen as playing fast and loose with 
the credit of the U.S… due to the easy monetary policy we have been pursuing.”575 
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Martin’s fears didn’t stem from paranoia.  Between 1958 and 1960, the U.S.’s monetary 
gold stock had fallen by over $5 billion dollars, nearly 25%. By January, 1961, the U.S. 
gold stock stood barely over $17 billion, $12 billion of which was legally-mandated 
collateral for domestic dollar claims.  
In December, 1960, Eisenhower and Anderson advised president-elect Kennedy 
about the balance-of-payments problem.576 Kennedy quickly formed a balance-of-
payments task force. He appointed former FRBNY President Allan Sproul to head the 
commission. The task force’s primary recommendation was that Kennedy appoint a 
Treasury Secretary “who enjoys high respect and confidence in the international financial 
world.”577 Kennedy passed on liberal candidates, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, and 
instead appointed the incumbent Undersecretary of State Douglas Dillon, a “conservative 
Republican and Wall Street stalwart.” Kennedy appointed Sproul’s FRBNY protégé, 
Robert Roosa, as Undersecretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs. The Dillon-Roosa 
faction would lead the charge within the Kennedy administration to reign in the external 
deficit and save Bretton Woods.578 They allied with Chairman Martin and FRBNY 
President Hayes inside the Fed in pursuit of these goals. 
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In December, 1960, Eisenhower authorized the FRBNY to begin sending a 
representative to monthly BIS meetings in Basel, Switzerland.579 The FRBNY dispatched 
Charles Coombs, its Vice-President for International Affairs, to attend the December 
meeting. Coombs reported back, “European central bankers were beginning to show 
signs of acute anxiety as to the future of the dollar. This anxiety was reflected in almost 
aggressive questioning as to the prospective policies of the new administration…"580 In 
January, FRBNY President Hayes joined Coombs in Basel. Hayes told his European 
counterparts that his presence was a “goodwill gesture” and didn’t represent an official 
change in the U.S.’s official BIS non-affiliation. Hayes reassured the Europeans that the 
new administration had no intentions of abandoning fundamental U.S. foreign economic 
policy commitments, including the dollar’s convertibility, free trade, and free 
international capital mobility.581 Europeans were comforted by Hayes’ message and the 
Dillon and Roosa appointments. They demanded that the Fed avoid “nullify[ing] 
European cooperative action by allowing interest rates to drop further.” The French 
representative brought up the possibility of a gold guarantee for France’s dollar holdings, 
but he was opposed by the other central bank governors. The Bank of Italy’s former 
governor, Donato Menichella, argued a gold guarantee would become “a fatal obstacle to 
monetary and fiscal discipline” in the U.S. 
On February 6th, 1961, newly-inaugurated President Kennedy gave a speech 
addressing the U.S.’s balance-of-payments situation. He declared, “The United States 
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official dollar price of gold can and will be maintained at $35 an ounce. Exchange 
controls over trade and investment will not be invoked. Our national security and 
economic assistance programs will be carried forward. Those who fear weakness in the 
dollar will find their fears unfounded. Those who hope for speculative reasons for an 
increase in the price of gold will find their hopes in vain.”582  
Currency speculation continued. Since Kennedy had taken a dollar devaluation 
off of the table, speculative pressure shifted toward West Germany, which was 
experiencing persistent balance-of-payment surpluses. On March 6th, the Deutsche mark 
was revalued by 5% vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Market participants considered this 
revaluation overly modest. The mark, the Italian lira and French franc surged on the 
foreign exchanges. To combat this speculative pressure, Bundesbank Governor Karl 
Blessing suggested the FRBNY make large sales of marks on forward markets. When the 
forward contracts matured, the Bundesbank promised to cover the foreign exchange costs 
of FRBNY sales it suffered a loss. At the March BIS meeting in Basel, the BIS offered 
the FRBNY a $1 billion dollar standby credit line. Pressure against the dollar finally 
subsided.583  
The Battle to Shape Currency Policy inside Kennedy’s New Frontier  
Fears that the Kennedy administration might enact policies which would 
destabilize the fragile fixed exchange rate regime were not unfounded. Aside from his 
conservative Treasury appointments, Kennedy surrounded himself with Keynesian 
economic advisors. He appointed Walter Heller (University of Minnesota) to head the 
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Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) and filled its ranks with economists James Tobin 
(Yale) and Kermit Gordon (Williams). Paul Samuelson was made a presidential adviser. 
John Kenneth Galbraith was named Ambassador to India. This Keynesian faction hoped 
to increase government spending and lower interest rates and taxes to accelerate 
economic growth. Heller recognized, however, that the dollar’s weakness posed a “cruel 
dilemma.”584 The pro-growth policies advocated by the CEA would inevitably lead to a 
further deterioration of the U.S.’s balance-of-payments. The Heller- and Dillon-led 
factions battled within Kennedy’s administration to shape currency policies. 
The Keynesian faction was attracted to Robert Triffin’s prognosis that the Bretton 
Woods system was inherently flawed.585 In 1960, Triffin published the “Gold and the 
Dollar Crisis,” where he predicted the imminent collapse of the fixed exchange system. 
Triffin argued that a paradox plagued the international payments system. Because the 
dollar was the global reserve currency, its supply needed to expand at a rate which would 
facilitate surging international trade. For the U.S. to provide this liquidity, however, it 
needed to run continuous balance-of-payments deficits. Over time, cumulative external 
deficits would result in more dollars being held abroad than U.S. monetary authorities 
had gold to redeem them. When foreign authorities realized this asymmetry, they would 
rush to trade their dollars for gold and a global run on the dollar would collapse the fixed 
exchange regime. The chaotic unraveling of Bretton Woods would trigger a global 
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liquidity crunch, and likely lead to the return of depression. Triffin’s proposed solution to 
this dilemma was to establish a new global currency issued by a supranational central 
bank. Kennedy’s Keynesian advisers took refuge in Triffin’s paradox. By rooting 
currency instability in a flawed monetary structure, rather than in the policies of 
persistent deficit states (e.g. the U.S. and U.K.), Triffin’s interpretation provided 
justification for sustaining expansionary policies despite their negative impact on the 
balance-of-payments position. In Triffin’s view, the U.S.’s external deficits served as a 
global public good. The Heller-led faction argued that U.S. austerity measures would 
both choke the domestic economy and cause a global liquidity crunch. 
The clash between the Keynesian and old guard factions broke out immediately 
within the Kennedy administration. In March, 1961, Heller urged the president to tell 
Federal Reserve Chairman Martin “the time has come not for nudging [rates] but for a 
real shove… to make investment funds abundant and inexpensive.”586 That month Heller, 
Dillon, and Martin testified before the congressional Joint Economic Committee. Heller 
argued that the recession’s recent end was “only the beginning, not the end of the task of 
restoring momentum to the American economy.” He called for lower long-term interest 
rates and increased Federal expenditures.587 Dillon stated he hoped the balance-of-
payments problem would be resolved “sometime during calendar 1963.” He told the 
committee that the president’s “vigorous and determined” pledge to defend the dollar had 
already caused a “decided slackening” in gold outflows. Martin then testified against 
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implementing an expansionary macroeconomic program, arguing “Attempts to reduce 
structural unemployment by massive monetary and fiscal stimulation of over-all demands 
likely will have to be carried to such lengths as to create serious inflationary 
problems.”588 
Keynesians would fail to grasp the levers of national economic policy under 
Kennedy’s watch. Kennedy regularly told his advisers that “the two things which scared 
him most were nuclear war and the payments deficit.”589 Instead, the old guard faction of 
Dillon, Roosa, Martin, and Hayes charted the nation’s currency policy and led the charge 
to preserve Bretton Woods.  
The next section overviews the construction of what Robert Roosa called the 
dollar’s “outer perimeter defenses” in the early 1960s, it demonstrates that Federal 
Reserve agents played key diplomatic roles in collaborating with European central 
bankers to find short-term solutions to currency speculation and buy time while the U.S. 
balance-of-payments position improved. It then argues that the effort to save Bretton 
Woods was undermined by a lack of supportive macroeconomic policy adjustments 
inside the U.S. Fiscal policy stagnated due to the clash between Keynesians and 
conservatives which was mapped onto the protracted budgetary process. Monetary policy 
also rigidified as an ideological split emerged inside the FOMC between the old-guard 
leadership and insurgent Keynesian appointees to the Board. Before the U.S.’s inflation 
rate began rising in 1965, international support for propping up the dollar was already 
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waning. Cumulative non-adjustments of U.S. macroeconomic policies rendered the 
U.S.’s gold commitment incredible. When U.S. fiscal policy shifted toward expansion 
after 1964, it merely hastened the inevitable collapse of Bretton Woods.  
Constructing the Dollar’s Outer Perimeter Defenses  
Between 1961 and 1964, Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury officials collaborated 
with European central bankers to develop new mechanisms for stabilizing the fixed 
exchange rate system. Although policymakers were aware of Triffin’s dilemma, they 
believed the incumbent order could be sustained indefinitely so long as foreigners were 
willing to continue accumulating dollars. Central bank cooperation’s return to the 
forefront of international monetary relations led one analyst to describe the 1960s as the 
“heyday” of Bretton Woods.590  Cooperative efforts were geared toward achieving two 
major objectives, reducing the U.S.’s large external deficit and creating new international 
financial linkages which would deter currency speculation. 
During the first half of the 1960s, the U.S.’s balance-of-payments deficit was 
driven entirely by capital outflows as the current account remained in surplus.591 Between 
1959 and 1964, the U.S. merchandise trade surplus actually increased from $1,148 
million in to $6,801 million dollars. The balance-of-payments deficit was driven by two 
main sources, government expenditures abroad and private capital flows. Federal foreign 
expenditures were dominated by the costs of stationing U.S. troops overseas and 
averaged $3 billion dollars per year between 1960 and 1964. Private capital outflows 
from the U.S. were made up of foreign direct investment and the movement of American 
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funds into European banking systems and Euromarkets. Private capital exports ballooned 
from $2.1 billion dollars in 1960 and to $4.5 billion in 1964.   
In 1961, the Kennedy administration asked its NATO allies to counter the 
balance-of-payments impact of the U.S.’s defense-related expenditures abroad by using 
U.S. military expenditure-related dollar surpluses to buy U.S.-produced military 
hardware.592 This pressure was aimed most directly at West Germany, which both 
generated the largest dollar surpluses and was the most vulnerable to a withdrawal of 
U.S. troops. West Germany’s opposition to military offsets softened after the erection of 
the Berlin Wall in 1961. In 1962, a full offset agreement was reached where Germany 
agreed to buy U.S. military hardware and U.S. Treasury bonds up to the full costs of 
stationing American troops.593 Each U.S. government agency was also instructed to 
develop a stringent “gold budget” which accounted for its impact on the national balance-
of-payments position.594 Treasury Secretary Dillon led a minority faction calling for the 
full withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in Europe to fix the U.S.’s external imbalance.595 
A second area of concern was the role of low short-term interest rates in pushing 
U.S. capital abroad. This brought into question the FOMC’s bills-only policy. Although 
bills-only was designed to defend the Federal Reserve’s independence, in practice the 
system continued supporting Treasury refunding campaigns. In 1954 and 1958, the 
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FOMC agreed to provide exceptional support for Treasury refinancing operations.596 In 
1958, heavy Federal Reserve purchases drove Treasury bill yields down from 2.4% in 
January to .8% in June. Since short-term market interest rates closely tracked Treasury 
bill changes, interventions to support Treasury refunding campaigns pushed U.S. short 
term interest rates below those prevailing in Europe. In these situations, market agents 
had incentives to move their mobile capital abroad. This dynamic repeated itself in 1960. 
In January, Treasury bills yielded 4.35%, but by October they yielded only 2.3%. On 
October 25th, Hayes (FRBNY) lamented, “[T]he sharp decline in bill rates has doubtless 
been a significant factor in the deterioration in the balance of payments deficit in the third 
quarter.”597 
In February 1961, Robert Roosa asked the FOMC to abandon bills-only and buy 
longer-dated Treasury bonds. Roosa wanted to twist the yield curve by allowing short-
term interest rates to rise while keeping long-term interest rates stable. Chairman Martin 
now agreed that bills-only was contributing to the gold outflow.598 The FOMC voted to 
support “Operation Nudge” which shortly developed into “Operation Twist” (see Figure 
11).599 Although the Fed’s interventions were less dramatic than some administration 
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mind. He admitted mistakes and respected Board members who disagreed with him.” 
 
599 Kettl 1986, 99; Bremner 2004, 159; Wood 2005, 256. 
 
 204 
 
 
officials hoped for, they had the intended effect of allowing short term interest rates to 
rise without pushing up long term rates.600 
Figure 11: Short- and Long-term Treasury Rates (1961-1965)  
 
       Source: Fred Database 
In addition to these measures intended to address policy-related aspects of the 
U.S.’s external deficit, Roosa, Hayes, and Martin embarked on an ambitious endeavor to 
convince Europeans to accommodate the U.S.’s external deficits in the short-run, while 
building durable institutional safeguards to deter currency speculation. The first goal was 
pursued by the issuance of so-called Roosa bonds in 1962.601 These 12- and 24- month 
bonds were marketed directly to European central banks as an alternative to exchanging 
surplus dollars for U.S. gold. Roosa bonds were sold for dollars, but were repayable in 
Swiss Francs, transferring exchange rate risk to the U.S. By the end of 1963, over $750 
million in Roosa bonds were outstanding. 
                                                 
600 For example, Heller complained that the Federal Reserve’s support was “half-hearted” and “timid.” 
Kettl 1986, 99. 
 
601 James 1996, 160; Bremner 2004, 166-7; Toniolo 2005, 388; Michael D. Bordo and Barry Eichengreen 
2013.  
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Three additional international regimes were created to stabilize the fixed 
exchange rate system: the London gold pool, the General Arrangements to Borrow 
facility at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and a central bank currency swap 
network. In November 1961, FRBNY President Alfred Hayes attended the BIS’s meeting 
and proposed establishing a central bank syndicate for intervening in the London gold 
market.602 Central bankers from the U.S., Switzerland, Britain, West Germany, France, 
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands collectively pledged $270 million dollars’ worth of 
gold to sell if the market price of gold in London rose above $35.20. The gold pool was 
also a buyer’s cartel, however. Each participating central bank pledged not to purchase 
gold autonomously. By delegating gold purchasing authority to the Bank of England, the 
central banks would avoid a competitive scramble for gold which would drive up its 
price. The central bankers believed that if gold speculation could be eliminated, the long 
run supply of monetary gold reserves would exceed central bank demand. Therefore, they 
believed the gold pool would promote long-run price stability. Through 1964, the pool’s 
gold sales were negligible and participating central banks’ gold reserves had risen by $1.2 
billion dollars.603 
The second regime established to stabilize the fixed exchange rate system was the 
IMF’s General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) facility. In a 1958 speech at Harvard 
University, IMF Research Director Edward Bernstein proposed enlarging the IMF’s stock 
of non-dollar reserves in case the U.S. needed to quickly access funds to fend off 
                                                 
602 A similar proposal was first floated by the Banque de France governor a year earlier. Treasury Secretary 
Dillon broached the subject with his G10 counterparts at the September 1961 meeting of the IMF. See 
discussions in James 1996, 160; Gavin 2004, 60; Toniolo 2005, 375-381; Andrews 2008, 117. 
 
603 Toniolo 2005, 381. 
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currency speculation.604 In 1960, Per Jacobsson, the IMF’s Managing Director, told 
Chairman Martin, “To succeed in an antideflationary policy they must work together - 
but it is sufficient that the leading industrial countries work together…. These countries 
are, I think, able to determine together . . . the price trend - through appropriate open 
market and wage policies. Fortunately they all by now have more or less adequate 
reserves… [but] borrowing could not really be improvised in a crisis: some advance 
arrangements had to be made.”605 Jacobsson warned that unless the GAB facility were 
established, “an obstinate Managing Director might refuse to initiate borrowing 
procedures before the U.S. budget balanced.” Milton Gilbert, a BIS economic advisor, 
pointed out “it had not been anticipated in Bretton Woods that the United States might be 
an applicant for IMF credit.”606 What was needed was “the creation of an additional 
facility by those industrial countries with an interest in preserving the functioning of the 
world reserve system.” In December 1961, the G10 industrial countries pledged an 
additional $6 billion on a standby basis which could be readily accessed by a large 
sovereign borrower on an emergency basis.  
The dollar’s final “outer perimeter defense” was the establishment of a central 
bank currency swap network. Early in 1961, Chairman Martin wrote Governor Brunet of 
the Banque de France proposing the creation of a central bank task force to study “the 
problem of restraining or neutralizing short-term capital movements arising from interest 
                                                 
604 Toniolo 2005, 399-402. 
 
605 Quoted in James 1996, 162. 
 
606 Quoted in Toniolo 2005, 399-400. 
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arbitrage and speculation.”607 Charles Coombs, the FRBNY’s representative, proposed 
establishing a currency swap network where each central bank would maintain bilateral 
credit lines accessible at any time to combat a speculative attack. Although continental 
Europeans were reluctant to establish a new mechanism which would automatically 
extend credit to deficit countries, they eventually agreed.608 
Chairman Martin had more trouble selling the swap network domestically inside 
the Federal Reserve, however. He first broached the subject at the September 1961 
FOMC meeting, but was met with indifference. Martin again brought it up on December 
5th, but again failed to win support. Gov. Robertson summarized the majority’s sentiment, 
“There are no gimmicks by which the position of the dollar can be maintained in the 
world. It would be unwise to resort to devices designed to hide the real problems. The 
United States must practice what it has long preached about the need for monetary and 
fiscal discipline.”609 Two weeks later Martin delivered a letter from Undersecretary of the 
Treasury and former FRBNY official Robert Roosa to the FOMC. Roosa argued, “Only 
the central bank can make the prompt, smooth adjustments that are called for [during a 
currency crisis]. The very existence of a central banking capability for coping effectively 
with volatile flows can give confidence to international traders and investors and further 
the orderly evolution of international market processes.”610 
                                                 
607 Quoted in Toniolo 2005, 384. 
 
608 Toniolo 2005, 387. 
 
609 Only FRBNY President Hayes and Governor George Mitchell supported the initiative. FOMC Minutes. 
12/5/1961. 
 
610 Letter included in FOMC Minutes. 12/19/1961. 
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The matter came to a head at a FOMC meeting on February 13, 1962, at which 
point the Federal Reserve’s whole litany of unresolved governance questions was again 
revisited. Did the system have the legal authority to intervene in foreign currency 
markets? If it did, who would oversee foreign currency operations: the Board, the FOMC, 
a subcommittee thereof, or the FRBNY? Did clear rules need to be established prior to 
proceeding? Why was Federal Reserve intervention necessary given the existence of the 
Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization Fund? Was Federal Reserve intervention only 
favorable due to its “unlimited pocketbook?”611  
FOMC members were also skeptical of the plan’s policy implications. Charles 
Coombs was asked how the system’s interventions would relate to Treasury foreign 
exchange operations. Coombs pointed out that the Treasury’s Exchange Stabilization 
Fund was nearly depleted.612 Coombs was also asked what might be expected to be 
accomplished by intervening in a specific foreign currency. He replied “it would be 
assumed that central banks would never be operating at cross purposes.” Martin 
described the actions “as a kind of lubricating device. These operations could not effect a 
fundamental cure for the balance-of-payments problem, but it should be possible to 
lubricate the market to a certain extent. The System's operations should not be so large as 
to try to correct a basic deficit, but they should be sufficient to give some assistance until 
                                                 
611 This question was posed by Gov. Robertson, FOMC Minutes 2/13/1962, 62. 
 
612 He reported the ESF had been reduced to $330 million and only $125 million of that was available for 
currency interventions. Therefore the Treasury lacked the resources to engage in large scale currency 
interventions. FOMC Minutes. 2/13/1962, 55. 
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the more fundamental problems could be corrected.” Coombs agreed, the “whole point of 
these operations was to gain time until the basic situation changed.”613  
Gov. Mitchell pointed out that FOMC members lacked the expertise to supervise 
foreign currency operations, “If the Open Market Committee was going to consider 
international and domestic factors together, the members would have to become as 
conversant with the international considerations as the domestic.”614 Martin urged his 
colleagues to rise to the challenge, “The world was changing quite a bit today… ten years 
from now operations in foreign currencies probably would be just as much a part of the 
System as open market operations in Government securities.”615 The proposal was finally 
approved unanimously. As Coombs later recalled, “the FOMC somewhat apprehensively 
approved the undertaking.”616 By the end of 1963, the FRBNY had established over $2 
billion dollars’ worth of swap lines. As James describes, the currency swap networks 
“revived in a straightforward way the day-to-day collaboration maintained in the 1920s 
between Governors Strong and Norman.”617 
                                                 
613Martin then asked Coombs to explain the circumstances under which the system might incur losses on its 
exchange interventions. Coombs “indicated that the most basic risk would be involved in the revaluation of 
a foreign currency.” He explained the Treasury had avoided such losses by requesting foreign central banks 
give two days’ notice prior to a revaluation, and this concession had been readily granted. FOMC Minutes. 
2/13/1962, 59. 
 
614 FOMC Minutes. 2/13/1962, 74. 
 
615 FOMC Minutes. 2/13/1962, 78. 
 
616 Quoted in Bremner 2004, 171.  
 
617 James 1996, 160. 
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Monetary Policy Rigidity in the Kennedy Years 
 Central bankers recognized that cooperation alone couldn’t save Bretton Woods. 
The BIS’s 1961 Annual Report stated: “While central bank co-operation… provides a 
strong basis for meeting speculative attacks on currencies... They afford temporary relief 
of a situation but they do not cure it. They take the strain off the exchange markets at 
moments of disorderliness but they do not make weak currencies strong. They afford time 
for adaptations of policies but they are not a substitute for such adaptations.”618 This 
section demonstrates that Chairman Martin and FRBNY President Hayes pushed their 
colleagues on the FOMC to enact tighter monetary policies in the early 1960s to address 
the dollar’s underlying weakness, but were hamstrung in their efforts by a fragmented 
policymaking process and increasing ideological polarization. 
  Thus far, this chapter has argued that the old guard faction dominated U.S. 
currency policy under Kennedy. Their victory over the CEA was not total, however. 
Shortly after Kennedy became president, he had the opportunity to fill a vacancy on the 
Board of Governors. Traditionally, the Treasury Secretary and the Chairman of the Board 
collaborated in identifying a potential governor, whom the President then appointed. 
Walter Heller was determined, however, to convince the president to appoint an 
economist who would exert a “liberal expansionary influence” on the Board.619 On June 
12th, 1961, Heller sent the president a memorandum suggesting the Board’s vacancy 
provided an opportunity “to groom someone to succeed Martin when his chairmanship 
                                                 
618 Quoted in Toniolo 2005, 383. 
 
619 Quoted in Bremner 2004, 160. 
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ends on March 31, 1963.”620 The current Board was “too passive… too unimaginative… 
[and] biased on the restrictive side – cutting booms off too soon and fighting 
unemployment half-heartedly.” Heller recommended that Kennedy appoint George 
Mitchell, the Chief Economist of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.621 Mitchell’s 
liberal credentials were demonstrated by his work on Adlai Stevenson’s 1956 presidential 
campaign. Heller recognized Martin would be have trouble opposing Mitchell’s 
appointment, as he was a well-respected member of the Chicago Fed. Kennedy 
announced Mitchell’s appointment in July. Shortly thereafter, Heller wrote Kennedy 
telling him that Mitchell was anxious to learn the “party line” so he could “meet the 
president’s expectations and justify his confidence.”622 Heller was confident Mitchell 
would be his ally inside the Fed. “His general sympathy lies strongly with the president. 
He is not prepared to accept every move that Bill Martin makes.”623  
 Heller’s intuition that Mitchell’s presence on the Board would lead to an easier 
monetary policy proved correct, but not in the way that he expected. Heller hoped 
Mitchell would convince other FOMC members to lower long-term interest rates and 
discount rates. Instead, Mitchell slowed the system’s customary tightening of monetary 
policy as the economic expansion phase progressed by creating a new domestically-
                                                 
620 Heller memorandum to President Kennedy, 6/12/1961. “Filling the Vacancy on the Federal Reserve 
Board.” Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Departments and 
Agencies. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 1961: June. 
 
621 Bremner (2004, 160) points out “Heller was the first CEA chairman to see the value of placing activist, 
pro-administration economists on the Fed’s board of governors.” 
 
622 Heller memorandum to President Kennedy, 7/13/1961. “Favorable Developments on the Federal 
Reserve Front.” Papers of John F. Kennedy. Presidential Papers. President's Office Files. Departments and 
Agencies. Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 1961: July. 
 
623 Quoted in Bremner 2004, 161. 
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oriented ideological pole within the system. Previously, the FOMC deferred to Martin 
and Hayes’ internationally-oriented leadership. Although it often took several meetings 
before a consensus would form around Martin and Hayes’ preferred policy adjustments, 
when Martin did bring changes up for a vote, they were usually unanimous. After 
Mitchell officially joined the Board of Governors on August 31st, 1961, his stalwart 
dovishness led to a breakdown of consensus on the FOMC (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12: Percentage of Unanimous FOMC Policy Directive Votes (1956-1964) 
 
The FOMC voted unanimously to maintain the same open market policy directive 
throughout 1961 until its final meeting on December 19th, when it voted 8-4 to increase 
monetary restraint. Mitchell led the dissent stating “he did not think this was the right 
time to start tightening.”624 Mitchell’s opposition to higher interest rates was in line with 
contemporary Keynesian orthodoxy, which prescribed low interest rate policies to 
support fiscal activism.  
On 23 January 1962, Hayes asked his colleagues to raise the discount rate to 
signal that the U.S. was serious about tackling its external deficit, “This country is just 
too easy a place in which to borrow and not a sufficiently attractive place in which to 
                                                 
624 FOMC Minutes 12/19/1962. 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
 213 
 
 
invest… In terms of open market policy this means that we should edge toward less 
ease… The balance of payments problem is serious enough to raise the question whether 
we could not act on the [discount] rate in advance of a market rate rise… to emphasize… 
our determination to do our part in meeting the critical international problem.”625 Johns 
(St. Louis) agreed, “Higher interest rates would be beneficial from the standpoint of the 
balance of payments, both in the shorter and the longer run.”626 
Mitchell (Board) led the charge against higher rates. He first noted his 
disagreement with Martin and Hayes’ view that interest rates should rise automatically as 
time passed during a business expansion. 627 Mitchell then addressed the international 
situation, “It might be true that this country was a good place to borrow for people in 
countries with higher interest rates. Nevertheless, one must be cautious about adopting a 
particular policy that was at odds with what the domestic economy required. A move in 
the direction of higher interest rates would not… renew the confidence of foreigners in 
this country. Such a move would perhaps make it a little harder for American banks to 
lend abroad, but this was about as much as the technique could hope to accomplish.” 
Bopp (Philadelphia) stated he wouldn’t support monetary policy tightening until he saw 
                                                 
625 Hayes emphasized that monetary policy alone could not correct the dollar’s underlying weakness and 
suggested Martin “stress to the Administration the seriousness with which we regard the international 
outlook and… urge a more prompt and vigorous concerted Government program to meet the balance-of-
payments outlook…” FOMC Minutes 1/23/1962, 11-12. 
 
626 Shepardson (Board) and Mills (Board) also voiced support for Hayes’ proposal. Deming (Minneapolis), 
Ellis (Boston), and Irons (Dallas) agreed with Hayes’ view, but believed timing was poor for a policy 
change due to a forthcoming refinancing campaign by the Treasury, during which the system would keep 
an “even keel.”   
 
627 Mitchell argued “monetary policy should be formulated according to the events of the moment.” FOMC 
Minutes. 1/23/1962, 15-16. 
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evidence of accelerating inflation.628 Many committee members stated that the system 
should delay a policy change in light of a forthcoming Treasury refinancing campaign.629 
Customarily, the system maintained an “even keel” during refunding campaigns, meaning 
that it tried to keep interest rates stable for the duration of bond drive. Irons (Dallas) 
summarized the FOMC’s dilemma, “the Committee continue[s] to face the problem of 
trying to strike a balance between the domestic situation and the international situation. 
At present there [is] also the fact that a Treasury refunding [is] in the offing.”630 
After everyone else spoke, Martin stated “…at this point there was less urgency 
for tightening, apart from the international situation… [which] was very difficult to 
evaluate; it was easy to see ghosts that might or might not be there… the immediate fact 
of overriding importance was the Treasury refunding… he thought the consensus today 
was essentially to maintain an even keel.”631 The committee voted unanimously to keep 
an even keel for the duration of the refunding campaign and to forego an immediate 
discount rate increase. 
In March, FOMC Secretary Ralph Young reported back from his attendance at a 
recent OECD meeting, “The tone of the meeting was highly critical of U.S. financial 
                                                 
628 Fulton (Cleveland), King (Board), Robertson (Board), Wayne (Richmond), Clay (Kansas City), Scanlon 
(Chicago), Deming (Minneapolis), Swan (San Francisco), Ellis (Boston), and Bryan (Atlanta) favored 
keeping policy stable. 
 
629 Robertson (Board) noted a policy change was only possible for one week and then an even keel would 
need to be maintained for Treasury financing. Wayne (Richmond), Clay (Kansas City), Deming 
(Minneapolis), Swan (San Francisco), Irons (Dallas), Ellis (Boston) also argued even keel should guide 
short-term policy. 
 
630 FOMC Minutes. 1/23/1962, 23. 
 
631 FOMC Minutes. 1/23/1962, 31-32. 
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policy. Confidence in the dollar is waning.”632 Martin revisited the balance-of-payments 
problem, telling his colleagues it was “…a vital factor in the unemployment situation. 
Foreign capital was finding the United States less and less attractive, there were pressures 
for movement of capital abroad, and this was having a deleterious effect on employment 
in this country. It was also causing uncertainty with regard to capital investment for 
modernization and improvement of plant and equipment, which was vital to an expanding 
business picture. Therefore, the balance of payments problem was not separable from the 
over-all problem.”633 Hayes agreed, “Everyone would agree… that the basic solution was 
in remedying the U.S. balance of payments. At such time as it was demonstrated that the 
United States was doing that, the desire for gold would fade away. The reason for 
uncertainty was nervousness as to where this country was headed.”634  
Despite Martin and Hayes’ calls for restraint, monetary policy changed slowly in 
the early 1960s. The discount rate increase Hayes demanded in January, 1962, wasn’t 
enacted until July, 1953. Policy changes were slowed by the interaction of fragmented 
institutions and ideological polarization. Bordo and Eichengreen summarize:635 
The FOMC meetings between 1961 and 1964 featured vigorous debate between 
those individuals (usually including Chairman Martin) advocating tight policy to 
defend the dollar and the proponents of looser conditions designed to stimulate 
growth and reduce unemployment. On multiple occasions, the two groups 
deadlocked, resulting in no change in policy. Policy almost certainly would have 
been loosened in a number of these instances absent the importance attached by 
the first faction to balance-of-payments considerations. 
                                                 
632 FOMC Minutes. 3/5/1962. 
 
633 FOMC Minutes 3/5/1962, 56-57 
 
634 FOMC Minutes 3/5/1962, 1962, 65. 
 
635 Bordo and Eichengreen 2013, 457. 
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Keynesian Ascendance and Macroeconomic Disorder under Johnson  
 The CEA’s Keynesian economists exercised limited influence under President 
Kennedy. While Heller succeeded in shaping Kennedy’s first appointment to the Federal 
Reserve Board, he was unsuccessful with subsequent appointments. When Martin’s term 
as chairman drew to a close in early 1963, Heller hoped Kennedy would replace him with 
George Mitchell.636 Dillon declared his support for Martin’s reappointment, however, 
“Martin’s support of our fiscal policy will be of vital importance in holding foreign 
opinion in line during the coming months and avoiding any foreign loss of confidence in 
the dollar.”637 Paul Samuelson agreed, telling Kennedy that Martin reassured foreigners 
and probably protected $1 billion of the U.S.’s gold reserve. After Kennedy asked Martin 
to stay on, he told Heller, “Frankly I need Martin and Dillon. I need these Republicans to 
maintain a strong front as far as the financial community is concerned.”638 Martin was a 
registered Democrat. 
Another vacancy on the Board of Governors opened when G.H. King resigned on 
September, 18th, 1963. Again, Heller proposed that Kennedy appoint a liberal economist. 
This time he suggested Seymour Harris of Harvard, a prominent Federal Reserve critic.639 
Martin and Dillon were determined not to be cut out of the appointment process again, 
however. According to Heller, Martin obscured the timing of King’s pending retirement 
                                                 
636 Heller recalled a conversation with the President. Kennedy asked Heller, “Now tell me again, how do I 
distinguish [macroeconomic] policy?” Heller responded, “Well, monetary, M, that’s Martin.” Kennedy 
responded, “Yes, but what about when Martin is no longer chairman of the Fed?” Heller said, “Well, 
you’ve got Mitchell.” Heller, Council of Economic Advisers Oral History Interview - JFK#1, 8/1/1964, 
194-195. 
 
637 Quoted in Bremner 2004, 174. 
 
638 Heller, Council of Economic Advisers Oral History Interview - JFK#1, 8/1/1964, 354-357. 
 
639 Bremner 2004, 181. 
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while he and Dillon vetted an appropriate candidate. They proposed J. Dewey Daane, a 
Treasury Department holdover from the Eisenhower Administration. Daane was a trained 
economist who formerly served as Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond. Kennedy appointed Daane.  
The one area in which the CEA gained the Kennedy administration’s support was 
in the realm of fiscal policy. In his 1963 State of the Union Address, Kennedy proposed a 
major tax cut to buoy economic growth. Conservatives attacked the proposal and it went 
nowhere in Congress. When Martin was reappointed, the administration asked him to 
publicly endorse the tax cut. Martin offered his guarded support to the Congressional 
Joint Economic Committee while insisting, “The System would be derelict in its 
responsibilities were it – in the light of a large deficit – to add to bank reserves and to 
bring about substantial credit expansion solely to facilitate the financing of the deficit.”640 
He warned, “Accelerated growth will lead to larger credit demand and a gradual rise in 
interest rates, not through a restrictive monetary policy, but through the influence of 
monetary forces.”641  
 Kennedy was assassinated on November 22nd, 1963. Shortly after Lyndon 
Johnson was sworn in as the new president, he declared to Walter Heller, “I’m no budget 
slasher… I am a Roosevelt New Dealer.”642 Johnson made passage of Kennedy’s tax cut 
                                                 
640 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Economic Report of the President. 1963. January 1963 
Economic Report of the President. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 322. 
 
641 U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Economic Report of the President. 1963. January 1963 
Economic Report of the President. 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 375. 
 
642 Heller Papers, cited in Bremner 2004, 187. 
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his administration’s top priority. At the final FOMC meeting of 1963, Martin told his 
colleagues, “If the present euphoria is translated into a tax cut into a real surge in the 
economy, we might be faced with the need for… drastic action to be taken at the first 
opportunity.”643  
 The Revenue Act of 1964 was signed into law by President Johnson on February 
26. The act called for major reductions in marginal income tax rates. The CEA feared that 
the Federal Reserve would move to raise interest rates after its passage and thereby 
mitigate its expansionary impact. Heller wrote in the New York Times, “A strong 
upswing in the economy need not bring tight money or high interest rates. It would be 
self-defeating to cancel the stimulus of the tax reduction by tightening money.”644 At the 
17 June FOMC meeting, FRBNY President Hayes warned his colleagues, “[Our] 
bargaining position in international financial matters has been dramatically weakened as 
our cumulative deficit has grown. We cannot afford to let the situation continue for long 
without taking decisive steps to check it.”645 On August 18, a divided FOMC voted 6-5 to 
tighten open market policy.646 On November 23rd, Martin took advantage of Mitchell’s 
absence from a Board meeting to gain 5-1 approval for a discount rate increase.  
 Despite making limited progress on reigning in expansionary U.S. 
macroeconomic policies, the early 1960s collaboration among Treasury officials, the 
                                                 
643 FOMC Minutes 12/17/1963, 55. 
 
644 “The President’s Economic Report for 1964,” New York Times, 26 January 1964. 
 
645 FOMC Minutes 6/17/1964. 
 
646 On this vote, recent Board appointee Dewey Daane joined with Governors Mitchell and Robertson and 
two reserve bank presidents in opposing the change. 
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Federal Reserve, and European central banks to stabilize the dollar seemed to be 
progressing well. A prominent 1963 Brookings Institution study predicted that the U.S. 
would return to achieving balance-of-payment surpluses by 1968.647 The U.S. 
merchandise trade surplus had grown from $1,148 million in 1959 to $6,801 million in 
1964.648 In 1964, the U.S. only lost $125 million dollars’ worth of monetary gold, a 
twentieth of its 1958 gold loss. 
 Although these trends were encouraging, CEA officials were anxious to criticize 
the Fed-Treasury’s dollar-stabilizing collaborations as “technical devices.”649 Heller 
derided the old guard faction’s tactics as “secret, day-to-day, piecemeal, [and] ad-hoc.”650 
The CEA’s Keynesians viewed international monetary problems through a Triffinite lens. 
Rather than seeking to preserve the doomed Bretton Woods order, they joined State 
Department officials in demanding that high-level political negotiations take place to 
reform the international monetary system.651 Keynesian ideas gained ascendance within 
the Johnson administration when Douglass Dillon tendered his resignation in January 
1965.652  
                                                 
647 Salant, W. A. 1963. “Competitiveness and the US Balance of Payments.” The US Balance of Payments 
in 1968. The Brookings Institution Washington. 
 
648 James 1996, 157. 
 
649 James 1996, 158. 
 
650 Cited in Gavin 2004, 84. 
 
651 Gavin 2004, 82. 
 
652 Meltzer 2009, 441. 
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The Johnson administration charted a dramatically different currency policy 
course than its predecessor. Under Kennedy, measures to reform the international 
currency regime, such as creating a new international reserve asset or devaluing the 
dollar, were considered taboo.653 The Johnson administration, by contrast, developed a 
dual-pronged strategy of using capital controls to address the U.S.’s balance-of-payments 
problem in the short run while undertaking a high-level diplomatic initiative to reform the 
international monetary regime. Kennedy had pioneered the use of capital controls by 
signing the interest equalization tax into law in July 1963. Under this program, 
Americans were taxed on the interest income differential accrued by purchasing higher-
yielding foreign bonds rather than investing domestically.654 Capital controls grew 
progressively more draconian under Johnson. In February 1965, the Johnson 
administration and the Federal Reserve jointly announced a “voluntary” capital export 
restraint program intended to limit the ability of American banks and corporations to loan 
funds abroad.655 In March, Martin told Johnson that he wanted to resign. Johnson rejected 
Martin’s resignation, however, stating that he couldn’t lose Martin right after losing 
Dillon.656 Martin stayed on without his ally.  
The second major shift in U.S. currency policy was announced by Treasury 
Secretary Henry Fowler in a speech on July 10th, 1965.657 Fowler declared that the U.S. 
                                                 
653 James 1996, 158; Andrews 2008. 
 
654 Bordo and Eichengreen 2013, 451. 
 
655 James 1996, 160; Hetzel 2008, 69; McKinnon 2013, 45. 
 
656 Bremner 2004, 161-162. 
 
657 Odell 1982, 79; James 1996, 167; Toniolo 2005, 408. James dubbed this “a partial conversion to 
Triffinism.” 
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was prepared to participate in the first international monetary conference since Bretton 
Woods to create a new mechanism for generating international liquidity (other than U.S. 
payments deficits). When central bankers next gathered at Basel there was an atmosphere 
of “astonishment, puzzlement and resentment.”658 The central bankers believed that they 
had been succeeding in preserving the incumbent order and considered the G-10 a poor 
venue for negotiating monetary reform. 
In 1965, the old guard faction’s battle to defend the dollar grew lonelier inside the 
Federal Reserve as well. On April 1st, President Johnson announced the appointment of 
Sherman Maisel to the Board of Governors. Maisel was the first academic economist 
appointed to the Board since Adolph Miller in 1914. Martin had pressed Johnson to 
appoint someone from the banking community and reminded him the Federal Reserve 
Act prescribed appointments “shall have due regard to a fair representation of the 
financial, agricultural, industrial and commercial interests and geographical divisions of 
the country.” Johnson was undeterred, however, and chose Maisel based on the belief he 
would join Mitchell in promoting low interest rate policies to support the president’s 
expansionary fiscal program. Maisel’s appointment meant that the Board now had three 
reliable doves, Mitchell, Robertson, and Maisel. The old guard which followed Martin 
and Hayes by focusing on balance-of-payments considerations was in retreat.659  
 By the time of Fowler’s announcement, Martin was growing increasingly 
frustrated with the administration’s expansionary fiscal policy and military programs 
                                                 
658 Toniolo 2005, 408. 
 
659 At this point it was unclear whether J. Dewey Daane would side with the hawks or the doves. If Daane 
sided with the Keynesians, Martin would have been unable to convince the Board to support austere 
monetary policies in anything but extreme inflationary conditions. 
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which he believed were placing the economy on a dangerous path. On June 1st, Martin 
gave the commencement speech at Columbia University where he compared prevailing 
boom conditions with those which existed on the eve of the Great Depression. He 
concluded, “Then, as now, government officials, scholars, and businessmen are 
convinced that a new economic era has opened, an era in which business fluctuations 
have become a thing of the past.”660  
 From May through August, the FOMC voted to keep its policy directive stable. At 
each meeting, however, dissenting votes were cast by agents calling for greater restraint. 
On 12 October 1965, Hayes told his colleagues there was “a real basis for concern about 
potential inflation pressure, against a background of cumulative large increases in bank 
credit and a serious international payments problem that leaves us little margin for 
assuming inflation risk… an increase in the discount rate [is] the most appropriate 
method of signaling a move toward greater firmness in monetary policy and validating 
the firming that has already occurred in market rates.”661 Throughout the fall, Martin and 
Hayes worked together to convince the Board to approve a discount rate increase.662 At 
the 23 November FOMC meeting, J. Dewey Daane stated that he would support a 
discount rate increase. The showdown between the Board’s hawks and doves came to a 
head on December 3rd, when the Board voted 4-3 to approve a ½ percent discount rate 
increase.663 President Johnson was irate. He invited Martin to his Texas home two days 
                                                 
660 Martin, Columbia University Commencement Speech, 6/1/1965. 
 
661 FOMC Minutes 10/12/1964. 
 
662 Bremner 2004, 206. 
 
663 Maisel, Mitchell, and Robertson voted against the increase. 
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later to receive Johnson’s famous “ranch treatment.”664 Martin refused to back down and 
informed the president the Board’s decision was final. 
In December, 1965, Martin told President Johnson that the Federal Reserve would 
not be able to lower interest rates until the Federal Government raised taxes to reign in 
exploding deficits. In March, April, and June of 1966, Martin followed up his initial 
request with letters to the president imploring him to “share the burden of economic 
restraint among all the tools of economic policy.”665 By mid-1966, most economists 
shared Martin’s view that taxes needed to be raised to cool aggregate demand. Paul 
Samuelson publicly endorsed a tax increase in February. Even Walter Heller wrote the 
president urging fiscal restraint.666 Johnson was leery of seeking a tax increase, however, 
because he knew that conservative Democrats in Congress would demand reductions in 
Great Society spending as a quid pro quo for a tax increase. Johnson refused to choose 
between guns and butter. 
 In January, 1966, Johnson had the opportunity to replace Canby Balderston on the 
Federal Reserve Board. Johnson appointed Andrew Brimmer, the Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce. Brimmer was a liberal economist and the Board’s first African American 
appointee. Martin protested that Kennedy and Johnson “ignored the law” by appointing 
“a majority from a single profession.”667 Another economist “would damage confidence 
                                                 
664 This included a tongue-lashing and a high-speed drive across the hilly dirt roads of Johnson’s estate. See 
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and gravely impair the ability of the Federal Reserve to carry out functions of vital 
importance to the economy and the government alike.”668 By spring of 1966, the 
Keynesian revolution on the Federal Reserve Board was nearly complete. There were 
now four economists serving on the Board, three of which were Keynesians. The Board’s 
staff was also increasingly dominated by Keynesians.669 Many conventional accounts 
blame the Fed’s Keynesian policy frameworks for enabling U.S. inflation rates to rise 
beginning in 1965. This view is inconsistent with the system’s actual policy actions in the 
late-1960s, however, when monetary policy grew increasingly stringent. After it became 
obvious fiscal tightening wasn’t forthcoming, the Fed’s Keynesians reluctantly embraced 
tighter monetary policies. As Gov. Maisel noted in his diary, “doves now became 
hawks.”670 Open market policy tightened through the spring of 1966 (see Figure 13).671 
Figure 13: Federal Reserve Policy-Related Interest Rates (1965-1968) 
 
Source: Fred database 
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670 Maisel diary, FOMC Summary, 2/9/1966, 3. Cited in Meltzer 2009, 494. 
 
671 The FOMC voted to tighten open market policy unanimously six straight times from December 14 th 
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 At the July 26th FOMC meeting, recently-appointed Gov. Andrew Brimmer urged 
“as much firmness as possible… and an increase in the discount rate when the time is 
propitious.”672 No further discount rate increases or open market restraint was 
forthcoming, however. At the end of June, Martin underwent prostate surgery which kept 
him sidelined for two months. The Martin-less Board rejected a FRBNY request for a 
discount rate increase, raised reserve requirements twice, and sent a letter to member 
banks asking them to voluntarily restrict their new loans. Like in 1929, the Board turned 
to moral suasion to slow credit expansion. 
 By August 1966, a “credit crunch” had enveloped the American economy. 
Relatively high yields on government and corporate bonds were draining deposits from 
savings and loans and commercial banks, whose interest rates were capped by Regulation 
Q. This disintermediation process restricted credit flows into mortgage and municipal 
bond markets, causing a public outcry.673 Members of congress criticized the Federal 
Reserve’s restrictive policy. The economy slowed. The Fed reversed course in the fall.674 
 In his 1967 State of the Union address, Johnson finally called for a 6% tax 
surcharge on corporate and individual income taxes to combat exploding deficits. 
Johnson’s call was ignored by Congress, however, and quickly dismissed as an 
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674 Between November 22nd and April 4th, 1967, the FOMC voted to ease monetary policy five times. On 
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administration priority. Unsustainable economic growth quickly returned. On June 5th, 
Martin confronted Johnson over his half-hearted support for a tax surcharge. In a June 26 
speech, Martin declared, “I would support income tax increases amounting to 10% to 
bring federal income and expenditures closer to balance.”675 In July, the administration 
announced it would send legislation to Congress to enact a 10% tax surcharge. Once 
again, Congress ignored the request. Congress would finally agree to implement a tax 
surcharge in June 1968, but it would come too late to save the fixed exchange rate 
system. 
The Collapse of Bretton Woods 
 Throughout the 1960s “heyday” of financial cooperation, central bankers 
explicitly recognized that their international collaborations would only prove successful 
in the long run if they were accompanied by domestic policy adjustments addressing the 
system’s underlying vulnerabilities. This meant the system’s two persistent deficit 
countries, the U.S. and Great Britain, needed to implement policies which brought their 
balance-of-payments positions closer to equilibrium.676 These countries’ shared position 
as issuers of international reserve currencies, however, afforded them an “exorbitant 
privilege” of financing their external deficits in their domestic currencies. In practice, this 
meant the U.S. and U.K. could delay absorption of macroeconomic adjustment costs and 
attempt to shift those costs onto their trading partners.677  
                                                 
675 Quoted in Bremner 2004, 235. 
 
676 Alternatively, surplus countries could have adopted more expansionary policies. 
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The above analysis has suggested that U.S. macroeconomic policy throughout the 
1960s was locked in an ideological stalemate which was grafted onto fragmented 
monetary and fiscal policymaking processes. If the U.S. case represents the pitfalls of 
excessive institutional fragmentation, Great Britain does a nice job of illustrating the 
vulnerabilities of excessive centralization. The British parliamentary system often grants 
unified control of government to a single political party. In the 1960s, the Bank of 
England was an adjunct of the state. Consequently, the levers of national economic policy 
instruments were often controlled by a single dominant party. Britain’s slow pace of 
economic adjustment during the 1960s was attributable to a strong state’s commitment to 
using macroeconomic policy instruments to fight domestic unemployment, rather than 
remedying Britain’s external deficits.  
Sterling’s vulnerability was a recurring theme after WWII. In 1949, a Labour 
government devalued the pound. By 1960, sterling was again in trouble. In 1961, the 
Bank of England gained access to $900 million dollars’ worth of bilateral credit lines 
with other central banks and the BIS. Its governor, Cameron Cobbold, noted that such 
assistance was “a short-term protective covering … that does nothing to change any long-
term trends.... we cannot expect our partners to maintain these arrangements indefinitely 
unless we are able to show that our underlying position is responding to treatment.”678 In 
late July, the Conservative British government announced emergency measures to deal 
with its external deficit and was granted a $2 billion IMF loan. Speculative pressure 
subsided. By the end of 1962, however, Britain had over £2.8 billion in external liabilities 
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compared with only £1 billion in foreign reserves. Consequently, sustaining the pound’s 
parity depended on the credibility of government policy.679 
In 1964, a Labour government came to power and speculation against Sterling 
again mounted. In July, estimates of Britain’s balance-of-payments deficit were revised 
upward. Labour officials considered devaluing the pound, and European central bankers 
braced for this possibility. The government ultimately ruled out a devaluation, however, 
because it didn’t want Labour to become known as the party of devaluation.680 To defend 
the pound, the British government renewed its $1 billion dollar credit line with the IMF 
and the Bank of England borrowed another $1 billion from eight central banks. Lord 
Cromer of the Bank of England demanded a discount rate hike to restore confidence in 
sterling, but was denied by the government. On November 11, the Labour government 
announced its budget, which called for increased social expenditures. Speculative 
pressure spiked and the government eventually agreed to raise the bank rate from 5% to 
7%. According to Toniolo, “what only a few weeks before would have been seen as 
evidence of decisive action was now interpreted as an admission of failure.”681 On 
November 25, Cromer and Hayes (FRBNY) called on their European counterparts to 
arrange a sterling support package. Hayes argued devaluation would have “disastrous 
consequences for the dollar and the whole international financial system.”682 A $3 billion 
package was quickly arranged and speculation eased.  
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On February 4, 1965, French President Charles de Gaulle made a public speech 
attacking the U.S.’s abuse of its “exorbitant privilege” and called for a return to a pure 
gold-standard.683 “The convention whereby the dollar is given a transcendent value as 
international currency no longer rests on its initial base, namely, the possession by 
America of most of the gold in the world. The fact that many States accept dollars as 
equivalent to gold, in order to make up for the deficits of any American balance of 
payments, has enabled the United States to be indebted to foreign countries free of 
charge.” French critics claimed persistent U.S. balance-of-payments deficits were 
enabling American corporations to buy up European companies at inflated prices. Over 
the preceding years, France had acquired large stocks of U.S. dollars through payments 
surpluses. Charles de Gaulle stunned the world by announcing that France would begin 
converting its existing portfolio of dollars into gold.684 If West Germany followed suit, 
the U.S.’s remaining surplus gold reserves would have been wiped out. Instead, on March 
30, 1967, Bundesbank President Karl Blessing wrote Chairman Martin promising the 
bank would keep its dollar reserves “to play its full part in contributing to international 
monetary cooperation.”685 
A final wave of speculative pressure in 1967 resulted in sterling’s devaluation and 
the collapse of the London gold pool.686 Over the summer, British authorities lost $1.3 
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billion dollars’ worth of reserves. On November 12th, BOE Governor O’Brien told his 
BIS colleagues that the pound would have to be devalued if a long-term $3 billion dollar 
support package could not be arranged. 687 Support for sterling could not be rallied. On 
November 15th, the Callahan government formally devalued the pound by 14.3%.  
Through 1965, the London gold pool had operated in surplus, allowing 
participating central banks to add to their gold reserves without pushing up the market 
price of gold. In 1966, however, the gold pool shifted into a permanent deficit. In 
September, the FRBNY received permission to expand the pool’s collective resources 
from $270 to $320 million. On May 23, 1967, the Bank of England informed 
participating central banks that the pool’s cumulative deficit had reached $282 million. 
Once again, Hayes (FRBNY) requested and received an additional $50 million increase 
in the pool’s limit. The outbreak of the Six Days War on June 5th, 1967, led to another 
spike in gold demand, and the pool was forced to sell $60 million dollars’ worth of gold 
in two days. On June 10, the pool’s cumulative deficit had grown to $367 million. Central 
bankers, including Federal Reserve Chairman Martin, gathered at the BIS to formulate a 
collective response. Although Martin expressed doubt about remedying the U.S.’s 
balance-of-payments deficit in the short term, he declared the U.S. would sell its gold "to 
the last bar, if need be, in defense of the gold price.”688  
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After sterling’s devaluation, speculative pressure immediately shifted to the 
dollar. At the time of the December BIS meeting, the gold pool’s cumulative deficit had 
grown to $550 million dollars. President Johnson dispatched Undersecretary of the 
Treasury Frederick Deming to Basel to meet with the central bank governors. The 
presence of a high-ranking political official at the BIS was unprecedented.689 
Arrangements were made to meet elsewhere in Basel. Word of Deming’s presence 
quickly leaked to the press, however, and was interpreted as presaging major changes in 
the international monetary regime. At the meeting, Governors Carli (Italy) and Ansiaux 
(Belgium) proposed establishing a two-tier gold market where official transactions would 
be settled according to the existing parity structure, but the private price of gold would be 
determined by market forces. Deming said the U.S. favored continuing the existing single 
market structure. Ansiaux responded that this meant, in practice, the U.S. wanted the gold 
pool’s permanent continuation. He cautioned that Americans “should understand that in 
Europe the central banks [are] at the end of their tether; they will not go on selling gold 
and accumulating dollars.”690 By the end of December 15th, the gold pool’s operational 
deficit had exploded to $1,949 million. The Economist described Deming’s trip as “a 
pretty expensive plane ride.”691 The next day, Fowler and Martin issued a joint statement 
reinforcing the U.S.’s commitment to maintaining its existing gold parity.  
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On January 1st, 1968, President Johnson announced a new balance-of-payment 
program which included more draconian capital controls. He also called upon Congress 
to repeal the gold cover requirement for domestic currency in circulation and to 
implement an income tax surcharge. The FOMC had voted unanimously to tighten open 
market policy at each meeting since sterling’s devaluation, and it continued to do so 
through April.692 The Federal Funds rate increased from 3.88% in October, 1967, to 
6.11% in May, 1968. 
Despite this last ditch effort to shore up the dollar’s external weaknesses, it came 
as too little too late. The gold pool continued hemorrhaging gold, and its cumulative 
deficit stood at $3,692 million by March 4th. President Johnson urged Chairman Martin to 
personally attend the March 9-11 BIS meeting. Although everyone in attendance 
acknowledged that the gold pool was on its last legs, Martin was able to gain one last 
respite to gain time for Congress to repeal the domestic dollar gold cover. The next week 
Treasury officials convinced Johnson to discontinue gold pool operations, however. 
Martin invited European central bankers to Washington, D.C.  
Over the weekend of March 15th, 1968, central bankers gathered one final time to 
try to save Bretton Woods.693 Martin declared that the US would preserve its gold-dollar 
parity and endorsed a proposal for the IMF to issue a new synthetic international reserve 
asset called Special Drawing Rights. On the morning of March 16th, Martin opened the 
conference by calling on Governor Guido Carli (Italy). Carli restated his earlier proposal 
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to create a two-tier gold market. After Carli presented, Governor O’Brien (BOE) 
proposed that the official price of gold be raised as an alternative. Martin shut down this 
proposal, however, by stating, “The price of gold cannot be raised this weekend. It is 
necessary to come to a practical solution before Monday.” On Sunday, the bankers 
reconvened and endorsed the Carli Plan, agreeing to dissolve the London Gold Pool. 
Subsequently, the U.S. Treasury stopped trading dollars for gold with foreign authorities. 
Bretton Woods was effectively finished.694 
 
  
                                                 
694 Gavin 2004, 182; Toniolo 2005, 423; McKinnon 2013, 44. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: THE INSTITUTIONAL ROOTS OF U.S. 
CURRENCY LEADERSHIP  
I vote first. I’m willing to stick my neck out. I think it’s important that I make 
my position known. A Chairman who sits there until everyone has made his 
position known and then votes with the majority – what kind of leadership is 
that? 
 Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Board of Governors, Fortune Magazine, 1971 
I might dream of a day of final triumph of central banking; that is when central 
banks are so successful in achieving and maintaining price and financial stability 
that currencies will be freely interchangeable at stable exchange rates. 
     Paul Volcker, Per Jacobsson Lecture, 1990  
 This dissertation has argued that central bank structures are crucial intervening 
variables in the monetary policymaking process which link central bankers’ preferences 
with policy outcomes. It has generalized a hypothesis first advanced by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) that fragmented central bank structures are a source of monetary policy 
mistakes, while abandoning their domestic analytic frame. When taking into account the 
international context, it is revealed that many intractable policy debates inside the Federal 
Reserve pitted internationally-oriented central bankers, who called for policy adjustments 
to stabilize the dollar, against domestically-focused agents who urged caution and 
expressed ambivalence about the global impacts of U.S. monetary policies. In periods of 
relatively-centralized Federal Reserve governance, such as the 1920s and the early 1950s, 
internationally-oriented agents dominated the system’s monetary policy decisions. As the 
system grew more fragmented in 1930 and 1955, however, these agents’ voiced were 
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drowned out by domestically-focused officials. Monetary policy grew increasingly rigid. 
I have argued that these domestic institutional changes supported transitions from 
relatively benign forms of U.S. currency leadership to more coercive forms. Fragmented 
institutions failed to support timely dollar-stabilizing policy adjustments which would 
have led to greater alignment between the U.S.’s de facto and de jure exchange rate 
regimes. Although U.S. presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and Richard 
Nixon are often blamed for abandoning the U.S.’s currency pegs, this dissertation’s 
empirical chapters have argued that a wedge between the dollar’s real and nominal 
exchange rates had already taken root by the time these officials came to power. As 
needed policy adjustments were deferred, the magnitude of the needed changes to defend 
the dollar’s parity grew to the point of political infeasibility.  
 This project has attempted to bridge a gap between segmented scholarly 
literatures on international currency leadership, post-WWI fixed exchange rate regimes, 
and the Federal Reserve System’s historical policy performance. It has argued, contrary 
to received wisdom, that U.S. central bankers have often taken into account the impact of 
U.S. monetary policies on the international currency regime when forming their policy 
preferences. Since the days of Benjamin Strong, FRBNY officials have taken the most 
cosmopolitan view of the system’s responsibilities. More so than other Americans, the 
FRBNY’s central bankers have consistently pushed for flexible monetary policies 
designed to support the dollar’s external stability.695 Fragmented institutional processes, 
                                                 
695 Board chairmen William McChesney Martin, Jr., and Paul Volcker are exceptions to this generalization. 
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however, often prevented these officials from achieving their policy goals. As more 
agents weighed in on monetary policy decisions, the Federal Reserve’s capacity to adjust 
policies in response to changing economic conditions decreased. This legacy would have 
pleased the Democrats who designed the Federal Reserve Act, as their primary design 
objective was to prevent New York financiers from capturing the system. Maybe William 
Jennings Bryan slayed the gold standard after all. 
 A remarkable aspect of the Federal Reserve System’s history is the surprising 
durability of decentralized governance. Exogenous shocks, including major wars and the 
development of new policy instruments, layered new hierarchies atop the system’s 
fragmented policymaking structures. These institutional changes increased the Fed’s 
decision-making efficiency, but they failed to sustain themselves. Whenever the system’s 
dormant governance debates flared, arguments in favor of reinstating the system’s 
decentralized traditions won out over defenses of hierarchy. While today we might 
consider independent central banks unique institutions which are impervious to politics, 
this view carried little weight in the early Federal Reserve, where governance debates 
inevitably spilled over into broader arguments about the nature of American democracy. 
Consider Chairman William McChesney Martin Jr.’s congressional testimony defending 
the system’s decentralized governance traditions:696 
The System is a unique concept, an ingenious merging of public and private 
interests in a characteristically democratic institution. The doctrine of the 
separation of powers, as Mr. Justice Brandeis once pointed out, was adopted 
"not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power”… 
Doubtless this reserve banking mechanism could be more efficiently devised… 
but it would be at the cost, I think, of something far more important… the 
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resolution of difficult problems… must come out of the minds of men and not 
from the forms in which they chance to be organized.  
To the extent that Chairman Martin is remembered today, it is for his quips about the 
goals of central banking. Martin famously declared that the Federal Reserve’s duty was to 
“to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going.” The consensual FOMC 
Martin crafted in the 1950s, however, made it difficult for him to achieve his hawkish 
policy objectives. In the early 1960s, Martin and FRBNY President Alfred Hayes agreed 
that the time had come for the Fed to take away the punchbowl of easy money and allow 
interest rates to rise. As they surveyed the FOMC’s other partygoers, however, they were 
overruled by majorities urging caution or an even more expansionary policy. The 
punchbowl was left out so long that eventually in 1966 the Board’s Keynesian “doves 
now became hawks.”697 
Leading explanations of the Federal Reserve’s policy mistakes in the 1930s and 
1960s point to the role of flawed ideas in driving persistent monetary policy errors.698 
Implicit within these analyses is the assumption that the system functioned as a coherent 
institutional actor. In reality, however, there was no “Fed” to make policy decisions by 
maximizing a social welfare function. Instead, decisions were made collectively by 
expansive committees which took into account many agents’ distinct policy 
preferences.699 Since monetary ideas were unevenly distributed across policymakers, the 
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mere existence of flawed ideas was an insufficient cause of policy mistakes. In the 
thirties and sixties alike, the FRBNY pushed for policies designed to promote 
international monetary stability. Inside the Fed, they were opposed by the holders of 
“flawed” ideas such as the real bills framework in the thirties or cost push inflation in the 
sixties. These battles were often fought to standstill and policy grew inflexible. The 
maintenance of rigid policies in the face of a changing economic environment led to 
policy “mistakes.” Consequently, existing ideational explanations of the Fed’s historical 
policy performance are incomplete. I have argued that rather than the flawed content of 
shared ideas being the root of policy errors, it was the polarization of conflicting ideas 
grafted upon fragmented processes which led to the maintenance of policies after they 
had become inappropriate. 
 This dissertation has focused its empirical analysis on the Federal Reserve’s 
policy performance during periods of operational independence running up to the London 
Gold Pool’s collapse. It ends its empirical analysis here for three interrelated reasons. 
First, the collapse of the London Gold Pool signaled the effective end of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system. In subsequent years, the system’s advocates of an 
externally-oriented monetary policy were in terminal retreat. Economists’ takeover of the 
Federal Reserve Board was nearly complete. Meanwhile, as inflation mounted, the 
system’s monetarist critics gained increasing prominence in academia, policymaking 
circles, and inside the Fed. This debate among two domestically-focused macroeconomic 
schools of thought grew increasingly acrimonious and politicized throughout the 1970s. 
After the dollar’s golden fetters were formally abandoned, internationally-oriented 
monetary policy concerns lost traction inside the Fed.  
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 The second reason my analysis ends in 1968 is because the passing of Martin’s 
chairmanship in 1970 represented the end of the FOMC’s institutional experimentation. 
Martin pushed the Federal Reserve Act’s legislative boundaries by including all twelve 
reserve bank presidents in monetary policy decisions. His “go-round” meeting procedure 
voluntarily relinquished his own agenda-setting authority. Martin’s commitment to 
building consensus meant “policy emerged slowly, but… no one FOMC member could 
dominate.”700 His principled opposition to stacking the Board with economists was 
Martin’s final act of fealty to the system’s foundational traditions. Although the 
institutional reforms Martin championed are broadly interpreted as laying the foundations 
of the modern Federal Reserve, they actually represented a re-assemblage of the system’s 
older traditions. When Arthur Burns replaced Martin in 1970, it signaled the passing of 
the system’s old order. Under Burns, we witnessed the rise of the modern chairman-
centric, technocratic, Federal Reserve. Burns abandoned many of Martin’s experiments. 
He often spoke first in FOMC meetings and stated his policy prescriptions. As a business 
economist, his appointment as chairman finalized the transition to a Fed dominated by 
economic thinking. Burns’ FOMC was less fragmented than Martin’s, but like in the 
thirties, a deteriorating macroeconomic environment meant that monetary politics 
escaped the confines of the Federal Reserve. 
 The final reason I end my empirical analysis in 1968 is the subsequent spike and 
then secular decline in ideological polarization among macroeconomists. In 1973, 
monetarist scholars established the Shadow Open Market Committee as a working group 
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devoted to advancing the goal of the U.S. adopting a fixed monetary growth rule. The St. 
Louis Fed pushed the system from within to take monetarist concerns into account in 
policy decisions.701 Finally, in the wake of the rational expectations revolution and 
persistent inflation in the late 1970s, Keynesian scholars made many concessions to their 
monetarist critics. Polarization among economists gave way to increasing consensus.702 
As consensus emerged inside the Federal Reserve regarding the primacy of maintaining 
inflation-fighting credibility as the first order objective of monetary policy, the effects of 
fragmentation on slowing Federal Reserve policy adjustments subsided.703 
 A central theme of this project has been that fragmented institutions make the 
development and steady pursuit of long term goals difficult. As Theodore Lowi and 
others have argued, this is true at the macro-level level of the polity.704 It is equally true 
at the level of individual political institutions, however. I have focused on fixed exchange 
rates as an example of a strategic goal U.S. monetary authorities have pursued in the past. 
I am agnostic regarding the types of strategic goals central banks should pursue, but it 
seems uncontroversial to argue that central banks should have the capacity to pursue far-
sighted goals. Since the Federal Reserve began operations a century ago, system insiders 
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have advanced reform proposals intended to root out endogenous sources of conflict. 
Here I will consider three of these strategic capacity-enhancing proposals. Increasing 
centralization among the Federal Reserve Banks, reducing the size of the Board of 
Governors, and streamlining the Federal Open Market Committee. 
 In this dissertation’s opening empirical chapter, I discussed Paul Warburg’s 
proposal to reduce the number of Federal Reserve Banks. Warburg’s entrepreneurial 
efforts to bring about this change on the Board were ultimately vetoed by the attorney 
general. Consequently, the twelve bank structure has remained a durable feature of the 
Federal Reserve.705 The Banking Act of 1935 reduced the influence of the reserve banks 
over open market policy decisions. Thereafter, the twelve reserve banks shared five 
FOMC votes on a rotating basis. Despite their reduced voting power over open market 
policy decisions, analysts and the public continue to take reserve bank presidents’ policy 
preferences more seriously than perhaps they should. In the past seven years when the 
system has maintained a zero interest rate policy, on several occasions dissenting reserve 
bank presidents have expressed opinions that interest rates should rise sooner than FOMC 
has signaled than they intend. Despite their relatively powerless position in the open 
market policymaking process, media outlets have seized on the asymmetries between 
certain reserve bank presidents’ statements and FOMC signals to suggest that the Fed 
might abandon the zero interest rate policy earlier than it has signaled.706 Despite the 
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system’s ongoing public information campaign to clarify its functioning and procedures, 
there remains considerable uncertainty in the media, among global investors, and 
especially among the American public regarding who hold actually controls policy within 
the system. One means of addressing this underlying uncertainty is by making the 
system’s policymaking process simpler. Instead of having five rotating reserve bank 
votes, there could be made five ex officio reserve bank voting members, such as the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been since 1942. Such a maneuver would entail 
the pooling of sovereignty among the separate reserve banks. The reserve banks other 
than New York are already divided into four groups among which the other four votes 
rotate. Each of these groups could be consolidated into a single, branched, reserve bank, 
or they could devise their own mechanisms for forming collective monetary policy 
preferences.  
 A second insider proposal for increasing the system’s strategic capacity has been 
to reduce the size of the Federal Reserve Board. This proposal has been advanced by 
Chairmen Marriner Eccles and William McChesney Martin, Jr., as well as the 
congressional Hoover commission.707 Reducing the Board’s size would have two major 
benefits. The first of these is that openings on the Board would occur less frequently. 
Oftentimes in recent decades, vacancies on the Board have remained unfilled for 
extended periods of time. Because presidential appointments have to be confirmed by the 
Senate, divided government can pose barriers to the timely replacement of retiring (or 
expiring) governors. When the Board is not staffed to capacity, it loses its advantage vis-
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à-vis the reserve banks in shaping open market policy decisions. Less slots for governors 
would mean less frequent openings. The second benefit is related to the first. Because the 
best potential governors have extensive opportunities in the private sector or academia, it 
can be hard to recruit and retain the most qualified individuals for the positions. By 
reducing the number of governors, it elevates the prestige of the position. Similarly, the 
salaries of the eliminated governors could be redistributed among the smaller Board. 
Higher salaries would come at no added cost and could serve as a strong inducement to 
recruit and retain high-caliber governors. 
 Finally, and most closely tied to this study’s theoretical underpinnings, the 
Federal Reserve’s strategic capacity could be enhanced by reducing the fragmentation of 
the Federal Open Market Committee. Alan Blinder, a prominent academic economist and 
former Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, has recommended reducing the number 
of votes on the open market committee from twelve to five.708 This dissertation has 
argued that governance experiments within the Federal Reserve have leant empirical 
support to this hypothesis. It specifically argued that the five-member Open Market 
Investment Committee outperformed its twelve member Open Market Policy Conference 
successor in terms of maintaining policy flexibility. It similarly argued that the five-
member Executive Committee of the Federal Open Market Committee would have 
maintained a more responsive monetary policy as economic conditions changed in the 
1960s than the highly-fragmented FOMC crafted by Martin. The Arthur Burns-led 
FOMC which replaced Martin’s did away with some of Martin’s fragmentation-
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increasing devices (e.g. abdication of the chairman’s agenda-setting authority, consensual 
decision-making procedures, and the policy go-round meeting procedure which 
encouraged all 19 FOMC members to weigh in with their policy preferences). Despite 
these centralizing reforms, the modern FOMC remains less centralized than some of its 
institutional predecessors. If Congress were to decide to restructure the FOMC to 
increase its strategic capacity, the Federal Reserve’s history provides both good and bad 
institutional templates. 
 This dissertation has employed a process-tracing approach to evaluate its 
hypotheses regarding the determinants and consequences of institutional change in the 
Federal Reserve. I believe this approach has yielded empirical support for each of my 
hypotheses. A case study-based approach remains open to the critique that the 
relationships between variables of interest should be tested more directly and rigorously, 
however. I believe this critique is less relevant for my hypotheses regarding the sources 
of institutional change within the Federal Reserve System. It is very salient regarding my 
hypotheses concerning the effects of central bank structures, however. In the future, I 
would like to conduct a time-series analysis which directly measures the effect of central 
bank regime type on monetary policy and exchange rate stability outcomes. Data 
limitations have pushed this objective beyond this dissertation’s scope, however. As 
many analysts of the Federal Reserve’s historical policy mistakes have pointed out, the 
Federal Reserve has employed different policy frameworks and indicators across its 
history. Many analysts today use the effective Federal Funds Rate as their measure of 
open market policy. This data only goes back to June, 1954, however. I might be able to 
more directly test my hypothesis by constructing a measure of the U.S. dollar’s real 
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exchange rate dating back to 1913. As far as I know, such data only presently exists 
dating back to the early 1960s.  
This analytic problem might be easier to tackle at the international level using 
panel data. For example, if I build a comparative measure of central bank fragmentation, 
I could test my prediction that central bank fragmentation promotes currency instability 
across advanced countries in the post-Bretton Woods era. There is abundant cross-
national data available for real exchange rate levels over this period. It might be more 
difficult to isolate the effect of central bank fragmentation over this time frame, however, 
due to changes in the level of central bank independence. At the start of the period, many 
central banks were legally subordinated to their respective governments, but subsequently 
gained greater independence. Consequently, I would also need to build a panel dataset 
incorporating dynamic measures of central bank independence. 
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